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July, 1961

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CONTENTS

EDITORIAL PREFACE.....	191
THE NEW ENGLISH BIBLE..... <i>Burton H. Throckmorton, Jr.</i>	193
THE IMPLICATIONS OF ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY FOR THEOLOGY..... <i>Willem F. Zuurdeeg</i>	204
MYTH IN BUDDHISM: ESSENTIAL OR PERIPHERAL?..... <i>Winston L. King</i>	211
FROM HISTORY TO MYTH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY..... <i>Harry M. Buck, Jr.</i>	219
THE NEVER-ENDING QUEST FOR THE HISTORICAL JESUS (A REVIEW ARTICLE)..... <i>Dwight Marion Beck</i>	227
STRUGGLE AND REBIRTH (A REVIEW ARTICLE)..... <i>S. Paul Schilling</i>	232
BOOK REVIEWS:	
NIEBUHR, H. RICHARD, RADICAL MONOTHEISM AND WESTERN CULTURE..... By <i>Edwin S. Gaustad</i>	237
SMART, JAMES D., SERVANTS OF THE WORD: THE PROPHETS OF ISRAEL..... By <i>Robert T. Anderson</i>	238
KUIST, HOWARD TILLMAN, THE BOOK OF JEREMIAH; THE LAMENTATIONS OF JEREMIAH..... By <i>Rolland E. Wolfe</i>	240
RHODES, ARNOLD B., THE BOOK OF PSALMS..... By <i>Rolland E. Wolfe</i>	241
MORRISON, CLINTON D., THE POWERS THAT BE..... By <i>Lindsey P. Pherigo</i>	242
KNIGHT, GEORGE A. F., A CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT..... By <i>Lionel A. Whiston, Jr.</i>	244
TINSLEY, ERNEST J., THE IMITATION OF GOD IN CHRIST..... By <i>Thomas S. Kepler</i>	245
WHALE, J. S., VICTOR AND VICTIM: THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION... By <i>Jack Boozer</i>	246
BOWIE, WALTER RUSSELL, JESUS AND THE TRINITY..... By <i>John F. Olson</i>	249
RAMSEY, ARTHUR MICHAEL, AN ERA IN ANGLICAN THEOLOGY..... By <i>W. Ivan Hoy</i>	250
MACGREGOR, GEDDES, THE COMING REFORMATION..... By <i>Altman K Swihart</i>	251
HOLBROOK, CLYDE A., FAITH AND COMMUNITY: A CHRISTIAN EXISTENTIAL AP- PROACH..... By <i>Peter H. Monsma</i>	252
MILLER, ALEXANDER, FAITH AND LEARNING..... By <i>Paul Deats, Jr.</i>	254
PIPER, OTTO A., THE BIBLICAL VIEW OF SEX AND MARRIAGE..... By <i>Andrew R. Eickhoff</i>	256

(Continued on page 276)

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Editorial Preface

The End of the Science-Religion Dialogue

Our years have seen a stress upon the virtue of dialogue. The dialogue of science and specific faith-claims has flourished along with the rest. Its contribution is not to be denied. But there are now signs that this particular dialogue is coming to an end—not in the sense that the arguments have been settled but in the sense that they have run their course. In more objective terms, history is passing the arguments by through the device of passing the disputants by.

There is no longer much furtiveness in allusions to a post-Christian age. Such allusions—perhaps reflective of honest conviction, perhaps not wholly free of some sort of death wish—have even attained respectability. In the case of the United States, full churches do not annul the verdict; on the contrary, they supply much of its inspiration. Our laboratories are full too; they do not preclude the judgment that the post-scientific age has begun. Scientific man is only a phase; phases, no matter how compelling, are one day superseded.

A deeper and more telling consideration is that science has been visited by the same fate that has already overtaken the churches (and non-Christian religious institutions): a failure to provide modern men with meaning. Prophets cry in our wilderness of authoritative publications. In a probing analysis in *American Scientist*, Joseph R. Royce, an experimental psychologist, is constrained to emphasize that science cannot supply us with meaning or significance ("The Search for Meaning," December, 1959). It is the case that the failure of science derives from an

incapacity intrinsic to science itself, whereas the failure of the churches is in some measure a moral deficiency. This distinction is not too relevant from the point of view of consequences. The truth is that the supplying of meaning has been claimed for science.

The desperate conclusion on the part of many contemporaries that the universe is absurd is testimony both to the beginnings of the post-scientific era and, secondarily, to the truth that the existentialist outreach will not have the power to fill the void left by either established religion or the scientific way. Science has not prevented or silenced the new dismay; in point of fact, the scientific way cringes and flees before all the anguish. It is said that this is a time when God has turned silent. Although Nature, by contrast, still speaks, she is growing old now. As her conquest at the hands of rational man moves to its consummation, Nature too must grow silent.

Historical epochs take time to rise and fall; the full force of the end of the scientific period will not be felt until another day. Thus it is not open to us to hazard prophecies of which dialogue will be spoken in place of the particular one now closing. We may, nevertheless, venture the judgment that to be decisive in the epoch opening before us, the new sounds and voices will have to be heard and expressed through the uniquely human dimension, the personal dimension which surpasses the manipulation of nature and of man himself. Further, we have received a gift which enables us to point to a sine qua non of every dialogue, to a Word that will not fall silent, to an End that is never finished. It is possible to interpret our

EDITORIAL PREFACE

reputedly post-Christian age as a new pre-Christian time, a time when God may enter the world again. If this interpretation is valid, our calling must be to prepare the way.

The Lilly Endowment Study of Pre-Seminary Education

The National Association of Biblical Instructors has been long concerned with the perplexities and opportunities in pre-seminary education. This concern reached a high point in the adoption of an official statement of policy on the subject at the National Meeting in December, 1958. (The statement was published in our April, 1959 number, pp. 139-42.)

Of further significance is the recently initiated study by the NABI and the American Association of Theological Schools, joint heirs of a generous grant from the Lilly Endowment. The subsidy will make possible an

intensive empirical and interpretive inquiry into the real state of affairs in pre-seminary education in the United States and Canada, with a view to provision for increasingly intelligent undergraduate preparation.

Happily, we are able to record below an announcement from the Advisory Board of the Lilly Study indicating that Keith R. Bridston and Dwight W. Culver have been secured as full-time directors of the project for its expected duration of two years. These men bring great talent, dedication, and enthusiasm to the effort.

To NABI members: We earnestly solicit your support of the Lilly Study. Many of you will be asked for tangible help in its execution.

To Messrs. Bridston, Culver, and staff: We offer our serious good wishes, and the abundant cooperation of the *Journal*. And we trust that your serendipity rate will be high.

AN ANNOUNCEMENT

The Advisory Board of the Lilly Endowment Study of Pre-Seminary Education announces the appointments of Keith R. Bridston as Director and Dwight W. Culver as Associate Director of the project. The Study will examine the nature of theological education in the undergraduate colleges and universities of the United States and Canada with special attention to the problem of the preparation of candidates for theological seminary and for full-time religious work. Supported by a grant from the Lilly Endowment, Inc., the project is under the joint sponsorship of the National Association of Biblical Instructors and the American Association of Theological Schools.

Mr. Bridston was awarded his B.D. from Yale Divinity School and his Ph.D. from the University of Edinburgh. He is a minister in the American Lutheran Church and has spent most of his active ministry in various overseas posts for that Church and more recently for the World Council of Churches. He has served as Visiting Professor of Ecumenics at the Higher Theological College in Djakarta, Java, Professor of Theology for the

Batak Church of Sumatra, and subsequently has taught theology at the Nommensen University at Pematang Siantar, Sumatra. He comes to the Lilly project from the position of Executive Secretary of the Commission on Faith and Order, World Council of Churches.

Mr. Culver is Associate Professor of Sociology at Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana and a minister in the Methodist Church. He was granted his B.D. and Ph.D. by Yale University. Active for many years in the field of race relations, he is known for his book *Negro Segregation in the Methodist Church* and for his many articles in this general area. A Danforth Associate in 1954, Mr. Culver has been active on many boards and committees devoted to social issues, including the Board of Directors of the Indiana Civil Liberties Union and the Sociology Research Committee of the Faculty Christian Fellowship.

The staff will be in the field beginning in September, 1961. The project headquarters is Minneapolis. It is expected that the Study will result in at least one published volume late in 1963.

The Journal of Bible and Religion solicits letters for publication responding to judgments contained in editorials, articles, and reviews.

THE EDITORS

The New English Bible

BURTON H. THROCKMORTON, JR.

ON March 14, 1961 the Oxford and Cambridge University Presses jointly released the long-awaited New Testament of *The New English Bible* (NEB). This is the first altogether fresh English translation of the New Testament by a group of representative Protestant scholars since the King James Bible (KJ) of 1611 which was itself based on earlier English renderings. The English Revised Version (RV) of 1881 (O.T., 1885) and the so-called American Standard Version (ASV) of 1901 were simply revisions of the King James Bible; they were not new translations. The revisers used as much of the KJ as they could, while remaining both clear and "faithful" to the Greek. The Revised Standard Version (RSV) of 1946 (O.T., 1952) published in this country is also, of course, no more than a revision. Basically, it is a renovation of the traditional English renderings. The NEB, however, uses none of the KJ words, expressions, or rhythms; it is a brand-new rendering into "the natural vocabulary, constructions, and rhythms of contemporary speech." It was begun in 1948 by a Joint Committee representing Protestant churches in England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales, the British and Foreign Bible Society, and the National Bible Society of Scotland, under the general direction of the renowned British New Testament scholar, C. H. Dodd.

How is one to evaluate this new translation? It has already been ranked, on the one hand, as unsurpassed, as the best English rendering available. On the other hand, it

has been classed with the more than thirty "private versions" made since the revision of 1881-85 as simply one more among many quite arbitrary and subjective "modernizations." Of course, one's estimate of the new translation will depend on the tests one puts to it, the criteria by which it is judged, and the purpose one expects it to serve. A translation may fail according to some criteria but be successful according to others. We should not make the mistake of assuming either that one attribute (important though it may be) means total success or that one weakness (pervasive though it may be) means utter failure. In what follows we shall consider several different aspects of this new translation, often comparing it with the RSV and KJ, in order to shed light from more than one point of view.

Text

A. *"Variant readings."* There are, of course, no original manuscripts of the New Testament, but simply thousands of manuscripts whose readings often differ from one another. A translator must decide in each case where there are so-called "variant readings" which reading he will accept as the original and use as the basis of his translation. One of the interesting aspects of the NEB is that it reveals a refreshing and sometimes quite daring willingness on the part of its translators to choose what seemed to them the best text, regardless of the resulting necessity of departing frequently from the traditional English translation. The Greek text presupposed by the NEB is an eclectic one, as it should be. It is far more eclectic than that presupposed in the RSV, which version is fairly conservative in its departures from traditional readings. We should observe also that the NEB in-

BURTON H. THROCKMORTON, JR. is Hayes Professor of New Testament at Bangor Theological Seminary, Bangor, Maine. His *Romans for the Layman* has just been published by Westminster Press.

cludes translations of many alternative texts in the footnotes. In fact, virtually all the footnotes are either translations of alternative readings or alternative translations of the same reading, of which there are also many. The footnotes contain no biblical references at all, to either Testament.

When alternative texts are translated in the footnotes, judgments are not made as to the kind of support available either for the text adopted, or for alternative texts. The usual notation is simply: "Some witnesses read," or "add," or "insert," or "omit." Or, "Other witnesses read"; or, in nine places, "One witness reads." This practice is laudable. But why, then, "One early witness has" (p. 3); "Some ancient witnesses read" (pp. 126, 278); "Many witnesses read" (p. 123); and "So the majority of ancient witnesses" (p. 94)? These adjectives (*early*, *ancient*, and *many*) are scrupulously avoided elsewhere.

The translation of selected "variant readings" is a very helpful practice, but some of the texts so translated seem hardly necessary in the light of other omissions. For example, at Mark 10:40 the relatively inconsequential reading "by my Father" is translated (words that are clearly a later addition to Mark, made by assimilation to Matt. 20:23 and in no way altering or adding to Mark's meaning); but the longer reading of Acts 8:39, which is of considerable interest and significance, is not disclosed. The so-called "Western non-interpolations" of Luke 22 and 24 are all in the footnotes, except at Luke 24:3 where there is no note for the reading, "of the Lord Jesus."

The interpolation in John concerning Jesus and the adulterous woman (John 7:53-8:11) is handled very nicely; it is placed on a separate page at the end of the Gospel. Mark 16:9-20 and the "Shorter Ending" of Mark are not relegated to smaller type in footnotes either (as in RSV); they are left as part of the text, the shorter ending being placed before vs. 9, with a note in-

dicating that "some of the most ancient witnesses" close Mark at 16:8. The so-called "Freer Ending" is not mentioned.

In his review of the RSV in *The Journal of Biblical Literature* (LXVI, 4 [Dec., 1947], 361 ff.) Kendrick Grobel raises the question of the meaning and value of providing translations of "variant readings" if support is omitted for both the "variants" and the readings adopted. Surely a reader sufficiently interested in the text to bother with a "variant reading" in the footnotes would also want to have some indication of the textual evidence for the readings involved. He might like to know, for example, that the "one witness" whose reading is adopted at John 19:29 is an eleventh-century cursive, and not a second- or third-century papyrus reading. Indeed, he deserves to be told what the "one witness" is; if some readers are not interested, nothing is lost. Once time and space are taken to provide textual data, they should also be given up to making such data intelligible. As matters stand, the reader is provided no way of interpreting the significance of the data offered him.

B. *Examples of textual readings.* Following are illustrations of the non-traditional, eclectic character of the NEB text—readings *not* preferred or adopted in RSV, or in the Greek texts of Nestle or Westcott and Hort (unless otherwise noted):

Matthew 1:10, *Amon* (rather than *Amos*); 1:18, omits *Jesus* (W.H. brackets); 9:34, omits *But the Pharisees said*, and retains the rest of the verse; 10:3, *Lebbeus* (rather than *Thaddaeus*); 12:47, verse included, with no footnote (Nestle brackets); 13:35, "prophecy of *Isaiah*"; 14:30, adds *strong* (with *wind*); 15:6, *law* (rather than *word*); 16:2b-3, omitted (bracketed in Nestle and W.H.); 22:35, omits *a lawyer*; 27:16, 17, *Jesus Bar-Abbas*.

Mark 1:41, reads Gk. *orgistheis* (weakly translated in *warm indignation*), rather than reading Gk. for *moved with pity*; 8:26, "Do not tell anyone in the village"; 8:38a, "If anyone is ashamed of me and *mine*"; 8:38b, "in the glory of his Father and of the holy angels"; 10:2, omits *Pharisees* (W.H. brackets).

Luke 5:8, *Simon* (rather than *Simon Peter*) ; 8:26, 37 *Gergesenes*; 9:26, "whoever is ashamed of me and mine"; 10:22, prefixed by "Then turning to his disciples he said;" 11:33, omits or under a bushel; 15:16, "glad to fill his belly with the pods" (as Nestle); 18:11, *The Pharisee stood up and prayed thus*; 22:16, "never again shall I eat it" (as Nestle); 22:62, verse omitted (W.H. bracket); RSV includes in text, with no footnote); 23:42, "when you come to your throne" (as Nestle and W.H.).

John 1:34, "This is God's Chosen One"; 3:13, adds whose home is in heaven; 5:2, *Bethesda*; 13:10, omits except the feet (Nestle and W.H. bracket); 16:23, in my name taken with ask, rather than with give; 17:11, 12, which thou hast given me taken with them, rather than with name; 19:29, *javelin* (rather than *hyssop*).

Acts 1:26, was then assigned a place among the twelve apostles; 2:37, omits the rest of; 3:21, omits from of old; 4:6, *Jonathan* (for John); 11:11, "house where I was staying"; 11:12, ends verse at told me to go with them; 18:26, the new way (rather than the way of God); 20:4, *Gaius the Doberian*.

Romans 5:1, let us continue at peace (reading the subjunctive, as W.H.); 8:24c, reads Gk. *hypomenei*: "why should a man endure and wait for (rather than hope for) what he already sees?"

I Corinthians 1:14, *Thank God* (rather than I am thankful); 8:3, omits *God*; 8:12, omits Gk. *asthenousan* (RSV trans. when it is weak); 14:38b, he himself should not be recognised; 15:54a, omits the perishable being clothed with the imperishable (as W.H.).

Galatians 1:6, omits of Christ; 4:25, omits *Hagar*, and reads, "Sinai is a mountain in Arabia."

Ephesians 5:19, omits spiritual. Philippians 3:3, omits *God*. I Timothy 5:16, "if a Christian man or woman."

Thus the NEB shows a most commendable willingness to break with many traditional readings, and to adopt texts often unanimously rejected (or at least not preferred) by the RSV, Nestle, and Westcott and Hort. Not everyone will agree, of course, that all the changes are improvements; but the British translators were in many more instances more willing than the American revisers to adopt what they considered to be the best text, even though its reading was quite untraditional, and to break with reliance upon

manuscripts that in recent decades have carried great weight.

However, one suspects that in a few instances the translators failed to act according to their best judgment and instead succumbed to the weight of tradition. Whatever the explanation, Luke 22:43-44 and 23:34 remain in the text, as do the words *at Ephesus* in Eph. 1:1; but it is doubtful that only textual judgments were involved. And highly dubious is the text adopted at I Cor. 13:3, where burnt is read (Gk. *kauthēsomai*, rather than *kauchēsomai*). This is all the more surprising in the light of the translators' regular preference for the Pauline readings of P⁴⁶; the reading here of P⁴⁶ is not burn, but boast or glory. (P⁴⁶ also omits *at Ephesus* in Eph. 1:1.)

Finally, the translators should certainly have added a note at Philemon vs. 9, indicating that the Greek word translated *ambassador* actually means *old man* (the former translation being arrived at only by a conjectured emendation in the spelling of the Greek).

Translation

We come now to the fundamental matter of the actual translation. As remarked above, we must consider the translation from more than one point of view if our estimate is to be of any value. Following are some reactions to different facets of the new translation, arranged in a quite arbitrary order.

A. *Contemporaneity*. The NEB Introduction speaks of the desire of the translators to use "the current speech of our time," "the idiom of contemporary English." Have the translators succeeded? On the whole the answer is yes. Obsolete words and constructions, almost without exception, do not appear. Of course, the language is *British* English, not American English, and there is a difference! Moreover, it is not always easy to know whether a word or expression, not currently used in America (if, indeed, it ever was), actually represents the contemporary speech of Great Britain. By and

large, however, there can be little question about the contemporaneity of the new translation. Its English is often pithy, tangy, and arrestingly good. The translators have frequently hit on just the right words. Consider, for example, "Plain 'Yes' or 'No' is all you need to say" (Matt. 5:37); or "Each day has troubles enough of its own" (Matt. 6:34b); or "Move from here to there!" (Matt. 17:20; cf. the RSV: "Move hence to yonder place" which is hardly current English); or "a man whose debt ran into millions" (Matt. 18:24). And the translation at Acts 9:11, "Go at once to Straight Street," accords with English idiom, as do the renderings "Beautiful Gate" (Acts 3:2) and "Solomon's Cloister" (Acts 3:11). The RSV translates these Acts expressions literally, but not into current English usage.

Let us note how certain other problems faced by the modern translator are handled in the NEB. The British translators have helpfully rendered Greek expressions for times of the day and night in accordance with our idiom. Thus, for example, we find "somewhere between three and six in the morning" (Mark 6:48) rather than the RSV "about the fourth watch of the night." The Greek for "the sixth hour" is translated "noon" (Matt. 20:5; John 4:6; 19:14; Acts 10:9) and "midday" (Matt. 27:45 and parallels)—an example of the way in which the NEB often renders the same Greek into different English. The Greek for "the ninth hour" is regularly translated "three in the afternoon," "the third hour" is rendered "nine in the morning" (Mark 15:25; Acts 2:15), and "the third hour of the night" is translated "three hours after sunset" (Acts 23:23). "The second or third watches" becomes in the NEB "in the middle of the night or before dawn" (Lk. 12:38).

As might be expected, words for weights, measurements, and money are translated into equivalent British terms. This is in some contrast to the RSV practice of indicating the contemporary American counterparts in

the footnotes. We might note, in passing, that the Greek *statér* (Matt. 17:27), which the RSV renders "shekel," is translated as "silver coin."

The word "raiment," found in twenty verses in the KJ New Testament and reduced to four verses in the RSV, has apparently been discarded entirely in the NEB. (I say "apparently" because the absence of an NEB concordance makes me wary of a categorical statement.) Similarly, "smite" ("smote"), which is not quite current English, still appears three times in the RSV, but is missing here. Thus we have, "An angel of the Lord struck him down" (Acts 12:23; RSV, "smote him"). The RSV "ears of grain" (Mark 2:23 and parallels), a somewhat odd expression, at least to the non-farmer, becomes "ears of corn" (which, incidentally, goes all the way back to Wyyclif).

The NEB has also given up the traditional order of words in the English New Testament which was derived from the order of the Greek words and which still appears occasionally in the RSV. For example, Lk. 3:11 is rendered, "the man with two shirts must share with him who has none" (cf. the RSV, "He who has two coats, let him share with him who has none"). The problem of word order also arises in connection with the first person pronoun, especially when it is singular. English practice is to put such a pronoun second, but Greek idiom did not require this. The NEB has followed English custom, for example, in "My Father and I" (John 10:30), and "accepted Barnabas and myself" (Gal. 2:9).

Finally, the Greek language used such conjunctions as "and" and "but" far more frequently than we do in English. These appear too often in English versions due to being too regularly translated. The NEB seems to cut down on the "ands" even more than did the RSV; for example, in Lk. 15:11-32, the RSV has "and" forty-seven times, the NEB thirty-one times.

We must add, however, that the NEB contains words and phrases which hardly represent contemporary American usage (I am in no position to dispute with the British about *their* current idiom); and there are also a few expressions having a slangy flavor. A few examples must suffice. In America "spat" is archaic; we *spit* even in the past time. But "spat" is regularly used in the NEB. Again, we may ask whether the translations at Lk. 24:28 ("he made as if to continue his journey") and Matt. 18:35 ("unless you each forgive your brother from your hearts") represent the best contemporary English.

At Lk. 19:43 the RSV uses the dubious expression "cast up a bank" (from the ASV); the new translation says "set up siege-works," which does not seem to be a noteworthy advance. "Begot," which one would have taken to be out-dated, is back in Acts 7:8. Wyclif's "farthing" reappears in Matt. 5:26 and Mk. 12:42, even though the term has been officially dropped by the British government. "Abomination of desolation" returns in Matt. 24:15; Mk. 13:14. "Is not his mother called Mary" (Matt. 13:55) is an instance of forsaking the NEB idiom for the KJ.

Following is a list of what are taken to be non-American words and phrases, selected only from the Gospel of Matthew: "truckle" (22:16); "meal-tub" (5:15); "Be off!" (9:24); "frame a charge" (12:10); "gross at heart" (13:15); "half a hundred-weight" (13:33); "they fell foul of him" (13:57); "turn faint" (15:32); "pounds" (for money, often; but NEB is not consistent in its translation of *dēnaria*, sometimes using "silver pieces," sometimes "pounds"); "the people rounded on them" (20:31); "tethered" (21:2); "catch me out" (22:18); "cudgels" (26:47, 55); and "took to their heels, and made for the town" (8:33), which has an unnecessarily slangy sound.

Before leaving the matter of contemporaneity, we may ask whether the present sub-

junctive really is as dead in the English language as the RSV and now the NEB would lead us to believe. Are the translators following its corpse to the grave, or are they trying to kill it? It would appear that the verbs in the following clauses are out in search of a change in mode:

"Take care that no one *misleads* you" (Mk. 13:5; Matt. 24:4); "If it is possible" (Matt. 26:39; but cf. "If it be thy will" in Lk. 22:42); "If anyone is thirsty" (John 7:37); "See to it . . . that no one among you *has* the wicked, faithless heart . . ." (Heb. 3:12); "See to it that there *is* no one among you . . ." (Heb. 12:15).

B. Accuracy. The Introduction to the NEB states that the translators' "overriding aims were accuracy and clarity." I have spoken briefly, and shall speak again, about the matter of clarity. On the question of accuracy we may say that the NEB frequently achieves a heartening degree of accuracy in many places where the RSV failed to do so. Often this is due to the close attention paid by the new translators to Greek syntax. Some examples follow:

1. *Periphrastic Semitisms*, which often are not translated into our idiom in the RSV, are handled better in the NEB. In the following illustrations, the first translation is RSV, the second is NEB:

"Hell of fire" (Matt. 5:22; 18:9) is "fires of hell"; "horn of salvation" (Lk. 1:69), which goes back to Tyndale, is "a deliverer of victorious power"; "son of perdition" (John 17:12; II Thess. 2:3), which was Wyclif's translation (in John, Tyndale translated "that lost child"), is "the man who must be lost" in John, and "the man doomed to perdition" in II Thess.

Just why the same Greek expression is translated in two different ways here is not clear, but it is characteristic of the NEB as a whole as we shall see later.

"Spirit of stupor" (Rom. 11:8), which is also the ASV rendering, becomes, happily, "numbness of spirit"; "we were . . . children of wrath" (Eph. 2:3), which was Tyndale's translation, is "we . . . lay under the dreadful judgement of God"; "sons of

disobedience" (Eph. 5:6) is "rebel subjects"; and cf. the translations in Lk. 10:6 and 20:34.

2. *Syntax.* The British translators are to be commended on the number of instances in which they have successfully captured the distinction between durative and punctiliar action. The Greek imperfect tense is notoriously difficult to translate, but in many cases the NEB renders its significance faithfully, and, on occasion, even brilliantly. The translation of *elegon* as "people were saying" (Mk. 3:21; 6:14, etc.) is just right. So also is the translation of the following descriptive imperfects: "Meanwhile he was looking around" (Mk. 5:32); "How dearly he must have loved him!" (John 11:36); and "we had been hoping" (Lk. 24:21). But in other instances the significance of the imperfect is not brought out; cf. Matt. 3:5, 6; 4:11; 13:8; Mk. 14:35; Lk. 2:49; 10:18.

Compare the following translations of iterative (customary) imperfects with the RSV renderings, noting how admirably NEB realizes their durative force: "It was the practice of his parents to go to Jerusalem every year" (Lk. 2:41); "he was . . . breaking the Sabbath" (John 5:18); "used to be carried there and laid every day" (Acts 3:2); "which you always had before you" (I John 2:7). But, once again, the sense of these imperfects is not caught in other passages, such as Mk. 7:26; 11:19; Lk. 5:15; John 3:22.

The inchoative or conative imperfects, whose force is too seldom realized in the RSV, sometimes, though not always, fare better in the NEB: "John tried to dissuade him" (Matt. 3:14); "he began to address them" (Matt. 5:2; but what is wrong with "teach"?); "we tried to stop him" (Mk. 9:38; but the force of the present imperative is missed in Jesus' reply, vs. 39); "he began to speak" (Lk. 1:64; why not also in Mk. 7:35?); "their nets began to split" (Lk. 5:6); "they . . . began to discuss" (Lk. 6:11); "they began to ship water" (Lk.

8:23). But the force of these imperfects is again lost in such instances as Mk. 15:23; Acts 11:2; 13:5.

The durative significance of present imperatives of injunction is caught on many occasions (but not always; cf. Mk. 9:39, already referred to). Thus we find: "put away anxious thoughts" (Matt. 6:25); "weep no more" (Lk. 7:13; 8:52; but why not also in Rev. 5:5?); "be unbelieving no longer" (John 20:27); "sin must no longer reign" (Rom. 6:12; but the "must" is dubious). The distinction between the present and aorist imperative is well brought out in Rom. 6:13: "you must no longer put. . . . No: put. . ." And the present and aorist infinitives of Jude, vs. 3 are also well translated: "I was fully engaged in writing . . . when it became urgently necessary to write at once. . ." On the other hand, the durative significance of present imperatives is not allowed in such passages as Matt. 6:19; 7:1; 10:31; Lk. 11:7; John 5:45. The translation of the aorist imperative and the pronoun in Matt. 26:39—"let this cup pass me by"—creates a peculiar picture in the mind; and the phrase "pass me by" occurs also in vs. 42, where the poorly attested *koine* text has apparently been adopted. The present and aorist imperatives in John 11:34 are still not differentiated; the translation remains, "Come and see."

The durative implication of the present participle in Gal. 5:8 was missed in the RSV where the translation is misleading on two counts: the "him" in the RSV could be Paul, which it is not; and the durative force of the Greek participle is lost in the English "called." The NEB clearly and correctly represents Paul's Greek: ". . . it did not come from God who is calling you." The rendering of the present participle at Lk. 9:62 is also excellent: "and then keeps looking back"; so is the translation of the aorist participle "learned" in Acts 9:30 (RSV, "knew"). We are, nevertheless, let down again by the translation of the present par-

ticipal in Matt. 20:20 by "begged"; and the effective force of the aorist participle in Matt. 26:10 is missed by being translated again (as in RSV) "aware."

Perfective (intensive) compound verbs are allowed their full meaning in some passages where they are under-translated in the RSV: "searched him out" (Mk. 1:36; RSV "followed him"); "gulp down" (Matt. 23:24; RSV "swallow"); "joined issue with" (Acts 17:18; RSV "met"). In other passages, however, the perfective force of these verbs is not brought out, as in the following cases: "he will give" (Matt. 16:27; RSV's "he will repay" is better); *apechō* in Matt. 6:2, 5, 16; Lk. 6:24; *diakatharizō* in Matt. 3:12. The perfective significance of *katakaiō* is never captured; it is always translated like *kaiō*; *katamathe* (Matt. 6:28) is still weakly translated "consider"; the translation "work out" (Phil. 2:12) does not do justice to the full import of the verb, no matter how familiar the English may be in this passage; and "remove" (Heb. 10:11) is not quite adequate for *periaireō*.

Whether a neuter is a generalizing neuter to indicate people is sometimes difficult to determine, but the one in I John 5:4 probably is (although the RSV translators did not think so). The NEB renders, "every child of God" (as against the RSV, "whatever is born of God").

3. *The Meaning of Words.* Many other words and phrases could be singled out as illustrations of just the right English translation, and they are all the more welcome in cases where the RSV is inadequate or misleading. Once again, there is space for just a few examples.

In Matt. 15:17 (and Mk. 7:19) *aphedrōn* (which the RSV does not translate at all) is "drain"; and Matthew's *ekballetai* (which the RSV translates "passes on," as though Matthew's verb were the same as Mark's) is "discharged." The Greek *euruchōros* of Matt. 7:13 is "plenty of room" (the RSV "easy" is incorrect); *kalōs* (Mk. 7:6) is

"right" ("Isaiah was *right*"). Eph. 4:13 has "full stature of Christ"; *schizomenos* in Mk. 1:10 is "torn open," which translation recognizes the distinction (not reflected in the RSV) between Mark's verb and the *different* verb used in the parallels of Matthew and Luke. The difference between Luke's *artuthēsetai* (14:34) and Matthew's *alisthēsetai* (5:13) is correctly brought out (while the RSV misleadingly translates the two passages identically). "Are you as dull as the rest?" (Mk. 7:18; cf. Matt. 15:16; Lk. 24:25), and "began to assail him fiercely" (Lk. 11:53) are far better translations than their tamer RSV counterparts.

The translation of both *ptōma* (Matt. 24:28) and *sōma* (in the parallel of Lk. 17:37) as "corpse" is better than the RSV translation of both words as "body"; and *aetoi* is well translated "vultures" rather than "eagles" as in the RSV, where the whole saying remains unnecessarily enigmatic. *Sarx mia* is one again rendered "one flesh" (rather than just "one": Matt. 19:5, 6; Mk. 10:8); *apolusai* (Mk. 10:4) is sensibly translated "divorce" (where the RSV-KJ "put away" sounds too much like hiding in a closet); and *chōrizō* (Mk. 10:9) is given its modern English equivalent "separate" (rather than the somewhat obsolete RSV-KJ "put asunder"). But *sklērokardia* in this passage (Mk. 10:5) is not adequately translated by "unteachable."

In the RSV of Acts 8:27, "Candace" appears to be the proper name of the queen (or, at least, may be so taken). The NEB correctly renders the meaning of the text by "a high official of the Kandake, or Queen, of Ethiopia, in charge of all her treasure." The translation at Acts 21:37—"So you speak Greek, do you?"—is very good. So also the meaning of Lk. 24:5 is rightly represented: "Why search among the dead for one who lives?" (RSV's "the living," from KJ and Tyndale, is poor because the reference is not to "the living" but to "the living one," Jesus.)

We may rejoice that the British transla-

tors have not seen fit to add "bread" to the text of Mk. 14:20. Unhappily, "bread" was inserted here in the RSV, apparently via Goodspeed; but regardless of its source, it does not belong. To discover the nature of Jesus' Last Supper is difficult enough without translators confounding the issue by having Jesus dip "bread" in vs. 20 before he "took bread" in vs. 22. Finally, Paul's word play on *psychē*—*psychikos* in I Cor. 15:44-46 is ingeniously represented in the English by a slight re-ordering of the Greek. Following the lead of the Vulgate, the NEB translates the adjective *psychikos* as "animal," and the noun *psychē* with *zōsan* as "animate being," the word play being on *animate-animal*.

C. *Consistency.* How consistent should a translator be in the English words he chooses to represent the Greek? The question is not easily answered. Bishop Lightfoot advocated regularly translating the same Greek word by the same English word; Jowett objected that this was "a mistaken attempt at precision." But one can err on either side. It is clearly a mistake always to translate the same Greek by the same English, for Greek words often had several meanings and were used in different senses. The RV-ASV erred on this side. On the other hand, if, for example, Jesus says the same thing (according to the Greek text) in Matthew, Mark, and Luke, this identity should be apparent in the English translation. (By the same token, a variation in the Greek of one Gospel should be represented in the English.)

But there are other situations in which inconsistency in translation is just as questionable. It is doubtful, for example, that a word occurring more than once in the same context and with the same meaning should be translated by different English words, with slightly different connotations, just for the sake of variety. It is doubtful that variety is preferable to accuracy. Potential error in exposition far outweighs possible gain in style; and while the translation should be

good English, it should also translate the original as accurately as possible. Whether by oversight or intent, the NEB appears to err on the side of inconsistency. There follow a few examples of the translation of parallel passages in the Synoptic Gospels.

In Matt. 5:25 f.; Lk. 11:57 ff., the same Gk. words are translated differently, and different Gk. words are translated identically. The same Gk. is translated in Matthew "once you are there you will not be let out," and in Luke "you will not come out." But two different words are both translated "constable," and two other different words are both translated "farthing" (unless the translators were following the unlikely D reading of Luke here).

In Matt. 8:10; Lk. 7:9 *ethaumasen* is "be astonished" (Matt.) and "admire" (Lk.); and the same Gk. is "such faith" in Matthew and "faith like this" in Luke. On the other hand, the distinction in Gk. between the beginning of Matt. 7:1 and Lk. 6:37 is lost in the NEB by being translated into the same English.

The Gk. in Matt. 18:6; Mk. 9:42; Lk. 17:2 is identical (RSV, "causes one of these little ones to sin"); but the NEB manages to translate it each time in a different way. The same verb in the doublet at Matt. 5:29; 18:9 is "leads you astray" in the former, and "is your undoing" in the latter. The translations at Matt. 27:33; Mk. 15:22 agree—"Place of a skull"; but it is "Place of the Skull" ("the" and cap. S) at John 19:17. The Gk. *ēgerthē* is "he has been raised again" in Matt. 28:6 (why "again"?); but "he has risen" in Mk. 16:6; Lk. 24:6.

Perhaps to make everyone happy the NEB translates *uios theou* as "a son of God" (Mk. 15:39), "the Son of God" (Matt. 14:33), and "Son of God" (minus the article, and in quotation marks, at Lk. 1:35). In Matt. 14:30 *anemos* is "gale," but in vss. 24, 32 of the same narrative it is only "wind"; *o ponēros* is "the evil one" eleven times; but once, at Matt. 5:37, it is "the devil." What is there about this one passage that led to the different translation here? *Amartōloi* are "sinners" in Matt. 9:11, 13, but "bad characters" in vs. 10. *Sunteleia aiōnos* is translated "end of time" in Matt. 13:39 f., 49; 28:20; but "end of the age" in Matt. 24:3, and "climax of history" in Heb. 9:26. The plural of fish is

"fishes" in Matt. 14:17 ff. and parallels, and Matt. 15:34 ff. and parallels. Why then is it just "fish" in Mk. 6:43?

The verb (*skandalizō*) is translated "is a cause of stumbling" in Matt. 18:6, but "leads astray" in the parallel at Mk. 9:42. In fact, the NEB translates this verb in sixteen different ways, most expansively in John 16:1—"to guard you against the breakdown of your faith."

In Matt. 15:1 the *grammateis* are "lawyers," but "doctors of the law" in the parallel of Mk. 7:1. In Matt. 16:21 (the second prediction of the Passion) they are "lawyers," but in the parallels at Mk. 8:31 and Lk. 9:22 they are "doctors of the law." In the third prediction of the Passion they are "doctors of the law" in Mk. 10:33 and Matt. 20:18. In Matt. 26:57; 27:41 the *grammateis* are "lawyers"; but in the parallels of Mk. 14:53; 25:31 they are "doctors of the law." In Matt. chap. 23 they are "doctors of the law" in vs. 2, just plain "lawyers" in vs. 13, and "teachers" in vs. 34!

The Gk. *euaggelizomai* is translated by a number of different verbs, but with "Gospel" always capitalized; yet "gospel" is written with a small *g* in Rom. 15:20.

There are other passages in which different Gk. is translated into the same English: Mk. 5:16; Lk. 8:36, quite unlike in Gk., are identical in the NEB (with the exception of Mark's final phrase, omitted in Luke). The same participle in Matt. 9:12; Mk. 2:17 is translated "the healthy"; but so also is a different participle in Luke's version (5:31). Two differences between Mk. 5:19 and Lk. 8:39 are ignored: different verbs are translated "tell," and different tenses of the same verb are translated "has done."

The over-inconsistency we have noted, something that is not particularly helpful or enlightening but, if anything, misleading, is not limited to the Synoptic Gospels. For example, *xulon* is rendered "gallows" in I Pet. 2:24, but "gibbet" three times in Acts. The identical Greek is translated "a stumbling-stone and a rock to trip them up" in Rom. 9:33, and "a stone to trip over, a rock to stumble against" in I Pet. 2:8. I fail to see any advantage, for the person who knows no Greek, in this kind of inconsistency.

NEB Translation of a Few Key Words

We cannot take the space to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the NEB's

regular translation of *Christos* as "Messiah" in the Gospels and Acts, except in the few cases when *Christos* occurs with *Iesous* as a proper name, which is rendered "Jesus Christ" or "Christ Jesus": in Mk. 1:1; John 1:17; 17:3, and twelve times in Acts. Of course, in John 1:41; 4:25 *Christos* has to be rendered "Christ" because "Messiah" is the rendering of *Messias* in these verses. The author of the Fourth Gospel, who knew the word *Messias*, did not use it but used *Christos*; the NEB translators, however, preferred *Messias*. But the feeling persists that the Fourth Gospel should have been rendered in *John's* terms, and that this principle should also have been applied in the Synoptic Gospels and Acts.

The few exceptions to the practice of translating *Christos* as "Messiah" in the Gospels should be mentioned. In Matt. 11:2; John 20:31 *Christos* is rendered "Christ." In Lk. 9:20 *o Christos tou theou* is "God's Messiah"; but in Lk. 23:35 the same Greek is "God's Anointed."

Outside of the Gospels and Acts *Christos* is regularly rendered "Christ" except in the following places: In Heb. 11:26 *o Christos* is quite misleadingly translated "God's Anointed," as if the reference were simply to Moses. In I John 2:22; 5:1, and II John vs. 9, where *o Christos* is plainly a title, the NEB renders "the Christ," where one might expect "the Messiah" (as in the Gospels and Acts); but in Rom. 9:5 it is translated "the Messiah." Finally, *o Christos* is "Christianity" in Heb. 6:1; and "Christian" in Rom. 9:1; 16:7; I Cor. 4:10; 7:22; II Cor. 12:2, 19; I Thess. 4:16; I Pet. 3:16.

The Greek *dikaios*, *dikaiosunē*, *dikaioō*, etc., (righteous, righteousness, make righteous) are translated in many different ways. The proper English rendering is, as is well known, a very difficult matter, but variety of translation hardly solves the problem. The adjective is rendered in thirteen different ways. In three places (Mk. 2:17 and parallels) it is "virtuous," which I find most objec-

tional even in this passage; but in similar contexts (e.g., Lk. 15:7) it is "righteous." I am less enthusiastic about the translation of *dikaios* as "good" or "goodness" than were the translators who used these English words (combined) fourteen times (although never in Paul, *Pace!*).

The verb *dikaioō* is only once translated with the word "righteous" (in Lk. 16:15). In Lk. 7:29 it is translated "praised," but otherwise usually as "justify," "vindicate," or "acquit."

The noun *dikaiosunē* is also translated in numerous ways, among the more doubtful of which are the following: "goodness" (Acts 13:10; Rev. 22:11; II Cor. 5:21—"the goodness of God himself"); or "good" (II Cor. 11:15; Titus 3:5); "religion" (Matt. 6:1); "morals" (Acts 24:25); "benevolence" (II Cor. 9:9 f.); "right living" (II Tim. 3:16); and "virtues" (I Pet. 3:14).

These observations on the translation of this Greek root help to point up a moralistic tone that seems never very far away in the NEB as a whole. To illustrate this impression further, we may note that *orgē* is translated "wrath" only once (John 3:36); but seventeen times as "retribution," eight times as "anger," and four times as "vengeance," plus a few other translations. But is the "*orgē* of God" in Paul, for instance, strictly and only God's *retribution*? The NEB translations of *orgē* have emotional and moralistic overtones which are much more pointed and explicit than they necessarily are in the Greek *orgē* or the English "wrath."

The translation of *sarx* (literally, "flesh") is perhaps even more revealing:

Sarx is "lower nature" in Rom. 7:5; 8:3a, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12a; Gal. 5:13, 16, 17, 19, 24; 6:8; Col. 2:11. Thus, apart from Christ, man "lives on the level of his lower nature." *Sarx* with *amartia* is "sinful nature" (Rom. 8:3b); *oi en sarki ontes* (Rom. 8:8) is "those who live on such a level"; and *kata sarka* (Rom. 8:12b) is "on that level" (i.e., on the level of the "lower nature"). In Rom. 7:18, 25 "unspiritual nature" is substituted for "lower na-

ture"; and *tēs sarkos* (Col. 2:13) is translated "morally."

Thus we see that *sarx* is interpreted in moralistic terms, in terms of "nature" and "level of living." It is made to connote weakness without including bondage. *Sarx* is interpreted as referring to level of living, and not also to a prior and more ultimate direction of living, to orientation.

Related to the translation of *sarx* is the translation of *pneuma* (literally, "spirit"). As *en sarki* is "on the lower level," so *en pneumati* in Rom. 8:9 is "on the spiritual level." And in Rom. 7:6 we have "the way of the spirit," by which is apparently meant the "spiritual way." Indeed, Rom. 8:6b is translated "those who live on the level of the spirit (small *s*) have the *spiritual outlook*." The frequent interpretation of "flesh . . . spirit" in rather narrowly moralistic terms serves to illustrate a weakness in the NEB that is manifested in other contexts as well. Two examples are these: In Acts 19:21 it is said that "Paul made up his mind" (with a footnote that the *Spirit* was involved). And in Rom. 14:22 f. *pistis* is translated "conviction," Paul being represented as saying that "anything which does not arise from conviction is sin." Where is the response to God's grace in Christ? It is displaced by conviction.

The Impossibility of Translation

As the NEB Introduction affirms, translation remains an impossible art. In Rom. 14:23 Paul says, literally, "Everything that is not from *pistis* is sin." Now *pistis* was used by Greek authors in many senses: faith, trust, reliability, confidence, oath, proof, pledge, etc. It is, of course, one of the key theological terms in Paul's letters, where it is usually translated "faith" (also in the NEB). However, the British translators have apparently concluded that in Rom. 14:22 f. *pistis* does not have the theological significance it usually has in Paul, but that

it is used there in a less theological sense, or in the more specific sense of "conviction." It is possible of course, that the NEB is right in this translation, but it is at least equally possible (many would say it is probable) that the NEB is wrong. The point is that the translation "conviction" considerably restricts Paul's meaning. It is far more precise than the apostle's Greek word, and, in addition, may not be his meaning at all. Translations tend increasingly to exclude possibilities of meaning that are allowed by the Greek text. The NEB is far more exact than the Greek, and clear when the Greek is ambiguous. A result is that in preaching and teaching from a translation, if the more precise English does not correspond exactly to the intention of the Greek, the more elaborately it is interpreted, the more erroneous the interpretation becomes. Where the Greek allows two or more meanings, the NEB selects one of the possibilities and thus excludes the alternatives. (Alternative translations in the footnotes, which appear in relatively few cases, do not solve the problem.)

No one should be under the illusion that the New Testament of the NEB can be used as a substitute for the Greek text. This was certainly not the intention of the translators. The NEB is not the equivalent, in English, of the original text; an English equivalent is simply not a possibility. The NEB is a kind of skeleton commentary, a commentary that lacks all elaboration. It attempts to interpret the Greek faithfully; but it must *interpret*. Following are a few illustrations (many more could be offered) of an exact English text with a restricted meaning, in cases where the Greek is open to at least one other interpretation.

"Our Master needs it" (Mk. 11:3 and parallels);

"It (the law) was added to make wrongdoing a legal offence" (Gal. 3:19); "every sin to which we cling" (Heb. 12:1); "he was declared Son of God by a mighty act in that he rose from the dead" (Rom. 1:4); "I received the privilege of a commission" (Rom. 1:5); "The real light which enlightens every man was even then coming into the world" (John 1:9—like RSV, but against Dodd); "with God's right hand" (Acts 2:33; 5:31); "by his name" (Acts 4:10); "when you see all these things, you may know that the end is near (Matt. 24:33; Mk. 13:29); "after singing the Passover Hymn" (Matt. 26:30; Mk. 14:26); "unless a man has been born over again" (John 3:3, with no footnote explaining the paronomasia); "do you love me more than all else?" (John 21:15); "The words are yours" (Mk. 15:2; Matt. 27:11; and the English is the same in Matt. 26:25, 64, where the verb is not present but aorist). (One final, unrelated query: Why is *Simōn Petros* translated simply "Peter" in John 18:25?)

Here, then, is a fresh translation of the New Testament. We welcome it! It has decided merit, and will unquestionably play a large and important role in the teaching and preaching of English-speaking Protestantism. Of the character and the extent of the significance it will have in the life and faith of the Church we cannot know now; but that it will be significant we need not doubt.

It seems to have been assumed in some quarters that the RSV is practically the equivalent (if not the exact equivalent) of the original Hebrew and Greek texts. The appearance of the NEB, whose English will be seen to be quite different from that of the RSV (not simply stylistically, but in *meaning*), will no doubt help to dispel this illusion. What a significant, if unintended, service the British translators will have performed for American Protestantism if the juxtaposition of the NEB with the RSV should reveal, like lightning from heaven, that *neither* translation can do, indeed, that *no* translation can do!

The Implications of Analytical Philosophy for Theology

WILLEM F. ZUURDEEG

WHAT is "logical analysis"? Strictly speaking, it is the name of a philosophical method which logically analyzes certain languages, e.g., those of mathematics, of empirical science, or of "ordinary language." The term is also used in a much wider sense; it is one of the names for a philosophical movement which has taken considerable hold in the United States and Great Britain. In an introductory discussion such as this, it is necessary to use the term in the second sense. We are speaking here of a powerful movement, and we must ask ourselves whether this way of "doing philosophy" has anything to say to theologians.

However, it is difficult to provide a clear picture of this movement. It is known by a variety of names—Logical Positivism, Logical Empiricism, Logical Analysis, Analytical Philosophy, the Vienna Circle. Indeed, philosophers themselves differ about the exact meaning of these names. For reasons mentioned later, I prefer the name "Analytical Philosophy"—perhaps because it is the vaguest!

Analytical Philosophy is a typical twentieth-century kind of philosophy. Although it has its roots in the years before the first World War, it became a definite movement not earlier than the twenties. There are five centers from which the movement spread.

WILLEM F. ZUURDEEG is Professor of Philosophy of Religion at McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago. He is a graduate of the University of Amsterdam with the Ph.D. in theology. His books include *Consequences of the Vienna Circle Philosophy for Ethics* and *An Analytical Philosophy of Religion*. The present article is based on a paper read by Dr. Zuurdeeg at the National Meeting of the NABI at Union Theological Seminary, New York, December 27-28, 1960.

The most important of these are Cambridge and Oxford, with Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. E. Moore, and Bertrand Russell, and Vienna, with Hans Hahn, Rudolf Carnap, Moritz Schlick, and Herbert Feigl. The other three centers are Poland with its logicians, Berlin with a small group of empirical philosophers led by Hans Reichenbach, and the United States with its radicalization of Pragmatism.

On the surface it might seem strange to look at all for implications of this kind of philosophy for theological thinking. The men mentioned are either indifferent toward the Christian church and its theology or openly hostile. Further, their interest is in the philosophy of science, in mathematics and the philosophical problems related to it, and in logic. Do these philosophers and their philosophy have any real points of contact with us and our theology?

Things become even worse if we ask for the main tenets of the analytical movement. One of its most conspicuous theses has been that metaphysics is a doubtful enterprise, or, as its own terminology would say, that metaphysical propositions cannot be admitted to the language of a purified philosophy. We certainly have to recognize that not all analytical philosophers radically reject all metaphysics; we should also admit that during the last two decades a certain moderation can be noticed. But the general trend of Analytical Philosophy is connected with the notion that traditional philosophy has lost its authority and its glamor, not so much because it gave unsatisfactory answers, but rather because it asked the wrong questions. What relation can theologians have with these people who are so highly critical of the great philosophers of the past to whom we

so consistently refer in our theologizing—such men as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Aquinas, and Hegel? Do all these men ask the wrong questions? Do their answers contain no more than meaningless metaphysics?

Some Advantages of Analytical Philosophy

1. Analytical Philosophy has to be understood as a significant phase in the development of modern philosophy, a revolution which consists in the claim that religious and moral language should be eliminated from philosophy. By the term "phase" here, I mean to indicate that Analytical Philosophy is not just an arrogant discarding or slighting of the past, but a further development in philosophy which makes quite a lot of sense. We can say that modern philosophy underwent a first revolution in the early twentieth century, when philosophy more or less openly finished the process of shedding the various sciences. It was clearly agreed that science is something other than philosophy; therefore we should keep them separate and distinct. A language philosopher would express the change in this way: It was recognized that a scientific question is a question about facts, whereas a philosophical question is one about meaning. We meet not only a different problem, but a different kind of problem when we go from the first to the second of the following questions: How many moose are still left in the State of New York? What do twentieth-century Americans mean when they use the word "justice"? The first question leads to an answer that can be verified by factual methods; the second question leads to an analysis of the way in which Americans speak. This shedding of the sciences by philosophy is the first revolution. We can say that everyone recognizes it as fact, and agrees with it. Who would quarrel with the idea that physics, chemistry, biology and psychology have to follow their own methods, have to answer their own questions, and are no longer considered a part of philosophy?

Analytical philosophers claim that since the early twenties a second revolution has been taking place, that this new step meets much resistance, and that the ones who do not go along with it hamper the growth of philosophy. This second revolution consists of the shedding of the languages of religion and morals from the domain of philosophy. We say that the philosophical question about the meaning of language has to be distinguished and separated from questions about God, about good and bad, about the ideal society, about the ideal man. If we ask, "What do North Americans of the twentieth century mean when they use the word 'justice'?" we are speaking another language from that in the question, "How can I live justly and decently?" Analytical philosophers are united in the claim that the latter kind of question does not belong in the realm of philosophy; they differ over the issue of the language in which this kind of question legitimately belongs. Some would say that this is a matter of poetry, others that they are not interested; while I would say that matters of faith and morality belong in the language of one's theology. A Muslim will discuss them in his Mohammedan theology, a Unitarian in his Unitarian theology, a Christian in his Christian theology, a Humanistic atheist in his Humanistic theology. To sum up, the second revolution is centered around the claim that philosophy can be relieved from quite a lot of confusion if it can abstain from the temptation to theologize and moralize.

In view of the fact that this second revolution meets so much resistance, we have to clarify some things. First, what is the nature of this resistance? Wherein is it rooted, on which presuppositions is it based, which doctrine of truth does it take for granted, with which concept of civilization does it work? In this short article, I do not have space to discuss these questions fully. But I can deal briefly with some relevant and important issues.

I can strengthen the case for Analytical Philosophy by pointing out that its main concern fits in very well with a significant element of modern civilization, i.e., this civilization not only recognizes but also approves of the fact of a plurality of languages. I have to qualify this by saying that at least many modern Westerners approve of it. By plurality of languages I mean, for example, that on one occasion we employ legal language and on another occasion scientific language, and we deem these languages to be proper for such occasions. Legal language is the proper language for a courtroom, scientific language the proper one in a laboratory. All the various languages follow their own method, their own procedure, their own standards. Morality, law, science, art—these are each *sui generis*, each having a kind of its own. It fits in very well when we say that philosophy is also *sui generis*, that it is of another kind than religion, or morality, or politics. Perhaps I should state it the other way: Religion is also *sui generis*; it is of another nature than morality, than politics, than philosophy.

There is another means of strengthening the case for Analytical Philosophy. When it seems so very radical in its demand for the shedding of all moral and religious considerations from the realm of philosophy, some assert that it no longer deserves the name of philosophy at all, for the reason that it has eliminated all the major concerns of traditional philosophy. The answer to this objection is simple: The concern about language has always been a major concern in philosophy, from Plato's time on. It was Socrates who interrogated his opponents and asked them to give account of their linguistic usage. Science and religion have been bowed out of philosophy; analysis of language remains.

What may the Christian theologian say with respect to the claim that philosophers should go along with this second revolution? Personally, I do not doubt at all that this development is favorable to a clear theology.

The recognition that Christian faith and its theology are other languages than science and philosophy helps to clear the atmosphere. Of course, this means that now the difficult problem arises of how we are to understand the various relationships between the language of theology and those of science, philosophy, and historical investigation. Here is a task for the philosophy of religion: to make clear what these relations actually are.

2. The analytical claim that philosophy should drop religious and moral language implies the conclusion that it does not belong to the business of philosophy to construct or justify metaphysical or theological systems.

It has to be made clear that the notions of constructing or justifying theologies and metaphysical systems are not self-evident. They become self-evident only within the domain of a specific theology, namely, that of traditional Western philosophers and theologians. This specific Western theology is rooted in the theology of classical Greece, as it was developed by Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle. Here I must stop for a moment to explain what I mean by such an expression as "the theology of Plato." This terminology is connected with what has been implied about the nature of traditional philosophy, i.e., it is a kind of philosophy wherein the distinction between religious and analytical language was not clearly made. I want to stress that in my opinion this means that in most cases the religious element was strongly predominant. Therefore, we speak much more clearly if we call such a traditional philosophy a theology. It is a kind of thinking which lives for the sake of certain basic convictions about good and bad, true knowledge, and true beauty. We respect the depth of these theologies even more if we recognize that the thinking is done, not so much for the sake of certain convictions alone, but for certain Realities: the Absolute Good, the Absolute Reason, the Absolute

Beauty. The god of this theology may not have been a personal god, but it is certain that this theology struggled to express clearly the conviction that life was not without deeper foundations, but was carried by, validated by, justified by, and received its meaning from, an unshakable foundation. This old Greek theology has as its theme the claim that while the life of the polis may be shaken, the foundations of its life and indeed of all life remain unshakable. Being, Truth, and Reason are eternal, unchanging and unchangeable, imperishable, and completely immune to the decay and death which are so powerful in the visible world. Plato proclaims a message of salvation: Here, in Being, and only here, is salvation!

Now one of the basic doctrines of this theology is the proclamation that Being and Reason are one. I admit that this formulation is too simple, for it is not certain exactly how Parmenides interpreted his famous dictum, neither is it clear exactly how Plato and Aristotle interpreted this basic doctrine of the theology which they shared. Perhaps it would be better to say that for these men, Reason was the essence of Being. However this may be, it is certain that their trust was in Being, in a cosmic Order which was absolutely good, absolutely harmonious, and absolutely rational. It seems safe to say that here, "good," "harmonious," and "rational" do not indicate three different aspects or characteristics of the divine cosmos, but are instead fundamentally identical.

Another main feature of this theology is the proclamation that man is a micro-cosmos, a small replica of the cosmos. Man is *animal rationale*, i.e., a living being which is essentially Reason, just as Being, the Being of the cosmos, is essentially Reason.

Granted these two doctrines—the Reason-nature of the cosmos and the Reason-nature of the micro-cosmos—the demand to glorify God by means of philosophy follows as a matter of course. In this religion of divine Reason, philosophy is not just another

branch of learning. It is a religious celebration. This God, this divine Order of Reason and Goodness *must* be glorified by man's reason, *must* be magnified by man's thinking, *must* be worshiped by philosophizing. Classical philosophy is one long *Magnificat*, in which the Glory of Reason is sung, and the vile tricks of the unbelievers, those Sophists, are unmasks and revealed in all their foolishness. Justification of one's beliefs by means of philosophy is the clearest expression of this venerable old religion.

The whole notion that we can justify our theology by means of reason, philosophy, or of any argument at all, is given up as soon as people no longer participate in the belief in Being, in the cosmic Order of Reason. Before David Hume, only Tertullian, the so-called philosophical Skeptics, and Luther and Calvin can be mentioned. With Hume there begins a small series of more or less isolated men who protest with vehemence against one or more aspects of classical Greek theology. I refer to Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche. In the twentieth century, however, whole groups, no longer only individuals, dissociate themselves from the old theology. In contemporary theology this group is under Karl Barth's leadership. In philosophy both the analytical and the existentialist movements are attempts to detach thinking from the immense and fascinating power of Greek theology.

Such dissociation from Platonic theology naturally implies the rejection of the traditional doctrines of the cosmos and the microcosmos. Thus, Kierkegaard's God is no longer Being, but the Father of Jesus Christ, while Nietzsche's understanding of man is very different from the proclamation that man is *animal rationale*. The end of these two traditional doctrines implies the end of the claim that philosophy can and should justify faith. From this point of view, the contention of Analytical Philosophy that theology and philosophy are wholly different enterprises, and that the first does not be-

long to the business of the latter, is nothing to be surprised about. Actually, we should be surprised that the demand to separate theology and philosophy was not made much earlier. This tardiness merely shows again the immense fascination of the theology of Reason.

What may Christian theologians say to this second claim of Analytical Philosophy, i.e., that one cannot justify his theology? I can speak here only for myself, and I must say that I agree wholeheartedly with the claim. How can we think of justifying Him who has revealed himself in One who was a stumblingblock to the Jews and folly to the Gentiles? How can we feel obliged to erect an impressive and respectable structure of thought around Him who had no form nor comeliness? If we look for a theology which honors such a God and such a Lord, we arrive, not at a well fitting system of thought, but at a stumbling attempt to set forth and interpret that which it has pleased our Lord God to disclose and communicate in his revelation. Of course, that which has been disclosed and communicated by God escapes clear classification and analysis. Although revelation is not unrelated to propositional truth, it is much more than that. It is above all God giving himself to us in Jesus Christ. Hence, while Christian "truth" can be uttered to a certain extent in human words, this propositional aspect is not its most important element. Truth has to do, in the first place, with encountering God in Jesus Christ. Truth is our relationship with God in Christ. Christ is Truth. It is amazing nonsense to think that we can justify this Truth by philosophy.

Some Disadvantages of Analytical Philosophy

1. The analysis proper to religious language is situational and existential in character.

Whereas logical analysis is the proper approach to the languages of mathematics and empirical science, it is an improper way of

understanding other languages, such as those of poetry, morality, and religion. Hence, I find myself in accord with those analytical philosophers who quite deliberately confine their logical analysis to the "artificial" languages of science and mathematics and who claim that they are "not interested" in the analysis of poetic or religious language (e.g., Rudolf Carnap). There are, however, a number of persons who are quite right in holding that the languages of religion, poetry, and morality can be and should be analyzed, if we are to receive full understanding of how modern Western people speak. But if in their analysis of religious language, these men of broader interest use the same methods as those used in the analysis of mathematics, they are guilty of a serious error. We can say that mathematical and scientific language are not so closely related to the center of the person in contrast to, e.g., religious or moral language. Analytical philosophy is supposed to ask the question of meaning, but this can be done in at least two different ways. We can ask: "What is the meaning of *this proposition*?" This way of asking for meaning is proper to mathematics and science. An example is a proposition putting forth a particular theory in the realm of theoretical physics. But we can also ask: "What does *this person* mean when he says such-and-such?" This way of asking for meaning is proper to religious language. An example is an exclamation of Luther about "good works." Note carefully the difference between the two utterances. We can understand a scientific theory largely without reference to the person who was the first to set it forth. The qualification, "largely," is needed because, for example, Einstein's theory of relativity has to be understood within the framework of early twentieth-century theoretical physics. Even so, the meaning of this theory is independent of the kind of person Einstein was. In the case of Luther's exclamation, however, we cannot separate the utterance from the person. Luther's

person is directly involved. This means that his whole situation is involved too. We cannot understand the meaning of what he says without understanding his time, his conflict with the Roman Catholic Church, the very personal interpretation of the Bible which he held, etc. In this latter case, analysis should not be logical, but situational and existential.

While the logical analysis of mathematical and scientific language considers propositions, the existential analysis of religious, poetic and moral language emphasizes man-who-speaks. Two key terms of the analytical philosophers are "use" and "language-game." These terms were introduced by Ludwig Wittgenstein. He repeats again and again that we understand the meaning of a word once we know the rules of its correct use. Further, he compares language to a game and especially chess. To know chess is to know how to move the various pieces, i.e., it is to know the rules of the game. The same goes for a language. One knows a language when one knows the rules for using its terms. Again, this approach seems to fit very well such artificial languages as mathematics and science. One does not really know the meaning of the terms of chemistry if he cannot use the terms correctly. Also, the comparison with a game is an apt one. Chemical terms are used in a limited field, which is clearly delineated in the same way as a board for playing chess. But to apply this method to religious language or to poetry is a very odd procedure. How is it possible here to speak of rules according to which such terms as "Christ," "salvation," or "splendid" have to be used? Do we really "use" such terms? Does not the very term "use" suggest a distance between the speaker and his words? This distance is certainly found in scientific language, but is it found in the language of faith? In the context of faith, we do not "use" our language; we (I like to suggest) *are* our language. Do we not say that a man *is* his word? I am not sure that I entirely

understand Wittgenstein and perhaps my argument is based upon a misinterpretation of his terminology. Further, my concept of "is-language" needs much greater elaboration. I submit the foregoing analysis as a basis for additional discussion.

The argument just presented may be connected with earlier remarks. I have said that the languages of faith and of theology cannot be justified. Just above, I argue that these languages cannot be analyzed logically. Does this not stand to reason? Languages which cannot be justified by philosophy cannot be analyzed logically by philosophy. Note that I do not say that they cannot be analyzed at all. The point is that *logical* analysis is out of place with respect to the languages of faith and of theology. Here situational and existential analysis is in order. Even so, we are able to understand these languages only to a certain extent. Hence we may say that those languages which cannot be justified can be analyzed only partially and in a way that demands prudence.

I must protest vehemently against the notion that the language of Christian faith consists of propositions which can be analyzed by means of logic. If it does not make sense to a philosopher to attempt a logical analysis of persons, how much sense will it make to a theologian to try to do so with the Lord God? Exactly in the way that man is man-who-speaks, so God is God-who-speaks. Can we offer a logical analysis of the Creator of Heaven and Earth? Shall we discard the doctrine of the Trinity simply because the language in which it is expressed is logically inconsistent? As a matter of fact, each of us must be made uneasy by the expression, "Exactly in the way that man is man-who-speaks, so God is God-who-speaks." For the Christian, it is actually the other way around. God is the God-who-speaks, the God who addresses us in Christ, and our faith is a stumbling attempt to respond to this divine Word. Even to think of doing a logical analysis of this relationship is sheer nonsense.

2. Most analytical philosophers have not responded to the challenge of existentialist philosophy.

We can consider existentialist philosophy as bringing about a third revolution in philosophy. Existentialist philosophers concentrate upon several relationships—of man to himself, between man and his God, and between man and other people and the world. These philosophers claim that such relationships are non-rational, or, more accurately, that they are of an other-than-exclusively-rational nature. Sartre uses such strong terms as "pre-judicative" and "pre-reflexive." He asserts that the relationships involved are often of the nature of nausea. Heidegger speaks of moods or dispensations; he makes much of anxiety. Marcel seeks to place faith and hope in central positions. If these existentialists are right, the problem of the meaning of language becomes much more complex than the analytical philosophers are ready to admit. Languages such as those of religion, morality and poetry are rooted in the above basic relationships. Hence, the question of the relationships between these languages and the "moods" in which they are rooted is unavoidable.

If this third revolution is taken seriously, the analytical philosophers are much closer to traditional philosophy than they are prepared to admit. For traditional philosophy took it for granted that the basic relationships of man were of a rational nature. No other alternative was possible, due to the fact that the two main proclamations of classical Greek theology were that both the macro-cosmos, i.e., Being, and the micro-cosmos, man, were essentially rational. It follows that the basic relationships—God and man, man and man, and man and himself—were also supposed to be rational. Now although the analytical philosophers have rejected one of the two proclamations of traditional Greek theology, namely, the rationality of the macro-cosmos, they have not discarded the second proclamation. In main-

taining that man is a rational animal, they remain Greeks.

As a Christian theologian I have to say that the claim of the existentialist philosophers about the nature of the three basic relationships deserves thorough consideration. The relationship between man and God, or better, that between God and man, is certainly better characterized by calling it "other-than-exclusively-rational" rather than by taking it to be rational. This admission makes the task of theology much more difficult, through the raising of various kinds of questions. Can we go along with Heidegger and his notion of "moods"? If so, what is the relationship between Christian faith and such moods? Are these moods so "pre-judicative" as Sartre seems to assert? If we can agree with neither Heidegger nor Sartre in the particular way in which they elaborate the notion of the basic relations as "other-than-exclusively-rational," is there another manner of interpreting this notion? I believe that we have to choose another way. I have tried to say something about it by means of the concept of convictional language.

Conclusions

1. Philosophers who are Christians should respond more eagerly to the challenge offered to them by Analytical Philosophy.

2. Such philosophers will then find that Analytical Philosophy makes certain radical claims which, while they *seem* to be unfriendly to Christian faith, are seen under closer scrutiny to be quite compatible with the understanding of faith implied in a Revelation theology.

3. However, such Christian philosophers would do well to avoid the arrogance of many analytical philosophers and many existentialists who ignore each other; they should try to philosophize, in Walter Kaufmann's words, "in the tension between analysis and existentialism" (*Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*, p. 51).

Myth in Buddhism: Essential or Peripheral?

WINSTON L. KING

I SHALL attempt to deal briefly with the role and importance in Buddhism of what we in the West call the "mythical element." As a matter of fact, the term "myth" would not commend itself to a Theravada (or Southern) Buddhist, for two reasons: As a fundamentalist who prides himself on the pristine purity and authenticity of his tradition and scriptures, he does not take kindly to talk about myth, symbolism, and the like. The other reason is that the distinction in Western thought between the symbolic and literal, or the mythical and historical, is largely foreign to the Buddhist and Eastern way of thinking. On the whole non-historical in its attitude and philosophically disposed to a kind of undercover idealism, that way of thinking does not draw a sharp line—and from its point of view a false line—between the physical and mental realities, or the objective and subjective worlds. In case the distinction is made, Buddhism tends to regard the mental and subjective realm as the more essential and real.

A Definition of Myth

The mythical form of the apprehension of reality is a matrix of ideation rather than one type of concept. It is a way of approach to reality rather than a definite philosophy, and it is found in attitudes rather than concepts. Accordingly, in the present context I shall define myth, or the mythical approach, in a

threefold way: (1) Mythical thinking is *picture-thinking* or *image-thinking*. (2) The mythical approach to truth and reality is a *Gestalt approach*. It seeks to grasp the totality of an experience or value, rather than being a matter of post-analytical synthesis, piece by piece. (3) Myth represents an *actionable orientation to truth and reality*; i.e., the mythical approach invites its user to participate in active personal relationships with the mythically grasped truth or value. When pertaining to one's own faith, it contains intrinsic emotional involvement and volitional potential. It is then no longer *mere* myth.

As a corollary of the above, we may mention three products of mythical thinking, or three contexts in which mythical thinking appears: (1) Myth appears in the form of *historical legend*, i.e., as an overlay of imaginative development or interpretation of some central historical event or person. The overlay consists in the addition of details of event or portraiture intended to correspond harmoniously with the basic religious interpretation. (2) Myth appears in *symbolic form* by means of which basic doctrines about the nature of the world, man, the moral and spiritual realities, and the mode of perceiving them are stated. (3) Myth in our sense is present in most religious traditions in a *sacramental role*; i.e., to use a phrase from Paul Tillich, it is present in its "participative" function whereby the myth becomes a near-instinctive technique of personal religious involvement. Here again we have myth-in-action, a mode of religious living. Obviously these three forms of mythical activity and significance overlap and complement each other.

I shall now turn to certain central questions about the role of myth in Buddhism and in Theravada Buddhism in particular.

WINSTON L. KING is Professor of Philosophy and Religion and Dean of the Chapel at Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa. From 1958-60 he was on leave as adviser to the Ford Foundation at the International Institute for Advanced Buddhist Studies in Rangoon, Burma. His latest book, *In the Hope of Nibbana*, will be published soon. Dr. King's article is based on a paper read at the National Meeting of the NABI at Union Theological Seminary, New York, December 27-28, 1960.

What is the place of myth? How does it function? How essential is mythology to the religious operation of Buddhism?

Historical Legend

That there has been elaboration of the genuinely historical in the Buddhist tradition can scarcely be doubted. Buddhism is a child of Indian religion, although a somewhat rebellious one. That allegedly pure, "original" form of Buddhism, which was only an austere, non-metaphysical moralism completely without mythological accoutrements, is the product in part of friendly idealization by Western scholars and in part of Eastern apologists for the presence in contemporary Buddhism of "un-Buddhistic" elements. Further, we may observe that during its first eight hundred years of existence, Buddhism was in constant commerce with Indian religious and philosophical thought. This finally resulted in the complete engulfing of native Buddhism and considerable Hinduization of one of its export forms, namely Mahayana Buddhism. By the same token, the other export form, Hinayana, was not totally unaffected by, even though it was resistant to, Hindu influences. Finally, we note that the basic Hinayana or Theravada scriptures were not actually written down for five hundred years or more. Despite the presumed faithfulness and inerrancy of oral tradition, this undoubtedly permitted some degree of legendary development.

It is principally around the life and deeds of Gautama Buddha that legendary and marvelous elements focalize in the Buddhist scriptures. As one example of this we may note certain items in the *Dialogues of the Buddha*. We read that on one occasion he miraculously transported himself across the Ganges when it was in full flood (D. ii, 89); that on another occasion, desiring a drink from a nearby stream, he sent a disciple to get it and the latter found the water perfectly clear even though five hundred carts had just crossed at that place (D. ii, 129); that on

still another occasion a sal tree blossomed out of season and releasing its petals covered the Buddha with them, while at the same time there was accompanying music from the heavens and a shower of fragrant sandal-wood powder (D. ii, 137-138). Upon the Buddha's passing away there was a mighty earthquake "terrible and awe inspiring" (D. ii, 156). And had he desired, the Buddha might have remained in the world for the rest of the aeon but for the fact that his faithful disciple Ananda neglected to entreat him to do so before the Buddha had made his vow to pass away (D. ii, 115 ff.).¹ It may be that we have here the same sort of process that occurred in the biblical account of Joshua's "command" that the sun stand still: the translation of a rhetorical apostrophe into a "historical" incident. For the miraculous river-crossing becomes subject to an exhortation by the Buddha for all men to take the raft of detached discipline across life's perilous floods. Indeed, the marvel of the descent of flower petals upon the Buddha is held to be of much less worth than following his way.

Such scriptural portrayals of the life of the Buddha—comparable to certain Gospel portraits of Jesus—are mild by comparison with what we find in the ensuing commentarial literature, beginning with Buddhaghosa of Ceylon in the fifth century A.D. The degree of magnification of the miraculous seems to be in direct ratio to the square of the chronological distance of the commentator from the event. A sampling of commentarial and semi-scriptural materials of post-canonical origin indicates the nature of that constantly miraculous supernaturalism which (it is held) encompassed the Buddha's life at every step. Thus on the day of his immaculate and miraculous conception in the womb of his divinely selected mother, thirty-two signs of the following sort appeared in the heavens and upon earth: the blind, deaf, dumb, and lame were healed; diseases ceased; musical instruments played by themselves; trees blossomed, parched deserts were gladdened by rain, the

water of the oceans became sweet; and heavenly music sounded. At his birth four attendant devas (gods) received him in a golden net. Therefrom he took seven paces, to the applause of the surrounding myriads of gods, and uttered the words: "The chief am I in all the world." His life as a prince was attended constantly by marvels. His struggle for enlightenment involved cosmic upheaval, a battle against the stupendous hosts of the evil Mara arrayed against him. Despite their assaults and the demon-inspired storms of rain, ashes, mud, hot coals, rocks and weapons, and the attacks of fierce animals, the Buddha gained his enlightenment, to the rejoicing of the cosmos of 10,000 worlds even as on the day of his conception.²

One further instance will suffice. It is Buddhaghosa's description of the blessed splendor which accompanied the daily rounds of the Buddha during his lifetime:

While the Lord of the World is entering for alms, gentle winds clear the ground before him; the clouds let fall drops of water to lay the dust in his pathway, and then become a canopy over him; other winds bring flowers and scatter them in his path; elevations of ground depress themselves, and depressions elevate themselves; wherever he places his foot, the ground is even and pleasant to walk upon, or lotus flowers receive his tread. No sooner had he set his right foot within the city gate than the rays of different colors which issue from his body race hither and thither over palaces and pagodas, and deck them, as it were, with the yellow sheen of gold, or with the colors of a painting. The elephants, the horses, the birds, and other animals give forth melodious sounds; likewise the tombs, lutes, and other musical instruments, and the ornaments worn by the people.³

While such descriptions are part of the non-scriptural literature and would be somewhat discounted by orthodox Buddhist scholars, their splendor has been added to the commonly accepted traditional aura which encompasses the Buddha figure. For most of the faithful such events seem most appropriate to the Great Sage, the One who shows the Way to both men and gods; without them, he would seem less than the Bud-

dha. Whether such legendary elevation of the Buddha figure is *essential* to the Buddhist way of life, I shall discuss later.

Cosmic Myth and Symbol

The second form of mythological development is found in the Buddhist world-picture. We may note three features: (1) *Karma-rebirth*; (2) the thirty-one planes of existence; (3) the achievement of super-normal psychic powers. The general theory of *karma* is somewhat familiar to people in the West, but primarily in its Indian form of the transmigration of eternal souls from life to life in accordance with past deeds. The Buddhist theory is a variant of this, having much the same practical religious import, but with important differentiae. For the Buddhist maintains that there is literally no soul or self to pass from birth to birth, nor, for that matter, from moment to moment of present sentient existence. And the Theravada Buddhist is most insistent upon the unreality of the self (*an-atta*, or *non-atman*, usually translated no-self or no-soul). The empirically perceived individual can be analyzed exhaustively into five sets of mental and physical factors, says the Buddhist. These are dissipated without substantial or identical remainder upon death. Yet there remains a continuity of the most iron-clad causal sort between successive lives whereby each new individual inevitably reaps the results and, indeed, is the result of what "he" has done in previous lives. This causal linkage is completely moral in its governance; one reaps a better, i.e., a more pleasant and virtuous, rebirth as the result of morally good deeds, or "he" reaps a worse rebirth in the hells or as an animal (for long ages) as the result of morally evil deeds.

Closely allied to the *karma-rebirth* concept in Theravada Buddhism is that of the thirty-one planes of existence. These constitute the cosmic framework in which karmic destiny is operative. The lowest plane, both geographically and morally speaking, comprises

the hells of suffering; then come the planes of animal existence, disembodied ghostly life, demonic Titans, and humanity. Finally, there are the twenty-six higher levels of devas (gods) and blessed beings, existence in which is progressively longer and more disembodied in nature, culminating in the immaterial spheres where the life span is that of millions of years. It is into one of the planes of this many-tiered universe that the sentient being is reborn upon each death.

Now death and *karma* rule all these realms. When one has sufficiently reaped the results of his evil deeds, he rises from the hells; when his good *karma* is exhausted, he descends from the blissful indulgence of the higher realms to the human or lower level of existence. Only in Nirvana, beyond all time and space and sentient existence, is release to be found.

Where are these planes? The ancient conception, still prevalent in Theravada Buddhism, is that of their relation to the central earth-mountain, Mount Meru or Sineru. Meru is 84,000 leagues in height, surrounded by concentric seas and mountain rings. Beneath it are the hells, on its slopes are the lower levels of the heavenly worlds, and stretching above its summit into limitless space are the remaining realms of existence-bliss. Some of the higher planes appear to be eternal, but the lower ones, well up beyond the summit of Mount Meru, are periodically destroyed and reformed in the recurring cycles of dissolution and renovation, worlds without end.

Closely related to existence in these planes is the third element of cosmic myth: the attainment of the higher psychic states, called *Jhanas*, trances, or absorptions; and their related psychic powers. These absorptions are attained by the increasingly successful and subtle one-pointed concentration of the mind upon some one object, physical or mental, until complete control of the attention and complete obliviousness to sense stimuli and ordinary discursive thoughts are attained.

Without detailing the particulars, we may note that attainment of these states is believed to lead to rebirth in the corresponding levels of the higher planes of existence. Thus, successful meditation upon the infinity of consciousness leads to rebirth in the triad of the planes of existence, third from the topmost level. It is perhaps debatable whether the mythology of the planes was created to fit the stages of meditative accomplishment or whether the reverse is the case.

Related to these absorptive trances, either as their normal accompaniments or as additional capacities voluntarily cultivated, are the supernormal psychic powers gained by the saints and the Buddhas. These powers include the Divine Ear, with which one hears "both heavenly and human sounds, far and near," i.e., one can at will know what transpires on the various thirty-one planes⁴; the Divine Eye by which one penetrates into a knowledge of the karmic careers of other beings, past and future; a knowledge of the inner mental-moral quality of other beings; the remembrance of one's own past existences in detail for aeons past; and what are called the magical powers or *iddhi*.

Now, O Brothers, the monk enjoys the various Magical Powers, such as being one he becomes manifold, and having become manifold he again becomes one. Without being obstructed he passes through walls and mountains, just as if on the air. He walks on water without sinking, just as if on the earth. In the earth he dives and rises up again, just as if in the water. Crosslegged he floats through the air, just as a winged bird. With his hand he touches sun and moon, these so mighty Ones, so powerful Ones. Even up to the Brahma world has he mastery over his body.⁵

As might be expected, the traditional accounts of the Buddha's life portray him as exercising these powers habitually. He could focus his omniscient intelligence on any living being and behold the latter's full past career, his present nature and potentialities, and his future spiritual destiny. In the early morning hours before dawn, the Buddha would always survey the universes with his

omniscient intelligence in order to perceive those beings ready for conversion, and he would then transport himself—or his astral body, or a multiplication of himself—into their presence.

Sacramental Mythology⁶

Still holding in abeyance the basic question of the centrality of the mythical element to basic Buddhist disciplines, we turn to our third category of mythical usage. This is the myth in action or in its "sacramental" function, bringing the devotee into effective relation to the core realities of his faith. There can be no question of the locus of this category; for Buddhism it is by common consent the meditational discipline. In meditational practice the total tradition is brought into existential involvement with the meditator; the experience of enlightenment to which it is finally conducive is the essence of the whole purpose and meaning of the Buddhist way of life, however large other usages may bulk in its actual historical practice. Whatever else in Buddhism fails to relate itself ultimately to progress here, or can be dispensed with in the meditational discipline, is essentially inessential. For meditation is the sole road to Nirvana.

Let us briefly note the nature of this ultimate sacrament, the meditational discipline. Its basic assumption is that the psycho-physical state of a human being determines at what level he will deal with reality and how much of it he can perceive—at least as far as any ultimately saving relation to reality is concerned. Necessary to any progress toward the ultimate enlightenment that brings one to Nirvana is the achievement of one-pointedness of mind. And instrumentally necessary to one-pointedness of mind are the time-tested meditational postures and techniques. This is not the place to describe these techniques in detail. Suffice it to say that they entail one or more of the traditional meditational postures of the body, the progressive withdrawal of attention from the

outward to an inward center of attention, and the progressively greater ability to control the attention at will, until complete control is achieved. When the meditator has gained a sufficient degree of such attentiveness, his teacher then directs him toward that kind of meditation which will finally produce enlightenment.

At this juncture, two routes are open: the traditional one of the absorptions and higher psychic powers mentioned above, and the shorter, steeper route which aims directly at Nirvanic peace through *viñāpanā*-type meditation (now much practiced in Burma). Exponents of the latter type of meditation look upon the attempt to attain the absorptions as fraught with spiritual peril; for the possessor of the higher powers may become proud of them, or even mistake them for the reality of salvation in Nirvana itself. Indeed, the one who enjoys these absorptions must subject his blissful absorption-experiences themselves to the more drastic type of *viñāpanā* meditational analysis if he truly hopes for Nirvana; for the road of the Jhanic trances or absorptions is ultimately a dead-end road. It leads only into new rebirths, and therefore re-deaths, however high the plane of existence attained. In any case, the essential work of salvation is yet to be done. And that is achieved only by *viñāpanā* meditation, through which one becomes directly and acutely aware of the three great characteristics of all tangible reality: impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, and unreality. The meditator must become aware of this in every fiber of his own being. He must realize at vivid first-hand that all that he sees, knows, feels—that even the feeling, seeing, knowing agent himself, as well as his most blessed Jhanic trance states—are impermanent, full of suffering and unreality. Only by this negative sacramentalism of meditational discipline can he cut the bonds of his attachment to continued sentient existence and its suffering, and finally achieve the cool calmness of Nirvana itself.

The Essential and the Peripheral

We turn finally to ask: How essential to the Buddhist way of life are the symbolic forms we have considered and what is their functional relationship to each other?

The legends surrounding the life of the Buddha represent the most dispensable of all the elements in the Buddhist tradition. This is seen in two ways: (1) There once was a time when Buddhism existed without most of this legendary apparatus; there are some contemporary forms of Buddhism (Mahayana) which exist without them; and now even in Theravada Buddhism there is a tendency to de-emphasize them. (2) If Buddhism is to be conceived as the way to Nirvana—whether this-life Nirvana or after-death Nirvana, or both—the legendary elements are still not absolutely essential. One simply does not need to believe that the Buddha was miraculously born, that his father was an Indian monarch, or that miracles surrounded him all the days of his life. There is only one essential: that the Buddha's experience of enlightenment opens the way to man's salvation in Nirvana.

Of course, the actual practice of Buddhism is not quite this pure and simple. Buddhist piety, expressing itself in the scriptures and commentaries, has felt that the One who shows the way to Nirvana must necessarily have been acclaimed by all the gods, have been infinite in all his capacities, and miraculous in all his deeds. This rich legendary material has been an intrinsic part of the living tradition for centuries, so that the excision of it would necessitate a major reconstruction of the faith—something for which few Theravada Buddhists are prepared. Those forms of Buddhism, like Zen, which *have* renounced the legendary elements of the tradition are looked upon as degenerate by Theravada orthodoxy. Yet even the orthodox Theravadin, when pressed, will affirm that the inner sacramental experience is the *true* reality, whatever view one takes of the his-

torical reality of scriptural or commentarial legend.

How essential is the second form of mythological development—the cosmic mythos of *karma*, the planes of existence, and their mastery by the higher psychic powers? For Buddhism as a whole, there seem to be two divergent attitudes on this question. To some Buddhists, the doctrine of karmically controlled rebirth in various planes of existence is an absolute essential. It must not be demythologized out of existence. One variant of this is found in Chinese Buddhism which developed an elaborate theology of hells and the means of rescue therefrom, in a way that far outdid Theravada Buddhism. Another variant is, of course, Tibetan Buddhism. And in Theravada countries no one would grant that any version of the Buddha's teachings without *karma* and the thirty-one planes was Buddhism at all. Without these, the Buddhist pattern of life would make no sense.

The opposite attitude is found primarily in Mahayana Buddhism. Nagarjuna, one of the founding fathers of the Mahayana tradition, radically denied the reality and meaning of all such categories, up to and including Nirvana itself. *Samsara* (rebirth) and Nirvana, said he, are one and the same. Was he, in actuality, subjectivizing the whole matter by teaching that Nirvana is not a metaphysical reality but merely a frame of mind? Or do we have here a new idealist metaphysic in which one's mental attitude is the reality of realities? Whatever one's conclusions, Nagarjuna initiated a current of Buddhist tradition which discards history and cosmology in favor of immediacy of experience. Zen Buddhism, of course, is this tradition's most radical contemporary form.

But even in Theravada Buddhism there is some stirring away from a sheer literalism. Though official orthodoxy is still staunchly set against any such deviation, a few will cautiously suggest that one may also think of the thirty-one planes of existence in a

figurative or symbolic way; or that some of the refinements of the commentaries are not found in the scriptures themselves; or that the transportation of a saint or the Buddha through the heavens by means of psychic power is only that of his *astral*, i.e., non-physical or mental, body; or that Mt. Meru is probably symbolic rather than physically real.

Always—confusingly enough—we must reckon with the fact that in all forms of Buddhism the reality of Nirvana and its absolutely transcendent categories lies closely beneath the surface of every doctrinal statement that is made on any subject. It is held that Nirvana is ultimate, either as metaphysical reality, mind-state, or both. Compared with it, all other truths and realities are unreal, or only relatively real. Hence, even in those forms of Buddhism where there is a literalist insistence on the reality of *karma* and the planes of existence, these latter are not the ultimate realities but may at any moment be swallowed up, as it were, in the distinctionless, absolute ineffability of Nirvanic thought and experience. Thus, even though this implication is seldom drawn explicitly by Theravada Buddhism, it is there beneath the surface (and it has been made explicit by other forms of Buddhism)—namely, that all cosmic schemes and historical statements are but symbolic, mythical entities which may be converted into the realities of inner attainment, almost without remainder.

The Transcendence of Symbol and Myth

This brings us to our final problem: Is the meditational discipline of Buddhism together with its ultimate goal, the Nirvanic quality of experience, beyond all symbolism or is it the ultimate Buddhist symbol? As already suggested, one may certainly say that historical legend is not absolutely essential to the meditational discipline. It does not really matter whether Gautama Buddha ever lived, or performed miraculous deeds, provided

only that the experience of enlightenment is repeatable and that the way of meditation leads to it—though the Theravadin usually insists upon thinking of Gautama Buddha as a historically existent individual. The same point holds respecting the planes of existence. The basic logic of meditation, particularly of the *vipassanā* type which aims directly at Nirvanic attainment, is that of bypassing in practice all the Jhanic trances which give access to the higher planes of existence. Why, then, are these planes not to be denied as such? Zen has done precisely this. But it would be almost inconceivable to the Theravadin to do so. Despite his present emphasis upon this shorter route to Nirvana, the reality of the other attainments is never doubted. Indeed, it is the native soil by which the whole meditational practice is nourished. And even though these traditional externalities are sometimes de-emphasized for the initial benefit of the non-Buddhist enquirer or meditator, once he makes his way further into meditational discipline, the ancient doctrinal landmarks are reinstated one by one and the full tradition reasserted.

Which, then, is the true Buddhism: the version that escapes from all historical and cosmic statement into pure experience, as Zen does, or the one that cherishes the meditational experience in the context of such statements—even though *both* claim that Nirvanic experience transcends such statements completely? The question is as futile as disputing over which form of Christianity is the “true” one. Both versions are found within the tradition which calls itself Buddhist.

Without settling this issue finally, we may, nevertheless, offer two concluding observations about the presumed or claimed transcendence of all symbol and myth by the non-symbolic, non-mythical purity of Nirvanic experience. For one thing, it must be repeated that actual Theravada meditational practice lives in and breathes the air of all its symbolisms and myths, regardless of what

theory is involved. However, at the point of theory, we may note that even though Nirvana is transcendent of *karma* and rebirth, it is, as Nagarjuna pointed out, by the same token also utterly dependent upon them. For if escape into Nirvana is real, then whatever is escaped from (rebirth, *karma*, the thirty-one planes) is likewise real, else there simply is no escape. The hope of escape from these is, in fact, the single and dynamic motivating force for all Theravadic meditation—although, paradoxically, even such meditation is held by some to advance one also along the scale of rebirth.

Secondly, let us suppose—either with those who would export Buddhism to the West as sheer “mind-culture” and no more, or with the Zen Buddhists—that we can avoid all reference to these cosmic and historical relativities and achieve a pure, absolute experience. What then? Obviously, even such “pure” experience is conditioned and formed in the matrix of Buddhist ideas about the nature of the self, its innate capacities, and its relation to the universe about it. The fact that this matrix is never recognized or its implications never stated does not void its formative power. Further, can it not be said that “pure” experience, when taken as the absolutely right way to relate oneself to the universe, is a kind of new *super-symbolism* in which psychological attitudes, their genesis, development, and significance have be-

come a new cosmology, a metaphysic of action if not of concept? Here, indeed, we are overtaken by that ultimate nemesis of all pure subjectivism or religious solipsism: It becomes a mythos-in-reverse, which, instead of reworking historical and natural realities in terms of human value apprehensions in the usual religious manner, takes man's inner mental states and calls them ultimate realities. Whether a system of mythically reworked history and nature, or one of cosmologized mind-states, is the more dependent upon myth, it is impossible to decide.

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²H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1909, pp. 38-83, *passim*.

³Ibid., pp. 91-2.

⁴One devout Buddhist expressed to me the hope that some Christian would sometime develop the powers of the Divine Ear sufficiently to communicate with Jesus, who is undoubtedly living on one of the higher planes.

⁵Thera Nyanatiloka, *Buddhist Dictionary*, Colombo: Frewin, 1956, p. 3.

⁶One critic of this paper has objected to the use of the word “sacramental” because “Buddhists have no sacraments.” In the wide functional sense used here, the term seems to me to be appropriate despite the above objection.

From History to Myth: A Comparative Study

HARRY M. BUCK, JR.

WHEN in the context of an organization calling itself an association of biblical instructors the topic of mythology is brought up, the name of the Marburg giant, Rudolf Bultmann, dominates our thinking, as indeed it should. But New Testament scholars have impoverished their studies by a kind of myopia resulting from a neglect of the problem of myth in the wider demands of *Religionswissenschaft*. Bultmann's well-known three story universe accompanied by divine intervention is not, strictly speaking, a mythology; it is a *Weltanschauung*. Of course, sophisticated modern man, for whom $E = mc^2$, cannot accept biblical cosmology, but neither could Copernicus. The real question of mythology runs much deeper. About a quarter of a century ago, the subject of myth began to be re-studied seriously after a long period of neglect. Malinowski, following Frazer and Lang, considered the anthropological aspects of folklore. Cassirer, Langer, Tillich and Urban directly explored the meaning of myth, and the researches of C. G. Jung gave added dimensions to our studies.¹

I

The problem is complicated by the fact that, by and large, two important religious systems, Christianity and Judaism, refuse to recognize mythology and insist instead upon a literal understanding of their images. It is a signal point of pride among Christian theologians that theirs is not a religion based on a myth, but on events which took place in

HARRY M. BUCK, JR. is Associate Professor of Bible and Religion at Wilson College, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. His article is based on a paper read at the National Meeting of the NABI at Union Theological Seminary, New York, December 27-28, 1960.

human history, that Jesus of Nazareth "suffered under Pontius Pilate," whose procuratorship we can fix between A.D. 26 and A.D. 36.

The struggle against Gnosticism resulted in repeated warnings to Christians not to "occupy themselves with myths and endless genealogies," nor to "turn away from listening to the truth and wander into myths," and to have nothing to do with "godless and silly myths" (I Tim. 1:4; 4:7; II Tim. 4:4). Although such thinking is seemingly consistent with that of modern man, "who consciously and voluntarily creates history,"² the truth is that "the Christianity of the popular European strata never succeeded in abolishing either the theory of the archetype (which transformed a historical personage into an exemplary hero and a historical event into a mythical category) or the cyclical and astral theories."³

It is precisely because of the fact that historical events are interpreted as having cosmic significance that ordinary historical language will not suffice. Even though a particular event is not conceived from the point of view of cyclical or repeatable time, its once-for-all character lifts it out of the realm of "mere history." The events so appropriated are not simply *historisch*; they constitute a *Geschichte* and, to rebaptize a word which has served various purposes, a *Heilsgeschichte*.⁴ They are the events which constitute God's redemption, and when the believing community recalls them over and over again, it is concerned not with critical reconstruction but with their bearing upon salvation.

In making the foregoing statement, we have satisfied the first criterion for a religious myth, its involvement with metahistorical time. The myth is not meaningful or

true because it contains elements of history, but because it places certain events—whether or not items of chronological history—into a scheme which possesses an existential character. That scheme is an expression of man's view of himself.⁶

The myth is paradigmatic, an expression of a classical archetype and itself the archetype for future thought and action. Romulus was not merely the first Roman in point of time, he is the first, i.e., the foremost, Roman, the epitome of the glory of Rome itself. It is evident that whatever the historicity of Romulus might be, its precise reconstruction is of little importance; he has become the paradigm of all Romans, and the cultic repetition of the myth results in an anamnesis of mythological history.⁶

Myth is not merely a story told, but a reality lived, a sanction for a way of life and a pattern for worship. The myth is simply the word itself, and it possesses divine power by its repetition. The point of mythology is that man does not act objectively toward the world; he encounters it and participates in it. It makes little difference whether the events described would have been visible to an impartial bystander in the fashion described. Certainly nobody ever saw Marduk slay Ti'amut or was a guest in the house built for Aleyn Ba'al or was splashed by water from the strange bath of Izanagi.

II

Religion functions through myth, and it is as impossible to separate the *kerygma* from the myth as to separate a painting from its canvas. Christianity and Judaism, ostensibly based on a firm sense of chronological history, have not only adopted mythological language but have also thought in mythological terms. When a religious system has no inherent mythology, it will either construct one from its own history or borrow mythological elements from other systems, or both.

The ritualistic observance of changing sea-

sons is of ancient origin, and the Hebrews encountered it in the religion of the Canaanites for whom each year re-enacted an archetypal year. The Hebrews could not dispense with the feast of the first fruits, but under the aegis of the Deuteronomists transformed it into an anamnesis of a historical redemption which took place at a nonrepeatable point of time. Hence, this formula was reached:

A wandering Aramean was my father; and he went down into Egypt and sojourned there, few in number; and there he became a nation, great, mighty and populous. And the Egyptians treated us harshly, and afflicted us, and laid upon us hard bondage. Then we cried to the LORD the God of our fathers, and the LORD heard our voice, and saw our affliction, our toil and our oppression; and the LORD brought us out of Egypt with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm, with great terror, with signs and wonders; and he brought us into this place and gave us this land, a land flowing with milk and honey (Deut. 26:5-9).

This formula cannot be simple history. Like the deuteronomistic formula in Judges, only a modicum of history can be found in it. Its significance lies in the eternal relationship of God with his people, and it functioned from the days of Josiah until it was supplanted in the fourth century B.C. by a mythology based not on the Exodus as the starting point of God's relationship with his people, but on creation.

More instructive is the spring festival, which the Hebrews came to associate with God's archetypal act of redemption, the Exodus. But the Exodus became the Passover, *Pesach*. The Priestly account in Exodus 12 is more suitable as a set of instructions for an annual anamnesis of the Passover than a description of the beginning of the Exodus. Note particularly such language as, "This day shall be for you a memorial day, and you shall keep it as a feast to the LORD; throughout your generations you shall observe it as an ordinance forever" (Exod. 12:14).⁷

There simply is no account of the Exodus which does not presuppose the existence of

the Passover for several generations. There is no objective story of the passing over of the angel of God, in the sense of "mere history"; there is only the account of "real history" which already has begun to function as a myth. The Passover is not a true myth, because it does have a point of origin in historical time and not *in illo tempore*; but it fulfills many of the same functions as a myth. It is not hailed as true because it records a chronicle of events, however accurate or inaccurate, but because it places these events in an existential scheme which is redemptive. By engaging in its cultic recollection, I may find myself. It is paradigmatic and a pattern for worship. It involves participation and struggle. By re-enacting it—not only at Passover but at every one of the major Jewish feasts—one encounters the ultimate power.

Christians did not discard the mythological feast in the spring, but made of it Easter. In its essential meaning, Easter has nothing to do with an ancient spring fertility rite—no matter how many sunrise services, rabbits or eggs are used in its celebration. The essential point is that in connection with the anamnesis of the Resurrection, the narrative of the Passion came to be the first extensive portion of the Gospel to be told and retold. Form-critics have amply demonstrated that the present shape of the narrative owes fully as much to the demands of the believing church as to historical knowledge. The Exodus was to become the archetype of the Resurrection; indeed, it is so referred to in Luke's account of the Transfiguration, where Moses and Elijah speak with Jesus of his Exodus (*tēn exodon autou*).

According to the New Testament and to subsequent Christianity, the Last Supper at once becomes the anamnesis of the Passion, Death and Resurrection of the Lord. It is impossible to separate the Last Supper (a single meal eaten by Jesus with his disciples before his execution) from the Lord's Supper (a cultic recollection), because there is no account of the Passion which was not

written in the light of Easter and of many Easters following. Paul's account of the Last Supper is imbedded in his instructions to the Corinthian Church for the celebration of the Lord's Supper. It says, "*Touto poiēte eis tēn emēn anamnēsin*" (I Cor. 11:24).

Our task is not to demonstrate the origins of the Eucharist or to work out intricate comparisons with the cultic meals of the mystery religions or the meals of the Essenes, if such they be, that are described in the Dead Sea Scrolls. Rather, it suffices to note that in the case both of the Exodus and of the Last Supper, there was a transmutation of history. The escape from Egypt and the Passion of the Lord served simply as the starting points from which the faith was to grow. To demonstrate that one system has borrowed from another does not in itself speak to the fact that the system from which the ideas were ostensibly borrowed is itself the working out of an archetype. As C. G. Jung says, "The life of Christ is just what it had to be if it is to be the life of a god and a man at the same time."⁸ Further,

Christ lived a concrete, personal and unique life which, in all essential features, had at the same time an archetypal character. . . . In the gospels themselves, factual reports, legends, and myths are woven into a whole. This is precisely what constitutes the meaning of the gospels, and they would immediately lose their character of wholeness if one tried to separate the individual from the archetypal with a critical scalpel.⁹

If the story of the Passion is told as a narrative of God's redemption, expression in the form of myth is a necessity. A simple recital of history, satisfying as it is to the scholar, does not suffice as the foundation of a cultus. The results of *Formgeschichte* corroborate Mircea Eliade's thesis that the historicity of the central figure in a cultic recollection of redemption "does not long resist the corrosive action of mythicization. The historical event in itself, however important, does not remain in the popular memory, nor does its recollection kindle the

poetic imagination save insofar as the particular historical event closely approaches a mythical mode."¹⁰

III

The historicity of the cult hero does not affect the mythopoetic process. The example of Krishna is instructive at this point precisely because his historicity is in doubt. Our first knowledge of Krishna comes in the Chhandogya Upanishad where he is the disciple to whom instruction is being imparted, but he does not come into his own until the time of the Mahabharata. The character of Krishna is fitted to the same sort of three story universe that Bultmann describes as mythological. There was a court of heaven led by Indra, very much like an earthly court. From time to time the gods stepped out of their heaven and took part in the affairs of men, so that eventually the classic statement of the Bhagavad-Gita could be made, "Whosoever the law fails and lawlessness uprises . . . then do I bring myself to bodied birth" (Bhagavad-Gita 4:4, translated by Macnicol). Below the earth there were demons who warred against the gods. God could not be indifferent to the struggle in which man was engaged, and so Vishnu intervened directly in the affairs of men. Eternity entered time. God became flesh to bring salvation. Krishna then figures in the tales told in the epic of the Mahabharata, which we need not here discuss.¹¹

The Fourth Gospel says of Jesus, "Among you stands one whom you do not know" (John 1:26b). So too with Krishna. Only a few episodes appear to indicate his true character: once when he rescues Draupadi whom the Kauravas would have dishonored, and again on the battlefield where he appears as Arjuna's charioteer in the famous Song of the Lord.

Many legends are told about Krishna, and not a few of them make him the means of union between heaven and earth. Such is the background of the stories of Krishna the

gopala and his exploits and affairs with the cowgirls, who are consumed with desire for his lovely presence. After many remarkable encounters, the problem of who and what Krishna is begins to emerge. The series of stories of Krishna and the gopis, and in particular Krishna and Rahda, are symbolic expressions of an eternal truth: There is a marriage between heaven and earth. The devotee is told, in effect, "God loves me," but in a way more profound and perfect than any discursive statement could achieve. The difficulty comes when we attempt to read the symbolism in literal fashion.

We may also consider an area where the historical basis is more evident. Buddhist literature can provide us with many instructive parallels, showing that civilizations and cultures quite independently of each other developed similar birth stories and apotheosized deities. They contain similar supernatural elements and thus go beyond the realm of historical plausibility.

The Path of the Buddha is a founded religion begun by the preaching of Siddhartha Gautama, the Enlightened One (Buddha), in the sixth century B.C. Although we cannot be sure that we have an authentic sermon of the Buddha, we do have the memory of his teaching in a believing community, the Sangha. Further, essentially the same processes of *Formgeschichtlichemethode* employed on Christian texts can be used on those of Buddhism.¹²

There is no authentic information about Gautama's childhood or youth, and no plausible biography is possible in any but the sketchiest details. We find a definite development in the different recensions of his biography. There is provided a sort of realistic life and there is also a "higher life," thus bearing out Eliade's contention that historical facts do not satisfy the necessity for cultic recollection.

As one would expect, the birth of the Buddha is told in legends which assert its cosmic importance. That is, although the birth of

Gautama probably did not differ as a simple event from the thousands of other births which took place in the subcontinent of India on the same day, in retrospect it is seen that this is one of those places where "eternity entered time." Hence this charming story:

Now at the moment when the future Buddha made himself incarnate in his mother's womb, the constituent elements of the ten-thousand world-systems at the same instant quaked and trembled and were shaken violently. The Thirty-two Good Omens also were made manifest. In the ten-thousand world-systems an immeasurable light appeared. The blind received their sight, as if from very longing to behold his glory. The deaf heard the noise. The dumb spake one with another. The crooked became straight. The lame walked. All prisoners were freed from their bonds and chains. In each hell the fire was extinguished. In the realm of the Petas hunger and thirst were allayed. The wild animals ceased to be afraid. The illness of all who were sick was allayed. All men began to speak kindly. Horses neighed, and elephants trumpeted gently. All musical instruments gave forth each its note, though none played upon them . . .¹³

What is this but the working out of the saviour archetype, which is of cosmic importance? In the same way, the Q Document has Jesus of Nazareth describe his own mission to John the Baptist by saying,

Go and tell John what you hear and see: the blind receive their sight and the lame walk, lepers are cleansed and the deaf hear, and the dead are raised up, and the poor have the good news preached to them (Matt. 11:4-5).

Doubtless the Q author—if not Jesus himself—had in mind the archetype spelled out in the apocalyptic additions to the book of Isaiah, where YHWH's redemption is stated thus:

Then shall the eyes of the blind be opened, and the ears of the deaf unstopped; then shall the lame man leap like a hart, and the tongue of the dumb sing for joy. For waters shall break forth in the wilderness, and streams in the desert. . . . No lion shall be there nor shall any ravenous beast come up on it; they shall not be found there, but the redeemed shall walk there (Isa. 35:5-6, 9).

The difference between Isaiah and Matthew is that the former proclaims a future redemption, and the latter, one that has come. But an even more striking parallel is the post-exilic Trito-Isaiah, which also looks back upon an event of cosmic proportions:

The spirit of the Lord Gon is upon me, for the Lord has anointed me; He has sent me to bring good news to the lowly, To bind up the broken-hearted, To proclaim liberty to the captives, And release to the prisoners; To proclaim the year of the Lord's favor (Isa. 61:1-2).

To return to Buddhism, Gautama, like Jesus of Nazareth, did not attract attention until his public ministry began. This did not prevent the tradition from assigning unusual powers to him from the very moment of his birth in, allegedly, a beautiful garden:

As soon as he is born the Bodhisattva firmly plants both feet flat on the ground, takes seven strides to the north, with a white canopy carried above his head, and surveys each quarter of the world, exclaiming in peerless tones: In all the world I am chief, best and foremost; this is my last birth; I shall never be born again. As soon as the Bodhisattva issues from his mother's womb, throughout the entire world with its gods and Maras and Brahmans there appears to all recluses and brahmins and to all gods and men, a measureless and vast effulgence surpassing the god's own celestial splendor and penetrating even those vast and murky interspaces between the world where gloomy darkness reigns and no light may enter of sun and moon for all their power and might.¹⁴

A comparable story appears in the Christian apocryphal tradition:

Jesus spake even when he was in the cradle, and said to his mother: Mary, I am Jesus the Son of God, that word which thou didst bring forth according to the declaration of the angel Gabriel to thee, and my father hath sent me for the salvation of the world.¹⁵

Christian piety rapidly developed legends about the birth and childhood of its Lord, a tendency which can be seen within the canonical Gospels themselves. However, since the canonical Gospels concern themselves neither with the childhood of Jesus nor with

the backgrounds of his family, it was only natural that a later generation would try to fill in the details.

We may refer briefly to one further religious tradition, Islam. As with Jesus and Gautama, the authentic history of Mohammed does not begin until he makes his appearance in Mecca as a prophet. But his figure does not escape the myth makers either. Tor Andrae has compiled pertinent information here. Additional exemplification of our archetype is immediately clear:

Even when Amina was carrying Mohammed in her womb remarkable signs occurred which foretold his future greatness. The mother experienced none of the burdens of pregnancy, and was unconscious of her condition until one day, in a state midway between sleep and waking, she heard a voice which said: 'The son whom you are to bear shall be the ruler and prophet of his people.' . . . the voice was heard again commanding her to name the child Ahmad. . . .

In the hour of his birth a brilliant light shone over the entire world from East to West. . . . When Mohammed was born he fell to the ground, took a handful of earth, and gazed toward heaven. He was born clean and without a spot, as a lamb is born, circumcised, and with the navel-cord already cut.¹⁷

IV

We may now turn again to the canonical Gospels and their stories about the birth of Jesus of Nazareth. These stories are cult legends par excellence. Their value consists almost entirely in the fact that as they are repeated year after year, the "Christ event" becomes a present reality and historical time is, in effect, obliterated. The Christian community sees the convergence of *kairos* and *chronos* in Christ, the entry of the timeless into time in an event which, while not repeatable, has conditioned all subsequent events and is, indeed, the goal of all previous events. The claim is a tremendous one. Only in modern times has any attempt been made to set it forth in systematic fashion.

Luke's account is more complicated than Matthew's because the birth of Jesus is there

intertwined with the birth of John. A comparison of the two shows such similarity that either one story is the model for the other or else both were derived from a common source. It is possible that stories of this sort were currently being told about John, and that, with alterations, they were made to apply to Jesus. It must be remembered that there were those who regarded John as the promised deliverer; that his story should be told in this fashion would, therefore, not be surprising.¹⁷

Common elements shared by Luke and Matthew include the divine name, the annunciation and prediction of the birth, the link with David, and the recognition (by *magoi* or by commoners). In comparison with some of the material we have pursued, these are restrained tales; yet their direction and motivation are clear. Back in 1930 Bacon recognized these stories as "the Jewish development of an international myth, whose ultimate roots are in Babylonia but which majian astrology spread to all regions of the eastern Mediterranean."¹⁸ It is evident that some of the underlying patterns, including the star, came from Jewish tradition. The *Sefer Havarshar*, a late Jewish midrash, speaks thus of the birth of Abraham:

On the night when he was born, Terah's friends, among whom were counsellors and astrologers of Nimrod, were resting in his house, and on leaving at night they observed a star, which swallowed up four other stars from the four sides of the heaven. They forthwith hastened to Nimrod and said: Of a certainty a lad has been born who is destined to conquer this world and the next.

Still further mythicization is involved. The celebration of Christmas has been placed at the winter solstice according to the Julian calendar, and this for reasons that have nothing to do with sober history. Luke contains the only possible purely historical indication of the time of year in his reference to "shepherds abiding in the field, keeping watch over their flock by night." In Palestine, shepherds abide in the fields between April and

November.¹⁹ The link becomes clear with the realization that the Koreion festival in Alexandria was also at the winter solstice. A close parallel with the Fourth Eclogue of Virgil has been widely recognized ever since Constantine had it translated into Greek for the benefit of the Council of Nicea, believing that it had a bearing on the discussion of the doctrine of the Incarnation. Virgil refers in this piece to the annual birthday of the Sun, December 25:

Now according to the prophecy of the Cumean Sibyl, the last age comes to an end. After the end follows another beginning, a cycle of new centuries.

... But for thee, dear Child, shall the earth unilled pour forth as her first little gifts at thy cradle all lovely flowers. The goats uncalled shall bring their milk, and the herds will not fear great lions; serpents shall be no more, nor poisonous herbs. . . .

. . . Enter on thy career—the hour is come—dear progeny of the gods, great offspring of Jupiter. Behold how the whole world—heaven, and earth and sea—rocks to and fro! how all things exult in the coming Aeon.

Begin, baby boy, to recognize thy mother with a smile. Begin, baby boy.

V

Obviously, some legendary material is dispensable, and world views can and do change. But one point must be made clear with respect to our particular discipline: The great religions of modern man are not only systems of belief formulated within some kind of super-terrestrial frame; they are, in addition, composed out of a matrix of inherited ideas and symbols. It is virtually impossible to separate the system from the matrix in which it is set. This means that as the matrix of modern life (including philosophy and religion) changes, religious systems will inevitably change.

In our day, these traditional systems are being reshaped, some simply by chance and some by direction. It is certain that the end of the twentieth century, into whose seventh decade we have already entered, will see the demise of much that we have regarded as

precious to our religious heritage. Paul Tillich has declared the end of the Protestant era, and there may well have been something prophetic in the choice of the name *The Christian Century* for the religious weekly christened in 1900.

The problem we have considered is not unique to one or another religious tradition. With dimensions appropriate to its own matrix, every major religious system faces virtually the same issue. Thus, there are unmistakable signs in Islam of an intelligent wrestling with the problem of transferring the genius, or, if you wish, the *kerygma*, of the old faith to the new wineskins of the fourteenth century of the *Hijra* in which we live. And the application of principles akin to *Formgeschichtlichemethode* to the Pali Buddhist canon indicates a similar awakening among those who walk in the Path of the Buddha.

The interpreter must combine two concerns. He must rigorously reconstruct as much simple history as he can by means of historical and literary criticism. He must also account for the mythicization of history, because the form in which an event of cosmic importance is recalled is likely more controlling than the mere history itself. One cannot solve the problem through an attempt to extract a timeless essence which can be reformulated according to a new world view. Events of redemptive significance are typically conveyed to ensuing generations in a form which is the outworking of a mythical archetype. Accordingly, the myth is fully as "true," at least in a psychological sense, as any reconstruction of "facts" devoid of interpretation.

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¹ Cf. Joachim Wach, *The Comparative Study of Religions*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1958, p. 65.

² Mircea Eliade, *Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return*, translated by Willard R. Trask, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959, p. 141.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁹ These terms are obviously related to Bultmann's analysis, but for the precise form of presentation, I am immediately indebted to Giovanni Miegge, *Gospel and Myth in the Thought of Rudolf Bultmann*, Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1960, *passim*.

¹⁰ Wach, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

¹¹ The use of the term anamnesis is not an attempt to cover a lack of clear definition by a Greek term. More is involved than memory, and even "recollection" does not come close enough. Anamnesis seems to be sanctioned in certain current psychoanalytic usage, and it is in this sense that it is employed here. Cf. Ira Progoff, *Jung's Psychology and its Social Meaning*, New York: Grove Press, 1953, p. 32.

¹² Cf. also vss. 17 and 24, which are certainly more of a reflection on an act frequently recalled than instructions for a journey.

¹³ C. G. Jung, *Psychology and Religion, West and East* (Bollingen Series, Vol. XX), New York: Pantheon Books, 1958, p. 409.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

¹⁵ Eliade, *op. cit.*, p. 42. In support of this thesis, Eliade cites a case in Rumania where a young man slipped and fell over a cliff and was mourned by his lover. Despite the fact that the principal witness, the lover herself, was present, a few years sufficed to strip the event of all historical authenticity and make of it a legendary tale, in which the young suitor had been bewitched by a mountain fairy, who, driven by jealousy, had flung him from the cliff. There developed a long liturgical lament full of mythological allusions. Even more surprising was the fact that although some of the villagers who told of the mythical version knew the his-

torical facts of the situation, these failed to satisfy. Some persons even said that the woman herself did not know what had happened and that only the myth told the truth. "Besides, was not the myth truer by the fact that it made the real story yield a deeper and richer meaning?" (*Ibid.*, p. 46.)

¹⁶ W. G. Archer, *The Loves of Krishna, in Indian Painting and Poetry*, New York: Grove Press, n.d., pp. 17 ff.

¹⁷ These methods are being employed by Professor Hajime Nakamura of the University of Tokyo with results remarkably similar to their counterpart in Gospel criticism.

¹⁸ From the Nidāna-Katha. Translated by T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys-Davids, in *Buddhist Birth Stories*, quoted in Clarence H. Hamilton, *Buddhism: A Religion of Infinite Compassion*, New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1952, p. 3.

¹⁹ Jack Finegan, *Archaeology of the World's Religions*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952, p. 250.

²⁰ I Infancy 1:1-2; quoted from *The Lost Books of the Bible*, New York: Lewis Copeland Co., 1930, p. 38.

²¹ Tor Andrae, *Mohammed the Man and his Faith*, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960, p. 34.

²² Martin Dibelius maintains that the legends about John became the basis for Luke's account of the birth of Jesus. See *Jungfrauenssohn und Krippekind*, Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1932.

²³ B. W. Bacon, *Studies in Matthew*, New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1930.

²⁴ S. M. Gilmour in *The Interpreter's Bible*, New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1951, Vol. VIII, p. 53.

The Never-Ending Quest for the Historical Jesus*

DWIGHT MARION BECK

Syracuse University

SINCE *Jesus von Nazareth* was first published in German in 1956, it has aroused widespread interest. The work of Bornkamm, Professor of New Testament in the University of Heidelberg and a noted scholar, is a return to the study of the historical Jesus, which has been an arid area in German New Testament research, especially since the rise of Form-criticism. (For recent developments, note the competent survey by James M. Robinson, *A New Quest of the Historical Jesus*, Allenson, 1959.) This turn in the tide may be seen also in Stausser's conservative book, *Jesus and His Story*, Knopf, 1960. It is probable that Bornkamm's work will even exceed in influence books like Bultmann's *Jesus* (1926) and Dibelius' *Jesus* (1939) because it has a wider scope and represents a more receptive attitude to the never-ending quest for the historical Jesus. The translators, working from the third German edition, provide at most points a lively, readable rendering into English.

This review falls into two parts: first, a rapid statement of what Bornkamm has presented and, second, some critical estimates of his work and its significance.

I

Bornkamm's book is intended to inform not only professional theologians but laymen also. He cannot agree that the actual history of Jesus must in all honesty be left blank. He writes with the real hope that his work

"might help the reader who is estranged from the heritage of the Church to a new and fresh meeting with the person and message of Jesus" (p. 10).

An opening chapter briefly discusses the basic issues of faith and history in the Gospels. Our historical knowledge of Jesus rests "almost exclusively" upon the Synoptics which "unite to a remarkable degree both record of Jesus and witness of him" (p. 14). However, Bornkamm does not hesitate throughout his study to quote from fifteen different chapters of John for additional understanding, even though in John, Jesus "is seen entirely with the eyes of post-Easter faith" (p. 68). The next chapter quickly presents the period and environment of Jesus, which includes the Jewish people, religion, groups, and John the Baptist. The third chapter, "Jesus of Nazareth," attempts to state the main indisputable traits of Jesus and an outline of his career. He was a prophet and a rabbi who proclaimed the coming kingdom of God and taught and gathered disciples. Yet he also differed from prophet and rabbi in manner, method, and followers. He possessed an astounding authority as he met both people and situations, and an insolvable and essential mystery which was "to make the reality of God present" (p. 62).

Then follow three chapters, the largest section of the volume, on the teachings of Jesus. These are entitled "The Dawn of the Kingdom of God," "The Will of God," and "Discipleship." "God's kingdom is near. That is the core of Jesus' message" (p. 64). This kingdom is not to realize the national hopes of his people. While his message shared

* GUNTHER BORNKAMM. *Jesus of Nazareth*. Translated by Irene and Fraser McCluskey with James M. Robinson. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. 239 pages. \$4.00.

some of the apocalyptic hopes of his day, its contrasts with these hopes were deep and fundamental. "Jesus' preaching and works are the signs and announcements of the coming kingdom of God . . . hidden in the everyday world of the present" (pp. 68-9). By his parables Jesus illustrates the coming reign of God. By his preaching he summons and promises. Repentance and readiness are required. Repentance leads to joyful living. Wisdom to interpret the present and watchfulness for the future are essential. A remarkable tension exists between Jesus' sayings about the future kingdom of God and its arrival in the present. These statements about future and present must not be separated. "The future of God is *salvation* to the man who apprehends the present as God's present, and as the hour of salvation. . . . God's future is God's call to the present, and the present is the time of decision in the light of God's future" (p. 93).

The Scriptures proclaimed the will of God but Jesus maintained an unparalleled freedom toward them which brought conflicts with Pharisees and scribes. He also proclaimed a new righteousness, seen notably in the Sermon on the Mount, a new stance whose reality is in God and whose command is love, "because it is what God wills and God does" (p. 114). Jesus saw the world and its powers in the light of the rule and the will of God whose immediate nearness and goodness and fatherhood "can only be understood as a miracle, and as an event which now takes place" (p. 128). For Jesus, faith is definitely counting on and trusting in the power of God, who is also the holy and coming judge. What Jesus taught his disciples about prayer is summarized in the Lord's Prayer. He "promises to those who do the will of God his reward in the kingdom of heaven" (p. 137). From Jesus came "a completely new meaning" of reward which, detached from deeds of merit, expressed divine justice and grace and summoned man to effort and faithfulness.

Discipleship depends upon Jesus' sovereign decision and upon man's answering decision to follow him. The kingdom imposes upon disciples a special task, destiny, and promise. The task is to "catch men" for the kingdom; the destiny and the promise lead to confirmation on the Day of Judgment.

Jesus' journey to Jerusalem, his suffering, and death are quickly covered. Aware of the possibility of a violent end, Jesus went to the city of God to deliver the message of the coming kingdom of God. "We have little certain knowledge in the proper historical sense about the last chapter of the life of Jesus" (p. 157). The events are interpreted to show the hand of God and the fulfillment of Scripture. The Jewish authorities, provoked by the entry and the cleansing of the Temple, felt compelled to intervene. Following the Last Supper, which, contrary to the Synoptics, Bornkamm thinks was not a Passover meal, Jesus was arrested. The report of the trial before the Jewish authorities arouses "critical doubts." The Roman execution, reluctantly authorized by Pilate, took place because Jesus was a "political suspect." The description of his death is presented in three great and profoundly different pictures by Matthew-Mark, by Luke, and by John.

The last two chapters, "The Messianic Question" and "Jesus Christ," deal with the all-important questions of Jesus' mission, the resurrection and the faith of the church. There is no doubt about the validity of the traditional views which accept Jesus as Messiah and Son of Man. However, Bornkamm does not think it is historically probable that Jesus used or accepted either of these terms for himself. "There still dimly emerges the fact that Jesus' history was originally a non-Messianic history, which was portrayed in the light of the Messianic faith of the Church only after Easter" (p. 172). The Messianic character of Jesus "is contained in his words and deeds and in the unmediatedness of his historic appearance" (p. 178). The resurrection is removed from historical scholarship.

The historical fact available is the Easter faith of the first disciples. But without the message of the resurrection of Christ there would be no gospel, no New Testament, no faith, no church, no worship, and no prayer in Christendom. The Easter *message* is earlier than the Easter *stories*, even though it must be sought in the stories. These stories differ in detail and contain gaps and legendary additions. The appearances of the risen Christ and the word of his witnesses gave rise to the faith that God himself had wrested Jesus of Nazareth from the power of sin and death and set him up as Lord of the world. The church began in the resurrection. It moved from him who proclaimed the coming kingdom to the one proclaimed with various confessional titles because Jesus himself was *the work of God* in the world.

II

The book deserves the highest commendation for its comprehensive clarity in presenting the most complex and debatable issues in the study of Jesus. Here is a fresh approach to the understanding of person, teaching, and work of Jesus, with an emphasis on unity of action and event and on the decisive significance—especially for the present but also for the future—of each of his words and deeds. Here is a searching, critical position which recognizes and values the faith of the early church reflected in the records but which insists that “the primitive tradition of Jesus is brim full of history” (p. 26). Though the Gospels interpret the history of Jesus as the history of God with the world, critical research retains an important role. Though the nature of the sources does not permit a life of Jesus, the Gospels do furnish much material for his history. Here is a confident renewal of hope in a historical as well as a faithful meeting with Jesus.

Bornkamm engages in a free and frank questioning not only of the sources but of the positions of other scholars. He makes

extensive references both to Scripture and to learned works to explain or support his expositions. He provides numerous wise negatives and distinctions in correcting or rejecting known views of both conservative and radical scholars. This work is significant as much for what it denies as for what it affirms about the historical Jesus, though this does not mean that the main tone is negative. It abounds in illuminating insights which invite extended quotation. The competence of the master scholar appears on every page as Bornkamm blazes his way through thickets of problems which beset any attempt “to seek history in the Kerygma of the Gospels and in this history to seek the Kerygma” (p. 21). The writing is refreshingly free from that continued use of “eschatological” which obscures much theological writing today.

The proportions of the book reveal the assurances of the author. The two chapters on “Jesus of Nazareth” and “Jesus’ Journey to Jerusalem: Suffering and Death” total twenty-five pages. The three chapters on the teachings of Jesus total seventy-nine pages. Does this indicate three times more confidence in the historicity of Jesus’ teachings? At least it accords with the well-known position of Bultmann. But although Bornkamm shares Bultmann’s view that faith cannot be dependent upon the changes, uncertainties, and relativities of historical research, he goes beyond Bultmann. Bornkamm includes not only Jesus’ teachings but his personality, activities and environment.

The brevity of some of the chapters may be due to the fact that *Jesus of Nazareth* is intended for laymen as well as professional theologians. While Bornkamm has remarkable ability to portray the essentials of a subject, there are statements which must be questioned. The tangled stories of Herodians, Romans and Jews are not clear at certain points. Antipater, administrator under Hyrcanus, was “forcibly removed” (p. 31). But Josephus reports that Antipater was poisoned by Malichus who desired to gain an

influential position in Judea (*Antiq.* XIV. 11.4; *Wars* I. 11.4). Agrippa I, who died in A.D. 44, is labelled "the last Herodian" (p. 33) but he actually had a son, Agrippa II (Acts 25:13; 26:2) who, though too young to rule at his father's death, did later continue the kingship with Roman permission until the end of the century. The "short duration" of the dominions of Herod's three sons who "almost all . . . finished up later as Roman exiles in Gaul" (p. 32) might well be more accurately stated. Archelaus did have a short rule of ten years but Antipas ruled forty-three years and Philip, thirty-eight. In fact, Philip died in his own dominion. To name Barabbas a "zealot" (p. 164) goes beyond historical evidence, though it is a possible inference, based on Mark's statement (15:6) that Barabbas was a rebel.

The outlines of Jesus' person and history are incisively drawn so that he emerges clearly possessed of historical reality. The interpretations of Jesus by the church are also pointedly indicated. This is no mean scholarly achievement. And where there are uncertainties, Bornkamm admits to them. Nevertheless, for all his remarkably successful portrayal of Jesus, from the standpoint of both event and significance, Bornkamm advocates positions which will not stand unchallenged. Thus, his claim that "doubtless Paul and the authors of the other New Testament writings knew extremely little of the detail which is known to us from the Gospels" (p. 17) is an argument largely from silence which could as easily cut in the opposite direction. Since Paul knew Peter and certain other disciples of Jesus and since his letters, which antedate the Gospels in composition, provide a considerable body of fact and interpretation of Jesus Christ, we may agree with Johannes Weiss that "there is no need to refute the purely academic theory that Paul had known nothing at all of Jesus" (*The History of Primitive Christianity*, p. 452).

It must be said that the person of Jesus

that stands out in Bornkamm's view presents some attenuated features. He was a prophet and rabbi but he was not Messiah or Son of Man (see chapters 3, 5, 8, and 9). No question arises about Jesus as prophet. But to accept "rabbi" as a title for him and to reject "Son of Man" (pp. 57, 230) is, as I see it, an impossible position on *any* historical ground, even though Bornkamm acknowledges that Jesus as a rabbi differed from others of this class. The evidence for "rabbi" is extremely slim in the Gospels. In Matthew and Mark, Jesus is called rabbi twice by Judas and twice by Peter. The term does not appear in Luke. Evidently Jesus made no impression as a rabbi outside the immediate circle of disciples; John's Gospel reports only once (6:25) that the people addressed him as rabbi. Probably the term was not popularly used until after the fall of Jerusalem and the reorganization of the schools, at which time the use of the title "Scribe" declined. "The old name, Scribes, was apparently the only one in use in the age from which the Gospels come" (G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, I, 43). How far Jesus was from scribe or rabbi can be seen through comparison with the ideal scribe or rabbi pictured in *Ecclesiasticus* (38:24-39:11). Jesus could be called an informal teacher but hardly "rabbi" in any precise meaning of that word.

In contrast, the title "Son of Man" appears some eighty times in the Synoptics and a dozen more in John (always in the words of Jesus himself) and only three times thereafter in the New Testament (Acts 7:56; Rev. 1:13, 14:14). Yet Barnkamm writes: "I consider it probable that the historical Jesus never used the title Son of Man for himself" (p. 230; cf. p. 177). Of course, this is no new position; Bruno Bauer long ago (1842) held it and so have some others. The origin, history and significance of the term present problems of the greatest difficulty. "The appellation Son of Man brings us face to face with the most involved and complicated of

all problems offered by the New Testament" (Charles Guignebert, *Jesus*, p. 270).

It is customary to divide Jesus' sayings about the Son of Man into three groups: (1) coming, (2) suffering, (3) acting, of which the first group is taken as being authentically from Jesus in its reference to a coming one other than Jesus. The complexities of this subject and the indecisiveness of the evidence require scholars to make no more than educated guesses. We may expect no agreement here. When the term, Son of Man, is studied in the Prophets, Psalms, Daniel, IV Ezra, Enoch, and the Gospels, it appears probable that Jesus knew and accepted the term for himself, though our understanding of the details of his usage will not be uniform. Since the use of the term, Son of Man, soon ceased both in the early church (which developed no theology about it) and also in the rabbinate, and since the Gospels report its use only by Jesus, there is less difficulty in accepting at least a partial application of the title by Jesus to himself than there is in ascribing its presence to the inventiveness of the first Christian community. One of Bornkamm's former students, H. E. Tödt, in his thorough study, *Der Menschensohn in der Synoptischen Überlieferung*, Mohr, 1959, has rightly supported some authentic usage of the term by Jesus. This is a subject on which the flood of scholarly study is still rising; we can only hope for more information and understanding.

Bornkamm gives some unusual interpretations of both teachings and events. The parables of the hidden treasure and of the high-priced pearl are not usually taken to illustrate repentance (pp. 82-3). The decisive basis for giving up all is not repentance but the kingdom. The question about taxes to Caesar is put in the margin as being "long ago decided," and yet God's things must be rendered in the light of the coming

kingdom of God which does not pass away (pp. 122-23). To identify the story of Gethsemane as historical and yet to assert that "no being witnessed Jesus' struggle" (p. 162) is to lessen unduly the evidence of the disciples' presence and to weaken the event historically. It may well be correct to see Jesus' history as originally non-Messianic (p. 172) and to accept his Messiahship as reflecting the faith of his first followers, but how then can it be affirmed that "the Messianic character of His [Jesus'] being is contained in his words and deeds" (p. 178)? Further explanation is needed of what Bornkamm means by "Messianic." It appears to me harder to believe historically "that Peter was given his name by the risen Lord" (p. 214) than to believe that he was so named by the earthly Jesus, since Jesus also gave nicknames to James and John, "the sons of thunder."

One could wish for more adequate discussion of miracles, due to the fact that they bulk so large in the Gospel reports. While "faith" (pp. 129-33) is all important, it is not the only ingredient in the New Testament accounts of miracles. As we have seen, Bornkamm does not think the Last Supper was a Passover meal; he prefers John's dating (Nisan 14), although he will "accept any date shortly before the festival" (p. 160). He supplies no refutation of the Synoptic interpretation of the Last Supper as a Passover. The brevity of discussion about the Supper is evidently due to the present form of text which reflects the church's celebration rather than the last meal with the disciples.

Even though brief, this book will on the whole invite repeated study for its depth of learning and for its interpretations of the most important issue in New Testament studies: the reliability of the Gospel accounts of Jesus.

Struggle and Rebirth*

S. PAUL SCHILLING
Boston University

PROBABLY no American Christian is better equipped to interpret the stirring lay movements of present-day Germany than the author of this informative and provocative book. To his competence as a church historian he adds the authority gained from some years of direct observation of and participation in the enterprises which he describes. The result merits the close attention of all who seek the renewal of the church and its redemptive participation in the fragmented life of our time.

Almost half of the volume deals with the historical and theological backgrounds of the *Kirchentag* and the *Evangelische Akademien*. The real "miracle" of post-war Germany, writes Littell, is not her rapid political and economic recovery, but the birth, amid the devastation, misery, and demoralization wrought by the war and the Nazi regime, of the most significant lay movements in the world today. These movements are a direct outgrowth of the heroic struggle of the "confessing church" against the totalitarian pretensions of Nazism, a conflict which found decisive expression in the famous Barmen Synod of 1934.

Under the influence of the late nineteenth-century intellectual outlook, German Protestantism of the early twentieth century assumed in the main the continuity of Christianity and culture. Religious affiliation and citizenship largely coincided; about ninety-five per cent of the population were nominal members of the church, Protestant or Catholic. Except for the small free-church minority, the Protestant churches received their

support from church taxes collected by the state. Remaining strong also were pietistic influences, which led many devout Christians to pursue the spiritual life without social concern. Holding a privileged position, the churches tended to accommodate themselves to the *status quo*, and only rarely did they venture to criticize or challenge accepted socio-cultural patterns.

This culture-Protestantism was shattered by the efforts of the Nazi state, in the name of a "positive" non-sectarian "religion," to compel the complete subservience of the church. Perceiving the deadliness of this threat to a truly Christian faith, multitudes of pastors, theological professors, and laymen strenuously resisted. Many of them lost their pastorates and teaching posts, large numbers were imprisoned, and some paid for their opposition with their lives. The theological foundation of this new "confessing church" was laid in the Barmen Declaration. In opposition to the "German Christians" and to less extreme adjustments to the Nazi order, the men of Barmen repudiated as false the teaching that there can be any other divine revelation than Jesus Christ, the one Word of God, and that "there are areas of our life in which we belong not to Jesus Christ but another lord." Here appeared a strong assertion of discontinuity between the demands of the state and society and the claims of the lordship of Christ. This recognition of discontinuity between gospel and culture Littell sees as functioning actively in the Stuttgart Declaration of October 19, 1945, in which the leaders of the newly formed Evangelical Church in Germany confessed their solidarity with the guilt of the German nation, and likewise in the formation of the first lay academy in September,

*FRANKLIN HAMLIN LITTELL. *The German Phoenix*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1960. xv + 226 pages. \$3.95.

1945 and the convening of the first *Kirchentag* in 1949. The need for such discontinuity is a recurring theme of the book.

The *Kirchentag* grew out of the resumption in 1949 of the *Evangelische Wochen* or lay rallies which Reinold von Thadden and like-minded laymen had held before the war to help faithful Christians resist Nazi pressures. The movement involves the holding, at first annually and more recently biennially, of large rallies together with a continuing program aimed at enlivening the laity. Negatively, the *Kirchentag* seeks to prevent another surrender of a morally unprepared and spiritually immature Christianity to the threats and allurements of a totalitarian state. Positively, as stated by von Thadden himself, its purpose is to take seriously five dimensions of life: the *time* in which we have been born, the *world* in which we live, the *human being* to which we belong, the *living God* who calls us, and the *Christian community*, the lay apostolate.

A typical national rally includes about 500 individual events: worship services, Bible study sessions, work-groups, lectures, concerts, presentations of plays and motion pictures, and exhibitions. There are six standing committees responsible for the main areas usually dealt with in the rallies: church and congregation, family and education, people and state, economics and society, village and agriculture, and city and settlement. The national rallies have drawn an average of 50,000 regular participants for a four-day period and from 180,000 to 650,000 for the closing outdoor mass meeting. Significantly, the largest attendance was that at Leipzig, in East Germany, in 1954, when 650,000 took part in the final meeting. Regional and local *Kirchentage* are also held. In these ways the movement is acting to deepen faith and to bring individual Christians and congregations into responsible relation to the life of today's world.

Born following the collapse of all civil institutions at the end of World War II, the

Evangelical Academies were initially an effort by the church to assist in the mental rehabilitation of the German people. Their continuing purpose, as formulated by the Council of Directors, is "to meet modern man in his everyday questions, to clarify these questions in the light of the gospel, and thus to witness to the unity of life in the freedom of the gospel." The academies are deeply disturbed over the fragmentation of present-day life, and especially by the disjunction of the work-world and the residence-world. People today seldom work where they live, so that church activity geared to the geographical parish alone fails to provide guidance where it is most needed. In a variety of ways the academies seek to witness to the lordship of Christ in both of these realms and thus to restore wholeness.

The work of the academies centers in conferences lasting two to four days and of two main types: those related to the problems of specific occupational or professional groups; and problem-centered conferences which relate the Christian faith to key issues in public policy. Participants include non-Christians, free churchmen, and Roman Catholics as well as members of the state churches. There is no effort to win acceptance of pre-conceived solutions; instead, stress is laid on full and free discussion of an informal type, with top-quality leaders being provided to contribute needed information and to help sharpen issues. Worship services are integral to the program but voluntary. In this setting laymen readily abandon their traditional role of passive receptivity. Called upon to help in defining questions and finding answers, and later in making concrete decisions in the light of their Christian faith, they become aware of their true apostolate. To a remarkable degree the academy movement has combined in its participants "both religious concern and professional integrity." It has won new respect for the church among many people who have long been hostile or indifferent, and it has given the church a new perspec-

tive on its own nature and its function in society.

There are now eighteen lay academies in Germany, including three in the German Democratic Republic. They sponsor approximately 600 conferences of all kinds each year.

In a penetrating closing chapter Littell asks what America can learn from the German phoenix. Here he surveys new developments in a third phase of reborn German church life, the Student Christian Movement, which now works through *Studentengemeinden*. This movement has found new vitality through multiplying the number of groups, which operate functionally according to the students' vocational commitments, and through forming many small Christian cell-groups which permit face-to-face acquaintance and discussion in depth. In view of the denominational pluralism of America, the author believes that the soundest strategy for applying the insights of Germany's lay academies in the United States would be the development of lay institutes in university settings, where trained personnel in many different disciplines could readily provide needed leadership.

As the author makes clear, the German lay academies have been extremely successful in confronting intellectuals in many walks of life and also leaders in business, industry, labor, communications, and government with the resources and imperatives of the Christian faith. However, it is doubtful whether the academies can effectively reach—or be expected to reach—large numbers of less educated people. Notable exceptions are conferences which have been held for such groups as department store employees, midwives, shop foremen, and hard coal workers. The fact remains that many of the topics considered—and the level of discussion—assume a greater background of knowledge and understanding than that possessed by many ordinary laymen who are still called to bear their witness in daily life.

This suggests a related problem: the inadequate connection between the large-scale aspects of the new lay movements and the life of the local church. Littell points out that many pastors and superintendents prefer to maintain their traditional monopoly of initiative and decision and hence resist the efforts of the *Kirchentag* to stimulate greater lay participation at the local level. Many attendants at academy conferences likewise find little in their local parishes to nourish or deepen their new-found concerns. Heinz Renkowitz, director of the Evangelical Academy at Arnoldshain, admitted after one conference that few of the participants could be expected to apply their new enthusiasms and carry their freshly aroused interest in basic religious beliefs to the point of making contact with congregations in their home communities. Nevertheless, Eberhard Mueller, founder of the pioneer academy at Bad Boll, insists that "the local parish will always be the center of the church." Bad Boll and a few other academies are now experimenting with follow-up efforts, assisting former conference attendants who live in one community to form continuing groups in the setting of parish life.

Littell renders an important service in calling special attention to the extent and vigor of the opposition to Hitler among pastors and laymen of the confessing church—a fact still not adequately appreciated by most Americans—and to the depth of the repentance expressed by the church in the Stuttgart Declaration after the war. He also points up the significance of the fact that in the divided Germany of today it is the church alone which maintains organized unity, while it continues to bear witness to its one Lord. He draws incisively and disturbingly a parallel between the culture-religion of pre-Nazi German Protestantism and much conventional Christianity in America today. "The difference between going to church as a part of 'the American way of life' and 'positive Christianity' as an expression of

'the religious genius of the German race' is, theologically speaking, a difference in temperature not a difference in climate" (p. 60). And the case he makes for the need of a disciplined lay witness in Germany, America, and elsewhere is irrefutable.

In the judgment of the present reviewer some of Littell's theological observations are insufficiently discriminating. For example, he quotes the view of Murawski that the nationalistic "German Christians" had good precedent for choosing their own "myth of the twentieth century," since the influential teachers of the church itself had already repudiated the Bible as only a book of fables, thus declaring the very center of church life to be untrue. Littell then adds, "Granted the initial position, the conclusions are hard to avoid" (p. 72), since nineteenth-century liberal theology had prepared the way for the abandonment of the biblical view of history and the relativizing of truth. He hints that the popular use of "textual criticism"—equated with "historical method"—had much to do with the growth of the hyphenated Christian groups which cooperated with the Nazis. Here the author fails to distinguish adequately between left-wing extremists and the main body of biblical critics, and overlooks the fact that many liberal theologians were centrally concerned to find firm historical foundations and the true and abiding meaning of Old Testament faith. He confuses textual and historical criticism, and unjustly blames biblical scholars for popular misinterpretations and false applications of their conclusions. He also forgets that the historico-critical method of biblical investigation is one legacy from liberal theology still cherished and constantly used by the theologians of the Word whom he honors.

Another question that requires attention is whether the lay movements really imply a theology of "radical discontinuity." Littell is certainly right in insisting that genuine Christian commitment and cultural conformity face in radically different directions. A

life lived under the lordship of Christ stands in sharpest opposition to that immersed in the spirit of the age. Yet both the *Kirchentag* and the Evangelical Academies assume a close relation between church and world and the relevance of Christian faith to the secular order. It is ordinary life in society that is to be ruled by God; the discontinuity of pietistic withdrawal is vehemently rejected. No symbol is more frequently used by the academies than the bridge. But a bridge connects two sides of the same river and supports us as we cross over. Bad Boll declares that its purpose is to bring to light "das gemeinsam Verbindende und Tragende" (that which mutually unites and upholds) in persons and groups, and to help people master the complex problems encountered in society through relating these issues to the sustaining and enduring fundamentals of life. Its program assumes that Christians and non-Christians, dependent ultimately on the divine activity, have a common basis of understanding, and that together they can by God's grace think their way through to sound answers. Littell himself seems to suspect that the academy procedure does not presuppose complete discontinuity, for he mentions as "an unresolved theological issue" the question to what extent real discussion can take place and how far the guidance of the Holy Spirit can be expected "in a mixed assembly of believers and non-believers" (p. 122). Yet the whole program of the academies seems clearly to imply the conviction that both results are possible.

Littell's discussion should challenge thoughtful Christians to explore anew what the relation between Christianity and culture ought to be. "The nineteenth-century religious and cultural continuum" involved both an inclusive church membership and the accommodation of the churches to prevailing social attitudes. Yet precisely in the midst of this identification, when practically everybody belonged to the church, a type of

religion became dominant which did not identify itself with men's day-by-day problems. Hence the very continuity of church and people in point of numbers involved a sharp separation between religion and life in reality. The same problem appears in American church life today, where expanding memberships are accompanied by increasing conformity to accepted cultural norms.

On the other hand, a church which knows itself to be a called assembly in the New Testament sense, a distinct people of God made new by his forgiving love in Christ,

will concern itself with the deepest needs and hopes of struggling human beings everywhere, who are at once God's creatures and the objects of his redemptive activity. The church is "called out" of the world for service in the world. Here in a real sense is discontinuity for the sake of a deeper continuity. A true church will neither neglect nor bless existing social arrangements. Rather it will seek to penetrate and transform them by the truth and power of the gospel, embodied in the daily decisions of faithful and informed witnesses.

On Thinking and Writing

The disciplined shaping of thought into speech is itself part of theology, despite the fact that much theological writing is very bad writing indeed. How did the notion ever get abroad that rigorous thinking and fine writing are at loggerheads with each other? Is it not a Christian insight that truth is a manner, as well as a matter, of saying or of living? One hopes for the time when theological writing will be not only more lucid but also more congruous in form with the bodying-forth in Christ of God's own speech to mankind, that is, more truly symbolic of the divine.

—ROGER HAZELTON in *New Accents in Contemporary Theology*, New York: Harper & Bros., 1960, p. 20.
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Book Reviews

GOD AND THE GODS

Radical Monotheism and Western Culture.

By H. RICHARD NIEBUHR. New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1960. 144 pages.
\$2.75.

Richard Niebuhr's latest volume is a powerful *Shema* to a latter day Israel, calling on Western man at last to heed the ancient neglected noble truth: the Lord thy God is one God. Is this *radical* monotheism? Yes, it is radical because it is taken with utmost seriousness. The other gods whom we worship are described so that we might forsake them, the compromises we accept are identified so that we might renounce them. Our faith is criticized so that, by this exercise of reason, it might be transformed. This, indeed, constitutes theology; and theology "must always participate in the activity of faith, though its ultimate concern is with God."

Faith means trust in a value center and loyalty to a cause. Any faith which is placed in the gods rather than in God has not yet responded to the call to Israel. "I shall contend," Niebuhr writes, that "the chief rival to monotheism . . . is henotheism or that social faith which makes a finite society, whether cultural or religious, the object of trust as well as of loyalty and which tends to subvert even officially monotheistic institutions, such as churches." In henotheism, there is worship of one god among many, not of one supreme God above all. The henotheistic deities may never be identified as such, but no matter; as Luther long ago recognized, "Whatever thy heart clings to . . . and relies upon, that is properly thy God." And though the circle of our loyalty and trust may be as small as self or as large

as humanity, the circles are still closed and the gods still fail. Our "country, our ideologies, our democracies, civilizations, churches, our art which we practice for art's sake, our truth which we pursue for truth's sake, our moral values, our ideas and the social forces which we personalize, adore, and on which we depend for deliverance from sheer nothingness and the utter inconsequence of existence"—these are the deities that stumble and fall, failing to provide the meaning and content which our lives desperately require. "The causes for which we live all die." Even the religion of humanity collapses, for "mankind does not find the unifying center within itself any more than any individual person does." Radical monotheism can find its center of loyalty in no closed circle whatever, but only in the principle of being itself, only in a loyalty to that One Reality by which all other realities exist and in which they participate.

When Western man is not henotheistic, he is likely to be polytheistic, thereby losing even the limited unity which henotheism affords. In the instance of a plurality of value-centers and loyalties, the severest disintegration of both personality and culture results. When the illusions of henotheistic worship are shattered, when loyalty to family, tribe or nation evaporates, then such competing and mutually nullifying deities as power, wealth, and prestige appear. "When the half-gods go the minimal gods arrive." Direction disappears, unity dissolves, confidence cracks.

And when all this occurs, a people might well begin to inquire after its national purpose. Where did it go? Who took it away? With so much sanctity and piety around,

must it not be here some place? To the mood of an honest and anxious re-examination—be it personal or national—Richard Niebuhr speaks. There must be a center of value which demands not only our love but also our loyalty—a center which directs not a portion of our lives but the full span of those lives, a center which makes of every day a Day of the Lord, of every nation a holy people, of every creature a sacred being formed in the image of God. Such a center of value can be known; it can be apprehended by faith, a faith born of intellectual struggle and of obedient suffering. Regrettably, a faith of this dimension is not widely sought, for it "involves us in a permanent revolution of the mind and heart." But "when men receive it, they receive a great gift."

This volume, which includes four "Supplementary Essays," is rich in its variety, rewarding in its perspicacity, regenerative in its promise. As one reads, he often finds himself recalling Isaiah's tragic lament: They keep on praying to a god that cannot save.

EDWIN S. GAUSTAD

University of Redlands

OLD TESTAMENT

Servants of the Word: The Prophets of Israel. By JAMES D. SMART. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960. 95 pages. \$1.50.


As promised in the Preface, this volume in the Westminster Guides to the Bible leads the reader through a long period of Israelite history and into the lives of many and varied personalities. It begins with an annotated listing of the early prophets: "J," the Sons of the Prophets, Moses, Deborah, Samuel, Nathan, Ahijah, Jehu, Elijah, Elisha and Micaiah. After this the pace slows down and more thorough treatment, within a framework of relevant time periods, is given to Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, Nahum, Zephaniah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Obadiah, Habakkuk, Second Isaiah, Haggai, Zechariah,

Joel, Malachi, Jonah and Second Zechariah. The account is well balanced with respect to both the relative amount of time given to each prophet and the things said about each figure.

It is somewhat surprising that the book does not discuss at all the work of the Scandinavian scholars. Any volume on the prophets, particularly one seeking to inform the laity on methods and results of recent study of the Bible (p. 8) can profitably make reference to the creative work of the oral traditionalists. One is reminded of this when the author alleges that Amos was a poet of unique power (p. 30). There are alternative interpretations. The poetry may be part of liturgical texts used by Amos or the medium which evolved to preserve the message of Amos. The oral traditionalists probably do not have the final word, but they represent the fact that the final word has not been spoken.

In the division of labor for these volumes, Mr. Smart was apparently assigned to handle every figure who was called a prophet. This has left him with a strong denotative definition of prophecy, but a difficult connotative definition. He points to many prophets, but it is hard to see what they have in common. Tradition justifies referring to such diverse characters as Moses, Amos, Malachi and Jonah as prophets. It has to be a broad definition that will embody something common to all these. And when such a definition is derived it cannot very well avoid covering a lot of other men too—the judges, for example. The author does state that there are different levels and types of prophecy (p. 19); it would be interesting and beneficial to discuss these types. Smart concludes that the prophet is neither primarily one who foretells the future nor one who speaks out against social evils, but one who declares "faithfully to his countrymen the will of God concerning them" (p. 12).

The treatment of Jonah is one of the most creative in the study. The author points up



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MARY COOPER ROBB, editor

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some important elements in what is not generally considered a very significant book. On the other hand, he gives rather nonchalant attention to some of the books generally held to be of greater importance. Hosea, for example, is treated rather sketchily. Not even much attention is given to the prophet's marriage; Smart does "not believe it provides a very solid basis for understanding the prophet" (p. 38). Likewise, Second Isaiah, which the author identifies with chapters 40-66, is briefly discussed with but little interpretation of the Suffering Servant passages. The discussion of some of the books, notably Ezekiel, could be livened up through more interpretation and less recitation of the content.

There are times when the reader wishes that the historical background of the prophets had not been assigned to another volume in the series. Such background could lend color and meaning to the understanding of some of the figures covered in this study. However, Smart has done an excellent and well-balanced job within the spatial limitations of this series. The beginner who is sophisticated will find here a comprehensive study of the prophets.

ROBERT T. ANDERSON

Michigan State University

The Book of Jeremiah; The Lamentations of Jeremiah. By HOWARD TILLMAN KUIST. The Layman's Bible Commentary, ed. Balmer H. Kelly *et al.*, Vol. 12. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960. 148 pages. \$2.00.

With the layman enthroned at present, at least as "king for a day," this pair of commentaries in non-technical, non-philological language is part of the rash of materials so generously provided for him. However, the author certainly does not dodge complexities in his treatment of Jeremiah. Kuist shows how this "rugged book" of "patchwork construction" is a very complex "scholar's puzzle," so that even "the trained interpreter is

confounded by many strange incongruities in the condition of the text" (p. 12). The author observes further that all these problems are caused by the book's being arranged according to topics rather than historical order. He is always truthful and frank in laying these problems before the layman, and masterful in doing so in such a simplified manner. He is especially good at tracing for the reader the stages by which the book has emerged and assumed its present form.

It is good to have an author desert some time-hallowed but apparently baseless interpretations. In connection with chapter five it is refreshing to see him veer away from the Scythian theory, which has been so popular in the past. In chapter thirteen, where the prophet goes to *ph'rath* to place his loin-cloth in the cleft of a rock, Kuist rightly casts his lot with those scholars who conclude that Jeremiah went to Phara, about four miles from his Anathoth home, rather than to the Euphrates, some four hundred miles away at its nearest point.

The fact that Kuist relates the work of this man of "burning moral convictions" to the work of other prophets at each step is particularly helpful. The author's remarkable ability at summarization is shown in his reduction of Jeremiah's whole temple sermon of chapter seven to one sentence: "A faith which divorces the worship of God from one's obligations to people is no real faith."

At certain points one must question Kuist's conclusions. It is not necessary to follow his assumption that Topheth (chap. seven) was rebuilt after the reform of Josiah. This particular utterance could well have been given during the years between the prophet's call in 626 B.C. (p. 7) and Josiah's reform in 622 B.C. (p. 44). It is hardly proper to call John the Baptist "the last of the prophets" (p. 22); surely the prophetic line has been carried forward by Jesus, Paul, Mohammed, Luther, Knox, Wesley, etc. Although Kuist regards the oracles against the nations in chapters 46-51 as genuine, the truth may be

on the side of those who regard them as a later appendage.

The author well observes that "conflict is the keynote of Jeremiah's public career" (p. 8). He also shows how this "harried and persecuted prophet" became increasingly "the elder statesman" of his day through being consulted by royalty. And he points out that Job and Jeremiah were the greatest sufferers in the Old Testament, and that they were also the two most determined seekers for ultimate answers. The word most used by each of these persistent questioners was "Why?"

With regard to Lamentations, Kuist describes them as "poignant litanies of grief mingled with communal confessions of guilt and heart-rending cries for mercy." He concludes that they were "composed during the exile" and apparently is inclined to accept the authorship of Jeremiah, at least of poems two, three, and four. In this connection he would have done well to remind his readers that Lamentations is not even included in the prophetic canon of Jewish Scripture.

There is no indication that Kuist is acquainted with the work of Julian Morgenstern who asserts that Lamentations was composed after a later destruction of Jerusalem in 485 B.C. and that, therefore, the poems are valuable as background against which the Book of Nehemiah is to be understood.

This reviewer was annoyed by the use of "Covenant people" and "Covenant God" on almost every page of both commentaries. Since the word "covenant" occurs in only nine chapters of Jeremiah's fifty-two, and never in Lamentations, it seems regrettable to see such terms turned into simply monotonous and repetitious shibboleths. We can hardly imagine Jesus, who regarded all people as the elect of God, using the former term, nor can we conceive of his employing the latter exclusive designation for the inclusive God of all mankind who sends his rain upon the unjust as well as the just. Rather than striving for new and supposedly im-

proved terminologies, perhaps we should be satisfied with the simple terms "God" and "Israel" as the biblical writers used them.

In spite of a few inadequacies, this is a well-written and solid pair of commentaries, so compacted with facts that they will provide the layman with something substantial to chew on for some time. Professor Kuist has not "stooped to conquer."

ROLLAND E. WOLFE

Western Reserve University

The Book of Psalms. By ARNOLD B. RHODES. The Layman's Bible Commentary, ed. Balmer H. Kelly et al., Vol. 9. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960. 192 pages. \$2.00.

This volume, in a series of twenty-five for laymen, is by the Professor of Old Testament at Louisville Presbyterian Seminary. He is also an associate editor of the whole series.

Some of the book's most valuable parts are the eighteen-page introduction, with almost half its content on the theology of the Psalms, the two-page list of psalms grouped according to type and subject, and the copious cross references to other biblical passages throughout the presentation.

In many respects this commentary is remarkably up-to-date. Although recognizing the distinctive elements in the Psalms, the author is aware that they are an integral part of the literature of the ancient Near East. As to authorship, he says that "there is reason to believe that David composed some psalms and stimulated the composition of others." Treatments of the individual psalms show that most of them cannot be regarded as Davidic. The author's datings range from "the very beginning of the Israelite nation" to approximately 300 B.C. He recognizes too that many psalms are not literary unities. For instance, Psalm 100 is regarded as a combination of two shorter hymns, while Psalm 95 shows the blending of a "double hymn" with a prophetic oracle.

Most of the interpretation is good; however, it is not uniform. The analysis of Psalm 24 is a good example. The author is rightly aware that this psalm is not a unity but "is composed of three distinct parts . . . which may have originated independently." And he wisely observes that the "reflection of prophetic thought" in vss. 3-6 "is too clear to permit a Davidic date" for that section. The entire treatment of vss. 1-6 is superb. But, by contrast, the discussion of the second part of the psalm goes astray when the author posits a choir at the "gates" (a term not used for temple doors) of Solomon's Temple. Instead, this latter part probably represents the victorious Israelite army returning by night with the ark to the city of Shiloh, and calling for the city gates to be opened in order that the ark may be returned to its usual place in the Temple.

Similarly, the interpretation of Psalm 23 is excellent in its following of the shepherd figure—until the last two verses. There the author is misled by older commentators into deserting the meaningful shepherd figure and diverting to the banquet scene and "gracious host" interpretation. This annuls the conclusion through a diversification which is unpardonable. Instead of the "House of the Lord" as the shepherd's dwelling, with attached sheepfold, or God's created world if the metaphor is resolved, the author presents "the Temple in Jerusalem." This certainly does not fit the thought of the psalm.

The interpretation of Psalm 95 goes even further astray. It hardly seems possible to deny that "a great king above all gods" assumes the existence of other gods. The assertion that there are no polytheistic remains in the Psalter (p. 17) forces Rhodes to conclude (p. 21) that the gods "are in essentially the same category as angels." This seems an undue glossing over of polytheistic influences.

The term "covenant," which occurs hundreds of times in this commentary, unduly generalizes the covenant idea by applying it

to all psalms, in spite of the fact that the actual word is found in only twelve of them. This uniformizes the Psalms with the result that the most distinctive element in the universalistic psalms is lost.

In an error of fact it is stated (p. 7) that the Second Temple existed from 537 to 519 B.C. While the latter may be a typographical error for the author's own date of 19 B.C. as the founding of Herod's Temple, the former date cannot be so excused. Zerubbabel's Temple was not started until 520 B.C. and was not dedicated until 516 B.C.

This study might well have been called "A Christian Commentary to the Psalms." It indicates which psalms are quoted in the New Testament, giving attention to the circumstances and purposes of such references. The teachings of Jesus and of Paul and other New Testament writers are frequently brought into juxtaposition with those passages from the Psalms where there is some relevance. Many treatments of individual psalms contain as a final paragraph a kind of Christian appendix which interprets the psalm involved from the standpoint of Christianity. Individual sentences throughout the commentary do the same thing. Many people will like all this; some will regret it. At times it is carried to a point where the author might be accused of pirating the Jewish Scriptures. If the authors of the Psalms could somehow read this commentary, what would they say about it?

Rhodes does offer an immortal definition of the Psalms: "the faith of the Old Testament set to music."

ROLLAND E. WOLFE
Western Reserve University

BIBLICAL THEOLOGY

The Powers That Be. By CLINTON D. MORRISON. Naperville, Illinois: Alec R. Allenson, 1960. 144 pages. \$2.25.

The author of this twenty-ninth volume in the series "Studies in Biblical Theology"

is Associate Professor of New Testament at McCormick Theological Seminary. His subtitle is "Earthly Rulers and Demonic Powers in Romans 13:1-7." Dr. Morrison (Th.D., Basel, 1956) explains in the Preface that the present study was made in the summers of 1953-1955 and that references to more recent studies are additions to the manuscript as it was subsequently prepared for publication.

The book is divided into two parts. In the first, in standard doctoral dissertation style, Morrison reviews the problem of the meaning of Romans 13:1-7 and all earlier solutions. In the second part, he proposes a new contribution to the exegetical problem and then adds three short appendixes. Appendix A is a valuable discussion of the Ruler Cult, Appendix B is a bibliography on the Jewish colony in Rome in the Graeco-Roman period, and Appendix C contains some negative consequences of the main thesis, in the form of brief repudiations of some aspects of earlier exegesis. There are indexes of authors cited and biblical passages. Each chapter contains a bibliography.

The author states the problem as follows: How could Paul give such unqualified sanction to the state and how is such sanction related to the description of Rome in the Apocalypse as the "beast rising out of the sea"? The traditional solution that Paul's statement is a psychological reaction appropriate to the period prior to the official persecutions is rejected on the grounds that (1) Paul's erstwhile experience with Rome was not so uniformly happy as the theory presupposes; (2) I Cor. 6:1 ff. was written earlier than Romans 13 and seems to contradict it, or at least to qualify it; and (3) I Peter 2:13 ff. expresses a view similar to Paul's in Romans, and yet comes from a period of persecution.

Morrison then describes the development of a theological explanation, rooted in Dibelius and explicitly expressed in 1936 by Günther Dehn, which approaches Paul's thought from the point of view of late Jⁿ---

ish ideas about the spirit-world. The *exousia* refers to the "spiritual powers" that were active in the crucifixion of Jesus and were defeated but not destroyed through his resurrection. Standing behind legitimate human rulers, these *exousia* are now under Christ's lordship, even though they are "ignorant of or opposed to his gospel" (p. 34). The state's purpose, therefore, is one of maintaining peace and order in the interim between the "Kingdom of Christ" and the "Kingdom of God," a peace and order understood only by Christians as a necessary setting for the missionary enterprise. Paul's unqualified approval of the state, therefore, is eschatological; in the Kingdom of God "the State will no longer have purpose or substance" (p. 35).

After summarizing the criticisms of this theological exegesis in chapter two, the author evaluates both sides (chapter three), and then gives his own solution (chapters four and five). He begins with the (overstressed) assertion that the passage in question "must be understood as part of a communication" (p. 63). The deciding factor in the meaning of *exousia* has to come from the views of Paul's readers in Rome ("a conspicuously Gentile Church," p. 61) rather than from a psychological theory or consideration of late Jewish thought. Accordingly, Morrison proceeds to define the ideas of the Roman Christians to whom Paul was writing. To do this he expounds "The Graeco-Roman Conception of the State in the Cosmos" (pp. 68 ff.), and reaches the surprising conclusion that this conception was common to everyone in this period—to Jews, pagans, and Christians. Therefore, it was also the view of the Roman Church. (If so, why emphasize "communication," as the author does earlier?) This common view assumed that behind all human rulers were corresponding cosmic powers. The two were inseparable concepts in the mind of the Graeco-Roman citizen.

This much Morrison finds to be true in

the newer theological explanation of Romans 13. But he does not find evidence for the view that the *exousia* were subjected to Christ in the resurrection event. He sees no change at all in their status or relationship to the cosmos as a result of the cross and the resurrection. Instead, he finds their role explained best in the early Christian doctrines of the work of Christ in creation. The *exousia* are divinely appointed (and temporary) agents for the maintenance of order, but they are servants of God, not of Christ, and they perform, therefore, a peculiar service in the *Heilsgeschichte*. Christ's victory over the *exousia* was not an objective victory in the cosmos, but a victory that has meaning only in the community of believers. Paul's approval of the state turns out, finally, to be a prudential matter; "the Church stood to benefit far more from the service of the *exousia* by avoiding their displeasure wherever possible." Resistance to the authorities, except where conflicts with a higher loyalty to Christ arose, "was not only foolish and injurious to the mission of the Church, but resistance to what God had appointed." The only guide to an intolerable conflict here is "the conscience of the man in Christ" (p. 129).

LINDSEY P. PHERIGO

National Methodist Theological Seminary

A Christian Theology of the Old Testament.

By GEORGE A. F. KNIGHT. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1959. 383 pages. \$5.00.

This is an important book, fresh and original in execution. It stands within the *Heilsgeschichtliche* approach. Perhaps at some points its accents are too bold, but on the other hand, this very boldness provokes thought and quickens insight.

The discussion falls into four divisions. In Part One examination is made of "what the Old Testament has to say about the person of the Living God." Although the Old Testament never describes God as a person, says

Knight, God is nevertheless revealed in his speeches and actions as a person. Further, just as Hebrew society and the Hebrew individual were interpreted from the point of view of unity in multiplicity, so God also as a corporate entity has revealed himself in a multiplicity of expressions, and yet remains a fundamental unity. This anthropomorphic approach to the Old Testament God does not seem to me to describe Israel's own consciousness of God, although it may well explain why Israel thought of God as it did. Understanding God in terms of Israel's understanding of man is a central theme in Knight's position. It reveals both the kind of overstatement which is characteristic of this book and the originality and sensitivity which are the book's great strengths.

Part Two maintains "that God's attitude to the universe, including man, must needs be one of wrath, since both fallen angels and man are in a state of rebellion against God's purposes for them." Knight sees the Old Testament interpreting Creation as a conflict between God and Chaos, light and darkness, a conflict which continues through all history, whether the Egyptian Exodus, the career of Jesus, or even the coming eschaton. The author's discussion here was to this reviewer the strongest and most original part of the book.

Part Three is comprised of "a series of pictures, each complementary to the other, portraying the unique relationship which has obtained in history between God and one nation of men," a relationship portrayed in such figures as the Vine, Son of God, Son of Man, the Bride, the Rock, and the Servant. Overarching this section is an accent on the God of history who acts and, more especially, acts through the unique relationship with Israel as his elect.

Part Four examines the purpose of God as revealed in the Old Testament. God wills the redemption of fallen mankind through the history of Israel seen in its five "moments": birth (Exodus), marriage (Sinai

covenant), death (Exile), resurrection (the Return and later), and life everlasting (the consummation of history). However, Knight acknowledges that the bald recital of these "moments" does injustice to biblical faith. These five relationships between God and man are phrased in terms of the meanings emanating from a core of historical events. Included in this section are an enumeration and description of seventeen characteristic expressions of Israel's eschatological faith. The book closes with a description of the new heaven and earth anticipated in the Old Testament and an appendix, "Israel and the Church."

The use of the word "Christian" in Knight's title suggests his approach. By and large he handles his material in ways that are faithful to the Old Testament, but when he comes upon subjects close to the heart of the New Testament (e.g., the Suffering Servant), his conclusions are always in the direction of orthodox Christian theology. Also his material frequently seems to be gathered and described in terms of New Testament interests (e.g., the six figures of Israel's interpretation of itself found in Part Three), rather than in terms of the Old Testament as a whole.

The book bears a personal flavor; it lacks the atmosphere of detachment found in the theologies of such men as Jacob and Vriezen. The style is more informal and employs modern analogies. This is not necessarily a deficiency, for the reasoning of the Old Testament itself is analogical and Knight's comparisons are apt. A definite result is greater ease in reading. The bibliography is broad but seems to cluster around selected topics. Interspersed throughout are lists of various subjects which provide valuable classifications and citations (e.g., the theophanies found on pp. 75 ff.). The discussion is strengthened by a reliance on the exposition of the meaning of Hebrew words and by frequent citations from the Old Testament which are not mere references but clear de-

scriptions of the meaning of the biblical text.

The overall theme of the book is that of the God who acts, a subject which has now been described a number of times. Knight's use of the five "moments" of Israel does not add too much here. His greatest contributions are found in certain sections of the study rather than in the whole. He is at his best in describing Yahweh's conflicts with chaos and darkness and in setting forth the psychological timbre of Israel. This is an important volume, one with which every serious student of the Old Testament should be familiar.

LIONEL A. WHISTON, JR.

Eden Theological Seminary

The Imitation of God in Christ. By ERNEST J. TINSLEY. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961. 189 pages. \$4.00.

There are books in biblical studies which occasionally bring forth enthusiastic words of approval from a reviewer. This book is one of them. It is written by an Anglican priest, lecturer in theology at the University of Hull, examining chaplain to the Archbishop of York, and Vice-President of the New Churches Research Group in Great Britain. Sometimes theologians quarrel over words, saying that we can "follow" Christ but not "imitate" him; and that "mysticism" belongs only to Eastern philosophic religions with their other-worldly and life-denying attitudes, with little relationship to a future eschatology, and with an obliteration of the "I-Thou" prayer situation. Tinsley, however, stresses "the imitation of God in Christ" as having its background in the Old Testament, where Israel acts as *Initiator Dei*, and thus shows in real fashion its continuing development through the writings of the New Testament which followed upon Jesus Christ's advent, life, teachings, death, and resurrection.

With respect to "mysticism," Tinsley relates this frequently misunderstood term to

the word "mystery," and believes that it is firmly grounded in the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Atonement. He differentiates "natural mysticism" from "revealed mysticism": "One could say that Christian mysticism provides the meditative prayer of revealed religion and 'natural mysticism' that of natural religion." He adds further that his book is written in the conviction that Christian spirituality can contain within itself a genuine mysticism which enhances rather than weakens its attachment to a particular revelation, and that this mysticism is centered upon the idea of "the imitation of Christ."

Jesus was interpreted by his followers as "the Way," through whom the Scriptures of Israel were fulfilled. He was the Way of Sonship, the Way of Knowledge, and the Way of the Torah. But through his Way of Sonship, the Way of the Son of Man was interrelated with the Way of the Servant. Jesus Christ saw that "his mission to Israel involved for him being himself Israel the martyr." Hence, the "sign" of the disciple was indicated through his own following of Christ: "If the life of the Lord is an imitation of the Father, the life of the disciple is an imitation of Christ." Tinsley leans toward the view of Stauffer, which concentrates upon the doxological way: Jesus Christ as the Son of Man is to imitate the Father and thus glorify him. Jesus intended his disciples to imitate him in "the Way." The Gospel of John emphasizes that Jesus is the imitator of the Father, while Paul seeks his followers to imitate him (Paul), the apostle of Christ. "St. John, like the Epistle to the Hebrews, was more concerned with meditating on Jesus as the *object* of the Christian life, whereas St. Paul was an 'active' mystic, primarily aware of Jesus as the *means*, through the Spirit, of the life of the Christian. . . . In the Christian *imitatio Christi* the Lord is at one and the same time the object of the *mimesis* and, through the Spirit, the means of it."

Readers of this review are urged to pro-

cure this study and to digest its rich contents. Its style and semantics are alive, and it has a deep devotional touch. Though committed to a particular theological position, its clarity and vitality will appeal to every person interested in biblical studies. The pages are rich in suggestions for preaching and teaching.

Let this book be placed near the top of one's "must read" list. It has a vital, scholarly, and readable message.

THOMAS S. KEPLER
Oberlin College

THEOLOGY AND ECCLESIOLOGY

Victor and Victim: The Christian Doctrine of Redemption. By J. S. WHALE. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960. 172 pages. \$3.75.

Within the compass of eight brief chapters, J. S. Whale interprets the Christian doctrine of redemption with characteristic clarity, learning, and conviction. The compactness of his presentation may be associated with his recognition that the doctrine of redemption is designed to serve the deed of redemption. He is impelled to write because his intellect is grasped by the "deed" and moved to offer an ode of dialectical praise.

Whale is skillful in laying open the actual "offenses" of biblical religion. The offenses of the "fullness of time"; of particularity and universality; of the "I," the "Thou," and the "We"; of justice and mercy; of law and grace; of creation and eschatology; of death and resurrection—all these are given expression between a first word of action—"The central declaration of Christianity is not that God is something but that he has done something" (p. 1)—and a last word of being—"For the final truth, which transcends logic and against which the evil of the world cannot ultimately prevail, is that God is love" (p. 166).

The divine grace as "love in action" is the

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central conviction of the book. "God's *prevenient* grace means . . . that everything in the Christian religion depends on the divine initiative and gift. The Incarnation means that God so loved the world that he gave his only Son (John 3:16). The Crucifixion means that God commands his love to us in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us (Rom. 5:8). The Resurrection means that God giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ (I Cor. 15:58). All is of God" (p. 126).

Grace as love in action is understood as something that is done in Christ for sinful men, something done "not only by God but to God" (p. 37). This paradox of the action and passion of the cross is developed through three biblical metaphors: the battlefield, the altar, and the law court. The battlefield emphasizes the victory through Christ as victor. The altar is the locus of the sacrifice of Christ as victim. The law court provides the symbol of judgment upon Christ the sinner. In his choice of the title *Victor and Victim*, Whale gives priority to the first two metaphors. The redemptive and expiatory functions are preferred to the penal function represented by the third metaphor. For, according to the author, the main witness of the New Testament "is to Christ as Victor and as Victim" (p. 73). Even so, Whale regards all the metaphors along with all theories of atonement as "efforts to state in words or images the paradox of forgiveness in judgment, the divine mercy in the divine wrath" (p. 75). Granted the fallibility of all such expressions, Whale's attempt to establish the priority of the "victor" and "victim" symbols seems strained, especially in view of his insistence on Christ's uttermost identity with sinners (p. 77) and his insistence that "judgment and penalty are one and the same fact in Christ crucified" (p. 67).

We must raise at least two further questions: (1) Is it really bad art if the passion of Christ is pictured in terms of suffering, loneliness, tears, and even despair? Or does

Whale intend only to criticize the self-pity and sentimentality in so much art of the passion? If he means the latter, no one will object. If he means the former, we must pause. Does the doctrine of the Trinity actually require that there be "no separation between the Father and the Son" in the passion? On the day of the crucifixion, was the crown of thorns only a crown of victory for Jesus? Is it true that Jesus was only reigning over the world from the tree? Is there not here a survival of the speculative effort to force a historical event into a pattern of thought, and this in a way that simply blunts the awfulness of the event? Whale does not seem to have made up his mind on this point, for he still wants a cry of dereliction from Jesus; indeed, he wants God's cursing of sin even when God's Son is its object. But Whale also maintains that there can be no ultimate or even temporary separation between the Father and the Son, for the Son's satisfaction is, "*ineffabili modo*, the Father's self-satisfaction" (p. 78). He further insists that "Christ alone could know the agony of being 'forsaken' by God, since he alone is indissolubly one with him" (p. 78). Whale is close to paying a docetic price in exchange for the perfection of the doctrine of the Trinity.

(2) Is it not more meaningful now to emphasize the coalescence of two histories in Jesus Christ than to perpetuate the Chalcedonian language of substance? Are not "process" and "history" more authentic biblical categories than "substance" for retaining the fullness of Jesus' manhood while maintaining nonetheless that God himself confronts man in this event? The language of act, "God was in Christ," is more suggestive than the language of substance and identity. Whale's quotation from Luther, "This Man is God, this God is Man," rather obscures the clarity of such functional expressions as the "saving events of Holy Week are the deed of God" (p. 58) and "since God is in the living and dying of this Man . . ." (p. 59).

These questions do not annul a deep appreciation for Whale's position, manner of expression, and excellence of presentation. The flavor of the volume is further suggested in a few final quotations: "The sentimental interpretation of the divine love is a lie" (p. 75). "The ultimate becomes actual only through the concrete, the universal only through the particular" (p. 87). "The Church of God is destined to include all humanity. Its meaning lies in its ultimate universality" (p. 115). "The supreme issue of death is not whether we have a soul or, if so, whether it survives when the body is buried or burned or drowned or blown to bits: it is whether we will live with God, which is heaven; or without him, which is hell" (pp. 151, 152).

JACK BOOZER

Emory University

Jesus and the Trinity. By WALTER RUSSELL BOWIE. New York-Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960. 155 pages. \$2.75.

With simple clarity and earnest evangelical purpose Dr. Bowie seeks to make the doctrine of the Trinity understandable, relevant, and vital to Christian laymen. Beginning with the personal impact of Jesus upon his disciples as disclosed by the Synoptic Gospels, he proceeds in short chapters through Paul's experience of the living Christ, John's concept of the incarnate Word, the Holy Spirit, and Gnosticism, to the Nicene Creed. "Trinity was not the first word," he writes, "but the last one; the first was Jesus" (p. 72). Throughout the volume he presses hard the point that to start with Jesus "is to start where thought and feeling can sense a contact which may have for everyone some real solidity" (p. 133). The doctrine of the Trinity is regarded as the consistent conclusion to which normal questioning grounded in faith led the church. There are those who believe that inconsistency or heresy precedes orthodoxy and that

orthodoxy may be powerful without being correct.

Having admitted the logic of Arius, the author argues that Athanasius saw more clearly the importance of the Incarnation. This is probably true, but it is also the case that the issues were fought more on a basis of *argumentum ad hominem* and of political intrigue than on critical intellectual grounds.

Bowie makes clear that the source of the doctrine is reverent imagination. "The doctrine of the Trinity thus is not a revelation," he declares, "it is a derivation" (p. 134). He devotes several pages to a criticism of that extreme neo-orthodoxy which so emphasizes God's "otherness" as to make incarnation impossible. On the other hand, he pays tribute to Dorothy Sayers' familiar position in *The Mind of the Maker*, but then ends by saying that "an attempted parallelism projected from the facts of the human mind simply does not bridge the gulf between our utmost conceptions and the mystery involved in the doctrine of the Trinity" (p. 140). For Leonard Hodgson's more penetrating work, *The Doctrine of the Trinity*, which he succinctly and accurately summarizes, Bowie has a similar word of dismissal. Were Hodgson's reasoning completely followed, he concludes, "it would prove too much" (p. 142).

A disturbing intellectual defeatism runs through this slim volume. Why one should bother to think hard about the Trinity is not clear in view of the above emphasis. Nevertheless, in a final chapter Bowie suggests a heuristic position with respect to all intellectual exercises on the doctrine. He calls for acceptance of the doctrine, not as something merely to be "understood," but as possessing the fragrance and fruitfulness of a living truth rooted in the remembrance of the Word made flesh (p. 155).

It seems to this reviewer that the author gives inadequate attention to the peculiarity of the intellectual climate in which the early church worked out the formulations of its

faith. Suppose, for example, that Jesus had come first to eighteenth-century Birmingham. Would the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have formulated any such creeds as we have inherited from previous epochs? What has Athens to do with Oak Ridge? What has the doctrine of the Trinity to do with relativity and quantum mechanics? Can fourth-century formulae be made vital to twentieth-century minds? There can be no doubt that men and women are still confronted by Jesus and captured by the living Christ. But there is little likelihood that they will articulate that experience meaningfully in a symbolism not integral to their culture. Old wineskins are always inadequate no matter how well they are patched up.

Few books have been written with such piety and enthusiasm in the face of this perplexing doctrine. Whether the theology is "sound" the reader will have to decide for himself. Certainly the spirit of the volume is open, irenic, and devout. Unfortunately, most trinitarian Christians, unlike the author, seem to end up in one of the many pitfalls he points out. I for one doubt that the doctrine can or should have the importance in modern thought Bowie gives to it.

JOHN F. OLSON

Syracuse University

An Era in Anglican Theology. By ARTHUR MICHAEL RAMSEY. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. x + 187 pages. \$3.50.

There should be no fear that the new occupant of Lambeth Palace is not alert to the beliefs of his church. Archbishop Ramsey is a former professor at Durham and Cambridge and has produced a number of works in biblical and historical theology. His sixth book consists of the Hale Lectures at Seabury-Western Theological Seminary. He identifies his lectures as a sketch of a half century of Anglican theology from Gore to Temple (1889-1939).

The author first analyzes the attempt of the *Lux Mundi* school to "put the Catholic faith in its right relation to modern intellectual and moral problems . . ." (p. 2), illustrating this through references to evolution and biblical criticism. This group was criticized for a leaning toward philosophical idealism, and yet it was Gore's article in *Lux Mundi* that evoked a twenty-year discussion over incarnational kenotic theology. Faced with the danger that the interest in the kenotic position would eclipse soteriology, Gore insisted upon the necessity of a theology of redemption. Later Temple was to observe that a "theology of Incarnation tends to be a Christocentric metaphysic. A theology of Redemption . . . tends rather to sound the prophetic note . . ." (p. 159).

Ramsey finds that during the first three decades of the era, theologians viewed the Atonement in cosmic, liturgical, and evangelical terms. Liberalism favored an exclusivistic exemplarist position. A later tendency toward patristicism, as exemplified by Studdert-Kennedy, is noted.

The influence of Harnack upon English Modernism resulted in its concentration upon the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man and the rejection of all else as accretions. Modernism insisted upon the right of free inquiry, the use of the results of modern sciences, and the fact of development in the understanding of Christian faith. As the movement lacked uniqueness, it lost its appeal. However, it was responsible for the development of Liberal Catholicism, which was prominent between the World Wars. This latter movement, according to Gore, made its appeal to Scripture, antiquity, and reason. Later it called strongly for a synthesis of religion and contemporary scholarship. It asserted that faith in Christ must come first, and from this faith issues the teaching of the church.

During the second decade of the nineteenth century a controversy arose over required clerical subscription to credal affir-

mations. This controversy centered around the necessity of affirming a belief in a literal Virgin Birth and bodily resurrection of Jesus. The resultant diplomatic resolution made allowances for "uncertainty." Ramsey comments: "A little untidiness is the price which the Church can bear to pay for its power to present the one Catholic faith with sensitiveness to the difficulties of an age" (p. 91).

In his examination of the doctrine of the church, Ramsey shows that the main concern of the theologians was apostolic succession. Gore had maintained that apostolic orders were essential; otherwise an ecclesiastical body was a mere society. As the ecumenical movement began to develop, Anglican theologians contended that the historic episcopate was necessary to achieve unity. However, Temple affirmed the positive significance of the non-episcopal communions and advocated that each church body could, through confession of its own failures, contribute toward unity.

Ramsey's first work, *The Gospel and the Catholic Church*, has been called by J. A. T. Robinson the harbinger of a revival in biblical theology, but in one of the finest chapters of the present work, Ramsey gives an earlier scholar, Sir Edwyn Hoskyns, the credit for this new emphasis. It was this new biblical theology coupled with Herbert's liturgical interest that resulted in the "rediscovery of the Church within the Bible, and the Bible within the Church . . ." (p. 144). Ramsey issues a warning, however, against being too much "in the Bible" with the resultant neglect of the historical.

Temple is depicted as desirous of moving from idealistic philosophy to the center, Christ. He also felt that the purpose of the church was to permeate society. In the end he acknowledged his lack of success in reaching these goals.

The book is very concisely written, the only noticeable repetition being Gore's definition of Catholicism (pp. 100, 112). The

author is adept at summarizing whole books in a few sentences, as he pictures entire movements. A number of theological works of the period are necessarily omitted. Little of importance is presented from the Evangelicals. The greatest deficiency of the book is a lack of adequate indexes. A bibliography would have been of great value to the student of this period.

It is devoutly to be hoped that Dr. Ramsey's comment about the elevation of William Temple to Canterbury will not apply in his own case: "It could hardly be expected that he would continue creative theological work." If it does apply, we may nevertheless expect, in the new Archbishop's further words, that he will "guide and understand" and "help thinkers to understand one another."

W. IVAN HOY

The University of Miami

The Coming Reformation. By GEDDES MACGREGOR. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960. 160 pages. \$3.50.

The author of this book is a Scotsmen, raised and educated primarily in Europe and at present Dean of the Graduate School of Religion and Professor of Theology at the University of Southern California. Much that Dr. MacGregor presents reflects his Scottish interests and background. His sarcasm and sharp strictures cut deeply into the weaknesses of religious life in America.

The author's chief concern is with the Reformed Church. His basic premise is *ecclesia reformata sed semper reformanda*, and, accordingly, his own suggestions for reform are only for the present. Other problems will occur and other solutions will be required in the future. MacGregor turns back to the Reformation in order to ascertain which of its principles deserve emphasis today. He believes that the Protestant heritage has been sabotaged in two areas. First, the reality of the church as held by the Roman Catholic Church has been lost; and second, the idea

of Christian perfection has been neglected through the rejection of Catholic monasticism.

The author proposes a recovery of the Protestant witness along three lines: (1) There must be a revival of discipline. The Reformed Church in its inception demanded discipline; today, churches have become largely social clubs. Discipline is in fact the minimal condition for strengthening the inner spiritual life. Through a common discipline for all types of members, a sense of the unity of the church could be achieved. In this connection, MacGregor emphasizes the centrality of serious theological education.

(2) There must be a revival of the interior life through meditation upon the great devotional literature of the past. A splendid bibliography of such books, both Catholic and Protestant, is provided. As the author states, "Unless there is a deep and pervasive revival of the spiritual life in the Reformed Church today, our people, far from having the astounding interior strength that distinguished our forefathers who were nurtured on the spiritual pastures that were so abundantly available and so widely used, will have less interior vitality than even an indifferent Roman Catholic, content to do no more than the minimum his Church prescribes for avoiding hell" (p. 102).

(3) There must be a revival of liturgy. MacGregor points to the very rich Protestant liturgical heritage and also to the way modern industrialization has at once speeded up our present forms and made them ugly. "The chief enemies of liturgical reform are emotionalism, sentimentality, subjectivism, and—above all—lack of the humility that seeks to learn from others and does not scorn all it does not find immediately and easily comprehensible" (p. 124 f.). Calvin desired a weekly administration of the Lord's Supper; a service without it, says the author, is a "supperless Supper." Today the Reformed Church offers "a dry mass without the muttering." Instead, "the Eucharist, central to all

Christian worship, must be restored as the norm, in practice no less than theory, in the Reformed Church. Every other liturgical reform or revival is not only secondary, it is vain till this is achieved" (p. 130). To the extent that reverence for the Eucharist can be heightened, the religious life of the Reformed Church will be strengthened. (A liturgy for the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, according to the Reformed tradition, is given in the Appendix.)

Many will agree with the author concerning the weaknesses he finds in modern Reformed church life and also with the goals he desires to achieve. But not all will agree that a greater emphasis on the liturgy and the Eucharist can in itself help to fulfill these goals. Unless a deeper mystical understanding can be achieved in this area, the result may simply be an exaggerated stress upon certain minor elements in worship. As a matter of fact, an elaborate liturgy, however beautiful, is hardly compatible with the severity of Calvin's theology. Furthermore, a re-emphasis upon discipline might unintentionally serve to restore a sense of merit which is not at all Protestant.

Dean MacGregor's views will probably receive wider acceptance in the Protestant Episcopal Church and perhaps in the Lutheran Church than in his own Reformed Church. But everyone will profit from his book. Reading it was a delightful experience. It should open the eyes of many clergy to the lack of depth in many present-day devotional and liturgical practices in this country.

ALTMAN K SWIHART
Carthage College

APPLIED THEOLOGY

Faith and Community: A Christian Existential Approach. By CLYDE A. HOLBROOK. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. 159 pages. \$3.00.

Professor Holbrook offers an insight into his own theological journey and position

with the thought that these may be of personal help to the reader. He does not claim that they are normative, but he takes them seriously and exercises great care to state them exactly and clearly.

In a critical estimate of the book two questions suggest themselves. Are the author's procedure and views philosophically sound? And is his interpretation of Christianity acceptable?

In the first chapter he argues from "primal" faith," that is, from what is absolutely presupposed within human existence on the basis of our biological and social natures and our psychological capabilities, to that which is the all-embracing source of both being and value, God himself, upon whom we absolutely depend. Holbrook's method is to ask what it means to live as a person caught up in that situation of complete trust and absolute dependence which is primal faith and finding that the inevitable search for meaning and fulfillment of the self ends nowhere if it does not end in God. Such a procedure is doubtless justifiable from a philosophical point of view, once the substance of the various steps proves reliable. The presence of primal faith in man's life can hardly be doubted, and Holbrook argues this point well. The need for something more than primal faith is also well put. But from this point on questions arise. Just what determines the nature of the encounter with God and of its meaning for one's life, or of what Holbrook calls "radical faith"? How much of the experience is indubitable? Why has he to such a large extent put aside reason as a source of faith and a means of understanding human life? Cannot reason help to define and even supplement the existential evidence?

The author's interpretation of Christianity will on the whole be welcomed by those in sympathy with recent developments in theology, and in part by many conservative Christians who share his view of man's moral and spiritual impotence. Others will agree with and applaud his spurning of le-

galism, his emphasizing of personal, dynamic faith, and his acceptance of Christ as the irreplaceable locus of God's revelation. But important features of his interpretation will be questioned by many who accept the Bible as their criterion as well as by those who cannot share his low estimate of man's rational and moral powers.

As understood by Holbrook, man is not an intelligent, moral being capable of achieving divinely appointed ends and responsible in large measure for his acceptance by God; he is only the recipient of God's forgiveness. If he comes to be grateful, repentant, and loving, this is only in response to the prior and redeeming love of God. Life in the new being which results from the encounter with God is still life under judgment. Because man stands before God's righteousness, which is made bearable only by God's gracious acceptance of man, there remains a tension of discontent within the life of faith. The essence of redemption is a continuing process of reconciliation and acceptance.

Where in all this are the disciples who are "the light of the world"? Where is the crusader who can do all things through Christ who strengthens him? Where is the faith which is the victory that overcomes the world? In commenting on the Sermon on the Mount, Holbrook observes that Christ in his power here confronts us with a demand which we simply cannot fulfill. But what about the new life of the Spirit in true disciples? Are they not enabled to live by this power? Did not the early disciples, rejoicing that they were counted worthy to suffer dishonor for Christ, seek first God's kingdom and his righteousness? Are there not men and women today who in the spirit of Christ would rather serve than be served, give than receive, prove honest than become rich—men and women who pray truly Christlike prayers? And have not such persons shown unto their neighbors and even their enemies self-sacrificing and redeeming goodwill?

The author's conception of "community"

as God's will for man may also be questioned. Is this what God basically desires or would he not rather have surrendered lives and dedicated service? In this connection, we may question whether sin is essentially rebellion against creatureliness. Is it not, instead, a wrong choice of values—specifically, granting something that is less than God the place of first and controlling importance in one's life?

Perhaps the most serious issue in Holbrook's position is his conception of God. Does God, as the author holds, really accept us just as we are? Does he not require repentance and a changed life before he will accept us? Would he be quite holy and worthy of our deepest reverence and worship if he required anything less? It is significant that Jesus speaks of sheep who are accepted because of what they did and of goats who are rejected because of what they failed to do.

In the opinion of the reviewer, Holbrook's book reflects the stage which certain strong, and in some ways refreshing, currents of theological thought have at present reached. At the same time it furnishes a basis from which we ought to move on to sounder views.

PETER H. MONSMA

Grove City College

Faith and Learning. By ALEXANDER MILLER. New York: Association Press, 1960. 215 pages. \$3.50 (paper \$1.95).

This volume is proposed by its sponsors as the American counterpart of Sir Walter Moberly's *Crisis in the University*. The late Alexander Miller was himself more modest. He sought to build upon the work of Moberly and of A. J. Coleman (*The Task of the Christian in the University*) and Arnold Nash (*The University and the Modern World*). Pointing out that much of the mass of writing in this field is "vastly repetitive," Miller has drawn upon the related insights of

H. Richard Niebuhr (*Christ and Culture*), Will Herberg (*Protestant-Catholic-Jew*), and George H. Williams (*The Theological Idea of the University*). In addition, he has brought to bear upon the problem a rich professional experience which started with a term as General Secretary of the New Zealand Student Christian Movement. At the time of his death in May of 1960, Miller was Professor of Religion in Stanford University and a member of the Executive Committee of the Faculty Christian Fellowship.

The central ideas of Moberly are here related to the American college and university situation. The flavor and skill of Miller's own theological persuasion are applied to almost every issue of religion in higher education, but the discussion of the "university question" is still to be moved significantly forward from Moberly in 1949.

Miller's story begins with the original Puritan influence on American higher education and then considers the development of religious pluralism which overlaid this heritage and led to a muting of theological discussion. More recently, the university has become a problem to itself and to the church, so that the way seems open for fruitful encounter. The church has "come through to a new articulateness and relevance" by way of a theological revival, while the university recognizes that it faces "dilemmas difficult to be resolved out of its present resources" (p. 30). The developing encounter is not only one of ideas but of the two communities—of faith and of learning. The church, variously identified as the community of faith, of love, and of grace, wages war on two fronts: *against* illegitimate claims of the state (the community of power) and of the university (the community of learning or wisdom), and *for* the true health of each (pp. 65-68).

Miller has genuine respect for the university as thus in some sense "ordained of God," rather than considering it a threat to the church or simply as a mission field. It is "an

area of positive Christian responsibility." With its own proper autonomy established, it "serves the church best by doing its own work well" (p. 77). This positive attitude is continued as the author deals with "the vocation of the Christian college" and with "the community of faith within the community of learning."

In a chapter entitled "Teaching Religion and Teaching the Christian Faith," major attention is paid to religion as a legitimate academic discipline. Miller warns of the dangers in maintaining a separate department of religion, such as, the "departmentalization" of a phenomenon which is in truth pervasive and the excusing of other disciplines from exercising their full academic responsibility. If there must be such a department, it should practice rigorous self-denial so that other departments will be stimulated to live up to their scholarly obligations. In setting forth the Stanford experiment as a case study (not as a model) Miller argues that justice must be done to a variety of convictions as opposed to pretended neutrality; theology (*sic*) should be taught by believing men; not all positions should be represented; and "the classical heritage of belief" should be communicated as a means of resolving the issue. Should we be asked "who decides what is 'classical'" we can only reply with all proper diffidence that *we* do, since there is no one else around to do it" (p. 139).

A major source of difficulty with Miller's position lies in his use of the term "theology." At times he seems to equate theology with the study of religion; at other times he appears to interpret it as reflection upon the presuppositions of different disciplines or upon the commitments of persons. He does explicitly define theology as "the articulation of Revelation" and "not the product of culture" (p. 118). In these terms theology is not to be dealt with as one among other academic disciplines, and it requires "those who share the faith and belong in the community" for its interpretation. One wonders

how genuinely at home such a conception is in Miller's "integral" university.

The position from which the author approaches both his idea of the university and his conception of theology is stated in H. Richard Niebuhr's terms as "Christ and culture in paradox" (p. 65). It is a difficult base of operations from which faith is to do that serious intellectual business with the university which Miller proposes. He is aware of the difficulty: "If the Christian faith were simply a variety of religious culture or a form of religious inquiry then it would not be so difficult to relate it to other expressions of culture or to other lines of inquiry. But the form and structure of faith is totally other than this" (p. 56).

Despite this difficulty, Miller consistently emphasizes the importance of academic freedom—not because it will guarantee truth but because it is a safeguard against the enthroning of error (p. 99). It is refreshing to hear his warning: "The danger to the Chris-

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tian enterprise in the university community over the next immediate period will not come so much from its intellectual enemies, as from the fact that it may have things too easily its own way" (p. 130). This emphasis must be taken seriously by Miller's primary audience, the Christian men and women who share responsibility for the work of learning. And it might well open genuine conversation with his secondary audience, the "inquiring intellectuals"—unless they sense a certain undercurrent of theological dogmatism of which they are already fearful.

PAUL DEATS, JR.

Boston University

The Biblical View of Sex and Marriage. By OTTO A. PIPER. Revised Edition. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960. xii + 239 pages. \$3.95.

Dr. Piper's book must be read and carefully considered by anyone who is interested in the Christian view of sex. His earlier volume, *The Christian Interpretation of Sex*, of which the present study is a complete revision, was first published in 1941 and until a few years ago was one of the very few Protestant Christian writings in this field. The book requires close reading but it is clearly written and wastes few words. It suffers, however, from a severe shortage of commas. The bibliography is a very good cross section of a rapidly growing field. A few books have since appeared which present a point of view different from the author's.

A number of questions must be raised about the approach and the conclusions. The word "A" should have been used in the title instead of "The." Even though Piper in his Preface explicitly rejects biblical literalism, many would question his own interpretations of the Bible. While this does not necessarily imply a rejection of Piper's position, the fact remains that other equally serious scholars derive different answers from the very same materials.

Essentially, Piper's book is conservative in nature. It tends to follow literally biblical statements on relations between the sexes. Thus, he defends as God's will a subordinate place for women in society. He dismisses too lightly (cf. p. 93) comparative cultural studies that question the universality of the patriarchal system assumed by the biblical writers. Although no one can very well deny the incompleteness of man and woman without the other sex (a point that is made very well in the discussion of celibacy, pp. 107 ff.), it is highly questionable whether God's ultimate plan for man is a patriarchal system. Perhaps the author's exegetical method is at fault, although it is the case that he accepts the mythological character of much of the Bible.

Piper's approach stands in sharp contrast to D. S. Bailey's *Sexual Relations in Christian Thought* which seeks to present a theology of sex that takes into account twentieth-century research in the psychological fields as well as biblical interpretation. Bailey recognizes that the Old and New Testament authors, together with those Christian thinkers who developed the theology of sex and marriage over the centuries, were ignorant of some of the simplest facts in the area of sex and, of course, did not have the benefit of the comparative investigation of cultures. Piper, by contrast, makes little reference to those ideas that may be causing a revolution in Christian thought on this subject. This is unfortunate. It results in many statements that are highly questionable, however much they may be biblical in a literal sense: "These demands are not the remnants of an obsolete social order of antiquity but rather derive from the fact that God contrived to redeem mankind by a man rather than by a woman" (p. 96). "Why God assigned to the male sex the superior position is a moot question . . . and the wife who rebels against her husband's role as the responsible head must give account for her sin" (p. 97).

A woman "has greater difficulty in making an independent judgment" (p. 126).

Such allegations are quite unacceptable to most contemporary sociologists, psychologists, and theologians. The major weakness of Piper's presentation is, accordingly, that he makes little if any attempt to demythologize the biblical statements about sex and marriage. He offers no assessment of the non-theological factors that must have affected the biblical writers and which are becoming more and more clear in the light of modern research, and hence cannot be ignored. From the vantage point of twentieth-century knowledge of sex and marriage, there is no alternative but to say that the information and comprehension possessed by these men was warped and inadequate. Sex itself has not changed but certainly relations between the sexes have. Since 1900 the whole concept of sex has been drastically altered. Unless the work of theologians in this area is to become totally irrelevant, they must learn to understand and evaluate secular findings on the subject.

Even with the above reservations, Piper's study ought to be consulted by all who desire competence in this field. He does stay close to the biblical source material. Any decision to assume a different position should be made only after paying careful heed to a presentation such as this.

ANDREW R. EICKHOFF

Bradley University

The Theological Foundation of Law. By JACQUES EULL. Translated by Marguerite Wieser. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1960. 140 pages. \$3.95.

Jacques Ellul, a professor of law at the University of Bordeaux, has previously published books in history, sociology, law, and theology. He has become increasingly well-known in America among the growing number of scholars concerned with relations between the law and the Christian faith.

In this book Ellul points to the present world crisis in jurisprudence resulting from a general repudiation of natural law as the proper foundation of human law. "When natural law is rejected," he writes, "juridical technique is at the disposal of whoever wishes to take advantage of it" (p. 32). However, he does not move from this accurate and disturbing observation to a plea for a new acceptance of natural law as the basis of positive law. Since modern man is not disposed to accept natural law or any other limitation on his freedom to create whatever institutions and laws he pleases, the only hope is "the birth of a new civilization" which "can only originate in the will of God" (p. 36). Accordingly, it is important to ask whether such a renewal would allow a place for natural law. To this question Ellul answers with an absolute negative. Most of the book is devoted to the reasons for this rejection.

Of course, one expects these days to read theologically popular denunciations of "autonomous man" and of a self-authenticating reason, contrasted with a law grounded in God alone. But does not this argument confuse method of discovery with ground of being? May not natural law be God's law discoverable through a sufficiently disciplined and humble human search after truth and justice? The author has an answer at hand, for he is committed to the most exclusive kind of Christomonism. Jesus Christ "alone has rights before God. From him alone men receive rights before God" (p. 49). Apart from God there is no right or justice. Hence, "Law is entirely Christocentric" (p. 69). We are not surprised, accordingly, to read, "Natural law does not provide any meeting ground for Christians and non-Christians" (p. 69). The author adduces further proof of the last proposition by pointing out that men differ about the "concrete applications" of natural law (p. 70). But here some questions must be raised. Do not Christians differ about the concrete applications of their faith in Christ? Is such faith thereby inval-

dated? Our courts bear abundant witness to the fact that lawyers differ on the concrete applications of statutory laws. Are all such laws thereby made null and void?

A further pillar of support for Ellul's rejection of natural law is an extreme doctrine of total depravity. Since man is "by nature" evil, anything which "corresponds to his nature can therefore not be just" (p. 71). Calvin, it is true, left the door open to natural law by his vague doctrine of a residuum which remains after loss of the *imago Dei*. But Ellul altogether rejects any such notion. A final ground of his rejection of natural law is that if man could know the law, he could do the good. That he cannot know and do the good is proved both by the event of Jesus Christ (p. 61) and by the need for human law enforced by the state (p. 63). Such arguments are stated repeatedly, without so much as a mention of the common biblical teaching that men in fact know more of their duty than they perform. Such teaching is found in the Eden myth, in the accounts of the covenant which Israel knew but did not keep, in Jesus' insistence that men must do God's will and not merely teach it, and in Paul's complaint that although he knew the law and wanted to keep it, he found himself doing otherwise.

After having refuted the claims of natural law, or, more accurately, having begged the whole question by the unargued assumption that there is no right known or done on earth except in Jesus Christ, Ellul goes on to say some things which are true and useful. For example, he is emphatic in warning that "the state is not the creator of law" (p. 123), although the state does express, enforce, and guard the law (pp. 124-26). But what law is it that the state rightfully promulgates? It is the divine law. Otherwise it is no law at all, however violently it may be enforced. And how do we know the divine law? From the gospel alone, proclaimed and interpreted by the church. The church, then, must proclaim the divine righteousness in Christ.

Such righteousness, says Professor Ellul, is the only basis of just law. Must we not point out to him that the past history of attempts by the church to fill such a role, whether in Geneva, Plymouth, or Rome, is hardly reassuring?

If many lawyers are convinced by the unsupported dogmatism and fallacious logic that abound in this book, the law is in an even worse state than the author supposes. On the other hand, it is refreshing to find a layman taking so seriously the implications of Christian doctrine for his vocation. It is unfortunate that Ellul has apparently learned his theology only from the most extreme statements of Karl Barth and has missed even those dialectical reservations and corrections on which Barth would insist. We may hope that Ellul's earnestness will stimulate other students of jurisprudence to relate the law to a more comprehensive and illuminating interpretation of the Christian faith than is here offered.

L. HAROLD DEWOLF
Boston University

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

Religions of the East. By JOSEPH M. KITAGAWA. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960. 319 pages. \$4.50.

In this important contribution to the study of the world's religions Professor Kitagawa of the University of Chicago combines the disciplines of the historian, the theologian, and the sociologist to introduce the reader to the intellectual and social structures of Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam. Such a multiple approach is necessary, but it also is increasingly difficult today. It is necessary because of the constant need to make sense out of the mountains of data being accumulated by the specialist in every area of human thought and action. It is becoming more and more difficult because it entails, first the mastering and then the in-

terpretation of these same specialties to the layman.

In his Foreword, Kitagawa states that the "book is designed to give a general orientation to the history of religions . . . for college students and interested laymen." This purpose is ably fulfilled; the general reader will find here a vigorous and reliable introduction to the major religions of Asia. But a more ambitious task also is set by the author and in this he is not quite so successful. In his first chapter he states that he intends to use the concept of the "holy community," which he finds to be basic to any religion, as an aid to his presentation and analysis of the Asian religions. The origin of a given holy community might vary from religion to religion—stemming from religious concerns, as in Buddhism or Christianity, or from a social basis, as in Confucianism or Hinduism. But even though the holy community is a human creation "its *raison d'être* is based on the religious notion that it is the reflection or expression, however imperfect, of the cosmological order. So each religion's interpretation of the cosmos, man, and society is reflected in the structure of its holy community." At this point one wishes that Kitagawa had found it possible to delineate his understanding of the Christian Church as a holy community in order to afford the newcomer to the history of religions a basis for a comparative understanding of this concept in the religions of the East.

Chapter two focuses on the Chinese religions and the family system. The term "family-ism" is used to designate the Confucian family system which has served, over the millennia, as the "holy community" or the religious and social basis of Chinese life. But the real value of the chapter lies in its sweeping survey of Chinese religious history. The summary of Taoism leaves something to be desired, and the discussion of Chinese Buddhism is handicapped through absence of the necessary background of the Indian origins of Buddhism. The chapter is concluded with

a valuable summary of the present religious crisis in Red China.

Chapter three discusses Hinduism and the caste system. Again we are offered a helpful historical survey in the setting of which an interpretation of the Hindu religion in its historical development is included. Kitagawa is unclear on the distinction between the recent term "caste" as used to refer to an endogamous social unit and the four great "classes" stemming from Vedic times (cf. p. 133). His survey of Hinduism does not measure up to the surveys of Confucianism and, especially, of Islam, although we must not forget the enormity of the task involved.

Chapter four discusses Buddhism and the Samgha or "community" of monks and nuns. In spite of the author's main thesis concerning the "holy community," the conclusion presented is that the Samgha never has included the total Buddhist community of laity and recluses, except in theory (and in the first glorious days of the religion), while today the Samgha follows quite divergent patterns in various parts of the Buddhist world. Finally, in his last chapter on Islam and the Ummah (the congregation of Muslims) Kitagawa also demonstrates that no really universal Ummah obtains, save in the ideal form which the true believer hopes might some day be realized. For both Buddhism and Islam we are again treated to excellent summaries of origins and history.

We are led to the conclusion that if one reads this book with its title foremost in his mind, he is afforded a creative, though a bit advanced, introduction to the religions of the East; but that if the author's announced thesis is kept at the forefront, certain limitations immediately appear. It is a truism, for instance, to state that "religion is by nature a fellowship and a communion" (p. 29). But such a statement demands that a clear distinction be made between culture-bound communions, such as the caste society of Hinduism or the family system of Confucianism, and universalistic communions, such as the

missionary Samgha of Buddhism and Ummah of Islam. Is it not possible that the "holy community," rather than being basic to a religion, is instead a clue to its true inner nature, and that the very desire to strengthen a religious community may actually strangle the religion? It is instructive to note that Kitagawa finds a real "holy community" in the culture-bound societies of China and India, but only the dream of a universal community in Buddhism and Islam (and also Christianity). In other words, in Confucianism and Hinduism religion supports the status quo by identifying it with the holy community. In a genuinely missionary religion such as Buddhism or Islam no true holy community exists since the ideal community always represents a criticism of the status quo and, perforce, of the human "holy community."

A chapter summarizing the author's findings and comparing and contrasting the holy communities of each of these religions would have been a real service to the general reader. In the absence of such a "final chapter," it is to be hoped that Kitagawa will develop his thesis further in a future study.

DAVID G. BRADLEY

Duke University

RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE AND ETHICS

Language and Religious Language. By JULES LAURENCE MOREAU. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961. 207 pages. \$4.50.

This book is for all who are seriously concerned with the task of presenting the Christian message in an age of confusion. Although it is limited to the problem of finding a suitable religious language, the author (an Assistant Professor of New Testament at Seabury-Western Theological Seminary) brings such scholarly resources to bear on this vital matter that the result is very illuminating.

Chapter one provides the general background for all that follows. Christianity, in its efforts to reach the Greek mind, "employed both the vocabulary and the thought structure of Hellenistic Judaism" (p. 28). This process eventually meant a shift from such Semitic Christological terms as "Messiah-Christ or Son of Man" to such Greek concepts as "Son of God and Logos" (p. 40). Even as the Church had to substitute a Greek for a Semitic vocabulary in order to win the Greeks, so today, in order to reach modern man, it must find the right terminology.

In Chapter two, after a brief discussion of the shift during the later Middle Ages from Platonic to Aristotelian concepts, the author deals with three important aspects of contemporary philosophy: linguistic analysis, symbolic logic, and existentialism. Though fully aware of the contributions of the first two toward linguistic clarity, he is especially impressed with the accomplishments of existentialism. This "philosophical giant" is commended not only for bringing to consummation the criticisms of idealism begun by Kierkegaard, but for its profound analysis of the problem of Being (pp. 70-71).

Chapter three constitutes both an evaluation of the linguistic and semantical movement and a statement of Moreau's own theory of language. Rejecting the idea that "it is all a matter of semantics" (pp. 88-95), he presents his view of language as "functional vocabulary" (pp. 95-105). Thus religious language, as exemplified in the Apostles' Creed, unlike that of the "descriptive sciences," is "concrete, personal, historical, and evocative" (p. 102).

In Chapter four the author returns to the Bible in order "to test the hypothesis that the vocabulary of theological discourse is analyzable from the viewpoint of its internal semantic structure" (p. 106). With this issue in mind he discusses "the mythic stance" of both the Old and New Testaments. While the myths of the former portray the mighty

acts of God in history through Israel, the myths of the latter—as seen against the general background furnished by the former—disclose God's greatest act, his act of redemption through Christ. The analysis of the Apostles' Creed, both in terms of its mythical elements and the truths which these elements were meant to carry, is very interesting. An attempt is also made to show how the development of the language of the Creed itself reflects the changes demanded by the times during which it was formulated. Two things are stressed in this chapter: man's encounter with God in history, and the function of myth as the means of representing this encounter.

Chapter five deals with "the perils of translation." The discussion of the difficulties encountered in translating the original Hebrew into the Indo-European languages is superb. The author's insistence that each succeeding generation must make a new translation of the "normative stratum" contained in the gospel furnishes much food for thought. Finally, he offers criticisms of Bultmann and Tillich. Although recognizing their contributions, he endeavors to find a more adequate approach.

In the last chapter a real attempt is made to lay the basis for a suitable religious language. The architects of such a language must be willing to pioneer—which means, among other things, that they must not allow themselves to be bound by an obsolete Hellenistic terminology. They must make use of modern resources, including the contributions of linguistic analysis, existentialism, and science. Above all else, they must be careful to insure that such language will reflect the "peculiarly Christian myth as we now understand it" (p. 193).

In spite of its philosophical and theological relevance and excellence, this book has certain obvious weaknesses and limitations. To begin with, there is the author's existential bias. This is most marked in his lavish praise of Heidegger. Closely related to this is Mor-

eau's attempt to minimize the strong element of natural theology found in so many places in the Bible (e.g., Ps. 19:1-6; Jer. 10:11-12; 31:35-36; Matt. 5:44-45; Romans 1:19-20). While Moreau is most certainly correct in his insistence that for the Hebrews history constitutes the primary category, this does not mean that they were not interested in nature as a sphere of divine activity and divine disclosure. Moreover, in the biblical *Weltanschauung* the historical and natural means of revelation tend to reinforce and to corroborate each other.

Finally, one has the feeling that the need for a more accurate language is overemphasized, granted its importance. If Christianity, faced as it is by an aggressive naturalism and secularism, is to be effective today, two things seem to be even more necessary than a more suitable language. The first is the development of an adequate Christian *Weltanschauung*. Man must once again feel at home in the universe. The second is the sort of social vision that finds expression through effective action.

ARTHUR W. MUNK

Albion College

The Principles of Moral Philosophy. By BEN KIMPEL. New York: Philosophical Library, 1960. x + 223 pages. \$3.75.

Professor Kimpel describes his book as "an empirical moral philosophy" and says that he has written it "in the form of a conversation with others who also are interested in thinking about moral problems" (p. x). Evidently he has in mind the great contributors to ethical thought. He makes full though critical use of such moralists as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Bentham, and G. E. Moore.

Kimpel attempts to work out some kind of synthesis between contemporary linguistic philosophy and an older pragmatic or empirical approach. The first half of the study emphasizes the theoretical, logical, and se-

mantic aspects of moral philosophy while the last half concentrates upon empirical considerations. This division does not mean that Kimpel regards the theoretical and empirical realms as separable; quite to the contrary, he thinks of them as complementary.

My purpose in reading this volume was the hope of discovering whether fruitful conversation can take place between philosophical moralists and Christian moralists. On the whole this hope was met with disappointment. The formalistic character of the author's effort and his verbose definitions of ethical concepts combine to make for not only tiresome reading but also difficulty in discovering just where conversation can begin. From the attempt to define "conduct" in the Preface to that of exploring "moral responsibility" in the final chapter, the volume proves to be primarily a lexicon of ethical terminology.

Kimpel is anxious to establish both subjective and objective referents for moral action. The notion of character is compared to Locke's concept of a substratum underlying physical objects (p. 132). Similarly, goodness is described as a property which is within certain actions as malleability is the property of certain metals (pp. 145 f.). But the final test for moral ideals is a pragmatic one. "The moral principle which is capable of bringing human life to its completest possible enrichment is a moral norm by which moral ideals must themselves be evaluated for their moral worth" (p. 44). Repeated use is made of the terms "beneficial" and "enrichment," and despite his semantic interests Kimpel nowhere submits these terms to linguistic inquiry as, for example, Plato did with the word "advantageous" in *The Republic* (cf. pp. 83 ff.).

The Christian moralist may hope to initiate conversation with a moral philosopher through a consideration of the moral nature of man. Although an empirical moral philosopher might be expected to share the same practical interest, Kimpel's discussion of the

nature of man is of brief compass and comes late (cf. pp. 171-176, 220-221).

Central to the moral understanding of man is the question of freedom. In typical philosophical fashion Kimpel treats this from the standpoint of the alternative between determinism and freedom. He does not like the term "free will," because of its association with faculty psychology. He substitutes "acts of choice" involving "a type of behavior which is not coerced by factors that are external to an individual's own initiative" (p. 118). Must we not say that if the only choice is between determinism and freedom, Christian moralists will come out on the side of freedom? Luther, for example, although no champion of "free will," denied what he called "the necessity of compulsion." But there is more than this to the Christian moralist's analysis of free will. He is concerned with the condition of the will as it exists and manifests itself in living persons, and it is here that the classical Protestant notion of man's moral captivity begins.

Kimpel does recognize that a disparity may occur between ideal conceptions and actions (p. 158), yet this does not alter his general view that obligation and responsibility are tenable only where there is a capacity to achieve the moral ideal (p. 105). He agrees with the Kantian dictum, "I ought, therefore I can," but not with the Christian testimony, "I ought, but I cannot." Thus, he misunderstands the nature of the ethical teaching of Jesus. For him, the Sermon on the Mount presents a difficult, but nonetheless achievable, ideal—at least for some men (p. 53). Jesus becomes a moral example whose life demonstrates "the realizability of the abundant life" of which all men are capable (p. 184). The book ends where Christian ethics begins, with a recognition of the contradiction between what we are and what we ought to be.

CHARLES E. CRAIN
Western Maryland College

PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

Out of the Depths. By ANTON T. BOISEN.
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960.
216 pages. \$4.00.

Anton T. Boisen's latest book is both an autobiography and a restatement of his point of view on the relation between mental disturbance and religious experience.

As an autobiography, *Out of the Depths* is of unusual interest, because it was Boisen's experience of mental breakdown and recovery that led both to his insights on mental illness and to the movement for clinical training of theological students and clergymen. Boisen describes his breakdown and hospitalization honestly, almost dispassionately, and yet movingly. Personal recollections of his childhood and youth, extensive correspondence with friends, especially letters to the only woman he ever loved, are all used to tell the story. This part of the book is at once clear and opaque. The onset of schizophrenia is clearly, almost clinically described. But at the same time Boisen consistently and rather stubbornly refuses to analyze the dynamics of his own case record. In part this reluctance is a natural consequence of one aspect of his own position, which is that the interpretation of case histories should not be governed by genetic assumptions. But his reluctance also has something of the flavor of the mystic's unwillingness to analyze an experience that is essentially ineffable. Perhaps, then, what to the reader is an annoying lack of analysis is, in fact, a practical application of the conviction that certain forms of mental disturbance are similar to religious experience.

The latter part of the book is most interesting for its description of the beginnings of the clinical training movement, the early successes and failures, and the help of such friends and colleagues as Fred Eastman, Elwood Worcester, Richard Cabot, Arthur Holt, Flanders Dunbar, A. C. McGiffert, Jr., and Fred Kuether. Boisen makes clear

Ethics in Space

"The Newer Science and Its Challenge to the Churches" is the theme of the symposium in the Summer issue of *Religion in Life*, a Christian quarterly of thought and opinion. Articles and writers are:

Stars, Ethics and Survival by Harlow Shapley, Emeritus Professor of Astronomy at Harvard.

Teilhard de Chardin and the Phenomenon of Man by D. Wade Safford, Episcopal minister.

Science and Religion at the Crossroads by G. D. Yarnold, English author of *The Spiritual Crisis and the Scientific Age*.

Ethical Problems in the Space Age by Edward L. Long, Associate Professor of Religion, Oberlin College.

Additional articles in the Summer issue are: *The New Situation in the Atomic Age*; *Mao Tse-tung and the Decree of Heaven*; *Walter Rauschenbusch and the New Evangelism*; *The Ministries and the Ministry of the Whole Church*; *Common Sense Looks at Man-Made Men*; *A Living Sacrifice: In Memoriam, John Baillie*; and *Painting as the Communication of Spirit*.

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his disagreement with the Council for Clinical Training, and includes among the reasons for this the Council's tendency to concentrate on interviewing rather than case histories—an indication of a "lessening of interest in understanding the basic experiences involved"—and the dominance of the Freudian perspective among the Council's leaders.

The next-to-the-last chapter contains Boisen's credo, according to which "certain forms of mental illness, particularly those characterized by anxiety and conviction of sin, are not evils. They are instead manifestations of the power that makes for health. They are analogous to fever or inflammation in the body." With respect to religion, the credo states that "religious experience is the sense of fellowship raised to its highest level, and religion is thus an inevitable consequence of the social nature of man." Boisen concludes the book with a retrospective summary of his own case record, finding in it confirmation of his view that in the disordered thinking of the schizophrenic there is sense, which, in the midst of the apparent nonsense, can be discovered and used constructively.

Out of the Depths adds little to what is already known of Boisen's viewpoint. Its worth must, therefore, be measured according to the value assigned to his position. There is little here to suggest that Boisen has modified or extended his general thesis as it was first advanced in 1936 in *The Exploration of the Inner World*. He is disappointed that students have not tested his hypothesis clinically, but the truth is that through the years Boisen has himself done little more than repeat and illustrate it. He has not formulated specific questions as a basis for investigation, nor has he proposed detailed methods of research. That his views have merit is acknowledged by such varied students as Harry Stack Sullivan, Seward Hiltner, and, recently, O. Hobart Mowrer (*The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion*).

But such approval has not been sufficiently substantial or developed enough to encourage the kind of scientific testing for which its author has called.

Whatever the merits of Boisen's thesis, its fortunes are bound to be affected by the shifting winds of religious and theological thought. He stands within the tradition of the "religious experience school" of several decades ago, variously exemplified by Edwin Starbuck, William James, Friedrich Heiler, and Rudolf Otto. The mood today is one of grave skepticism regarding the possibility of discovering general categories of religious experience, since it is no longer assumed that the requisite stance of detached objectivity is possible. Boisen gives no indication that he is aware of this change in mood, and this is why he gives the impression of answering questions no longer being asked and of avoiding crucial issues currently raised. The still somewhat arrested and untested condition of his point of view, together with his commitment to philosophical and theological assumptions no longer widely held, means that *Out of the Depths* has value chiefly as an interesting and moving document of the life of a pioneer figure in the field of religion and mental health.

CLYDE J. STECKEL

Illinois College

HOMILETICS

This World and the Beyond. By RUDOLF BULTMANN. Translated by Harold Knight. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960. 248 pages. \$3.50.

As the Bultmann corpus in English is enlarged, we are better able to view and to understand his significance both as a person and as a theologian. This book of sermons adds another dimension to this understanding. Of special importance is the insight which it provides into Bultmann's practical application of his own theological studies.

One of the most striking features of these sermons is their distinctively confessional emphasis. This is quite different from the apologetic concern which is usually regarded as characteristic of Bultmann. Of even greater significance is the clear revelation of something that should have been evident all along—Bultmann's genuine Christian confidence which carries him beyond every existential anxiety. Indeed, the volume could on the whole be called "a book of consolation" to the German people in the throes of social revolution and war.

This is not prophetic preaching. Bultmann's lack of socio-political concern here may be disappointing to those who, in retrospect at least, feel that more prophetic utterance was needed in Germany in that day. We do find an impressive and genuine pastoral quality in the sermons. (Perhaps the influence of his father, a village pastor to whom he refers, is reflected here.) Furthermore, we can detect an underlying concern over the claims of the Nazi regime and the self-aggrandizement of man. Again and again Bultmann warns against the temptation to believe that through scientific technology man can become master of his own world. (See especially the sermon on Genesis 8:22.)

Two of the more striking qualities of the sermons are their simplicity of language and of subject matter. Even though directed to a university community, they contain no jargon and are quite unpretentious. Bultmann's concern is with everyday affairs; he speaks of the value of Sabbath observance, the dignity of work, the beauty of springtime, the close of the academic semester, and personal crisis.

If any single word is descriptive of these sermons it is Barth's exclamation that Bultmann is a Lutheran! The theme of justification is central and there is a Lutheran understanding of the relation of the Christian to civil power.

Since sermons are not formal theology, it

is questionable whether they can be used to any great extent for purposes of theological construction and criticism. However, a theologian should exhibit continuity and consistency between his theology and his preaching. This Bultmann does. For those especially interested in his ideas there are clear expositions of his understanding of the nature of miracle (see p. 108 and the sermon on Luke 5:1-10, especially p. 160) and of freedom (p. 182). Reinforcement is forthcoming for the view that there is continuity between Bultmann's earlier thought and his later demythologizing effort. The programmatic essay on demythologization in *Kerygma and Myth* (1941) does not indicate an entirely new direction of thought but constitutes a clearer statement of a point of view that had been long held. On the other hand, there is exhibited here, as elsewhere, a puzzling eclecticism in Bultmann's theology. He combines elements of idealism, rationalism, and even romanticism with his existentialism. The question remains: Can he succeed in bringing together these divergent elements so as to produce a coherent system, or will this combination of ideas issue in profound theological confusion? This is not the place to attempt an answer to this question. But these sermons do raise the question in their own way.

Finally, a word of commendation is in order for the excellent English usage in the translation.

THOMAS A. LANGFORD

Duke University

A Theology of Proclamation. By DIETRICH RITSCHL. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960. 190 pages. \$3.50.

This book will set on edge the teeth of those who make a livelihood from the teaching and use of pulpit techniques. Theologians of a persuasion broader than Ritschl's will cringe at his incessant biblicalism. Some defenders of things American will bridle at the

sometimes condescending comments of a young divine from abroad whose notions of what the Bible says, of what God does, and of how ministers are to preach are colored as much by the cultural situation from which he comes as by the Bible itself. Some will applaud Ritschl's effort to show how a theological base rightfully informs preaching, but they will dissent violently from the cramped and involuted theology out of which his conceptions of preaching develop. The volume comes to the American public stamped with the ponderous seal of the master of Basel and his articulate disciple, Torrance of Edinburgh. And much that is valuable here is reared upon the sort of precarious reasoning—aided and abetted by the technique of flat assertion—which is all too common in that school of theology. The result is a book limited in appeal to those already receptive to an authoritarian mode of theologizing and calculated to reinforce a suspicion in others that Christian theology has definitely committed itself to a policy of irrelevant fideism couched in an esoteric language which the world will never have any interest in penetrating.

This charge of irrelevance is not one to daunt Ritschl. He revels in the conviction that the preacher should not bother his head about making his sermons relevant. The question so often asked by the preacher of how to gain relevance for his preaching is, for Ritschl, nothing less than "absurd" (p. 14). He quotes approvingly the statement that "there can be no question of our making the Word relevant to the world." The Word makes itself relevant to the world—which relieves us of an onerous duty (p. 50). In fact, so says Ritschl, "we can do our preaching and teaching in a way that is independent of the religions and ideologies of the countries we live in and irrespective of the social structures of East and West" (p. 14). The reader may be taken aback to learn at another point that the "preaching of the Word of God cannot possibly be separated from the

thought, world, problems and situations of its hearers (and must therefore be highly political)" (p. 131). But one is immediately brought back to the author's central thesis by the assurance that the content of the sermon does not come from the world but from the living God, who apparently is quite outside the world.

Indeed, all true preaching is done not by men but by the Word. Christ preaches the sermon—when it is a true sermon. He is both its content and the active agent that enables it to strike home. The Word comes to man through the Bible, and therefore all preaching must be done from Scripture. "It never has been and it never will be possible to preach an authentic sermon that does not grow out of a passage of the Bible" (p. 136). This pronouncement strikes me not only as an undue limitation upon the preacher, but as an absurd attempt to harness God's action to a piece of literature or, even more foolishly, to a particular kind of interpretation of that literature. I believe too that Ritschl's insistence upon the biblical foundation for his assertions would receive a decisive setback if he once paused to note that the Prophets' oracles, Jesus' teachings, and the "sermons" of Peter in the Book of Acts are quite "unbiblical," according to Ritschl's own curiously private manner of understanding the Bible, and yet they proved to be true vehicles of the Word.

The author is horrified by that kind of practical preaching which deals with "topics" and "subjects" and uses Scripture merely as a point of departure for the preacher's own opinions. I have sympathy for the criticism of this type of pulpit work and I agree too that a steady diet of "topics," especially when coupled with preaching tricks, soon wears thin. However, when Ritschl suggests that the Confessional Church in Germany would have been lost during the Hitler period if it had presented "subjects" and "topics" rather than biblical preaching, he ignores a prior question that cannot be finally

avoided: How did it ever come to pass that Hitler was able to rise and to accomplish his infamous work in that very country where presumably biblical preaching had been going on for so long? And when Ritschl inquires concerning the potential fate of the American churches should their preachers continue to preach on "topics," I am forcibly reminded by personal acquaintance that the churches of Europe today are hardly effective witnesses to the power of the Word. There is simply no ground for any sanguine hope in an approach which has gained such little honor and success in its own land, nor is there any basis for applauding its possible spread in this country.

If one wishes to read a tightly knit exposition of one type of theology of the Word, and to see how a learned and vigorous young theologian relates preaching to this theology, this volume will prove valuable. It should give pause to those pulpitiars whose theological studies were left behind in seminary and never again reclaimed. Ritschl's recommendations for sermon preparation, which include soliciting aid from the congregation, and his insistence upon exegetical preaching carefully fashioned with the tools of the theologian's trade, may sound unrealistic to many clergymen busy "running" their churches. But on these very scores his book speaks convincingly, and here he should be listened to with seriousness.

CLYDE A. HOLBROOK

Oberlin College

THE CHRISTIAN LIFE

The Art of Christian Doubt. By FRED DENBEAUX. New York: Association Press, 1960. xii + 181 pages. \$3.50.

Dr. Denbeaux takes up an important theme in this book—the place of doubt in a vital faith. His purpose is to try to induce the kind of doubt that is creative. Intellectual creativity, he asserts, "emerges out of a marriage

between thought and risk, a union between discipline and audacity" (p. 3). Whether we are dealing with a university that no longer doubts its empirical philosophy or a theology that wraps up all answers in a few neat packages, the result is the same—death to creative thought.

To understand western civilization, the author maintains, we must look to its foundation in Jesus and Socrates, in both of whom creative doubt was able to break through. This theme runs through the study. The analytic breakthrough of Socrates is seen both in contrast to and as complementary of the poetic insights of biblical faith. After a chapter on man's search for a "universe," Denbeaux examines logical positivism as an example of "pyrrhonism," the non-creative form of doubt, and orthodoxy in theology, the denial of doubt. He concludes that both answers are self-defeating. As a third alternative he examines the concept of critical Christianity as grounded in the Old and New Testaments and then traces the development of Christian thought through the Middle Ages, the Reformation, the Renaissance, and on into the modern world. He concludes with a discussion of faith and criticism in which he asks how "trust" can find its way past the chaos of existence to the cosmos. Such a way leads through "contemporaneity," "ambiguity," and "particularity."

There are times when one feels that Denbeaux, believing as he does that creative thinking comes from a union between "discipline and audacity," has come out more on the side of audacity than discipline. Many of his interpretations of other positions are highly questionable. For example, he explicitly treats Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein as logical positivists, a treatment that both would find surprising and shocking. The attitude of logical positivism toward poetry is, as presented by Denbeaux, a parody of the real position. He says that the basic premise of logical positivism is that "probability is not good enough. Certainty is

necessary. How much certainty? Not less than 100 per cent" (pp. 41-2). How can this possibly be reconciled with the essential premise upheld by logical positivists from whom Denbeaux actually quotes that we never achieve anything more than probability in any statement—save for tautologies, which give no information about reality? Further, the author somewhat overemphasizes the poetic nature of the Bible as over against the analytic orientation of Greek philosophy. Finally, he asserts that "sectarian orthodoxy as represented by the Quakers is perhaps the most insular of all contemporary religious disciplines" (p. 58). After eight years in a Quaker college I would insist that the word "insular" is nonsensical when used to describe contemporary Quakerism.

Despite these weaknesses, the book's theme is a vital one. Its method of presentation qualifies it for purposes of group discussion. However, I finished it with a sense of dissatisfaction. For all its emphasis upon doubt and risk, it reads like a very safe and sheltered book. The reader is deprived of any real glimpse of the true agony of doubt, of existential anxiety, of despair. Nor will he find here that radical dimension of doubt that can finally come to doubt its own doubting.

WILLIAM HORDERN

Garrett Biblical Institute

Francois de Sales. By MICHAEL DE LA BEOYERE. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. 250 pages. \$4.00.

St. Francis de Sales: Selected Letters. By ELISABETH STOPP. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. 318 pages. \$5.00.

Among many significant evidences of a current revival of interest in mysticism and the life of devotion is the appearance in book form of letters of spiritual direction and biographies of mystics and saints in and out of the church, who have been able by their knowledge and experience to guide and di-

rect the spiritual progress of others. Outstanding among these in both personal stature and influence is St. Francis de Sales (1577-1622), who has for many years been known only to students of ascetical theology, and who has frequently been confused by the uninformed with the other great St. Francis—the Poverello of Assisi. In recent years, Harper & Brothers has made the writings of the saintly bishop of Geneva available to a large circle of readers through the publication of C. F. Kelley's superb *The Spirit of Love* as well as his editing of the *Spiritual Maxims of St. Francois de Sales*. Now Harper has added de la Bedoyere's biography and Elisabeth Stopp's selection of some of the saint's many letters. (There were days when he wrote as many as fifty.) Both these books will sharpen the reader's appetite for others for which St. Francis is known and which have given him well-deserved fame: *The Introduction to the Devout Life* (also published by Harper's in Msgr. Ryan's translation) and the *Treatise on the Love of God*.

Count Michael de la Bedoyere, editor of the *Catholic Herald* (London) and a writer of distinction, has constructed a very readable life of Saint Francis. His work differs from others largely in that it takes advantage of information pieced together from the saint's extensive correspondence and also paints a human and even humanistic picture of his activities. Controversial matters, especially those considered by Calvinists to reflect a questionable ethics in the bishop's crusade to win back the heretics of Geneva to their original Catholicism, are presented in a sympathetic light. An attempt is made to portray St. Francis in his true humility and unworldliness.

This man, canonized thirty-nine years after his death and looked upon in the Roman Catholic Church as the patron saint of writers and journalists, was born the eldest of thirteen children. He was heir to a distinguished name and seemed destined for a

career in the service of the state. At fifteen he went to Paris to study at the Jesuit College of Clermont. Here he received an excellent grounding in Greek, Latin, and classical learning, as well as in the best humanistic tradition of the Renaissance. In 1588 he returned to his native Savoy for a time, and later to Italy and the University of Padua, where, after three years of brilliant work, he took a doctorate in law and also a doctorate in theology. The latter was not unusual in that period. His love and inclination for religion and the devotional life were early evident, but he kept his zeal for the religious vocation secret from all but his mother. His father never accepted wholeheartedly what seemed to him his son's defection from the obligation of carrying on the family name in the field of public service.

De la Bedoyere says that the writing of the book has left him with the conviction that

St. Francis de Sales is the greatest of the saints—"at least for modern times." A wag has said that he invented Christian charity. Such extravagance of phrase reveals something of the way he impressed his contemporaries and devoted followers. St. Vincent de Paul said that he could see in him "the person who most nearly reproduced the Son of God living on earth." Henri IV referred to him as "a rare bird, who was devout and learned and also a gentleman," and sought without success to get him to remain at the royal court in Paris.

St. Francis could be all things to all men because he was able to read their hearts. As soon as anyone gave evidence of real earnestness in the desire to lead a devout life, he became the saint's spiritual child. The secret was "that he was not afraid of love or of allowing himself to be used as a channel for the love of God." What he was, always

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shone through him, working its magic on prince and peasant, cleric and layman. He was gentle, but never weak; hard on himself, but always exhorting others to a sweetly reasonable middle way. The atmosphere in which he moved, says the author, can best be described as one of inspired common sense. He himself wrote that his spirit was the great lover of simplicity. An admirer summarized his spirit by the motto, *medium tenuere beati*: "blessed are they who keep to the middle way."

Two religious orders were founded by St. Francis. One was the Confraternity of the Penitents of the Holy Cross which still exists. The other was the Visitation of Holy Mary, a contemplative order which the saint was inwardly guided to establish through the loyalty and devotion of his companion in the spirit who was later beatified as St. Jeanne de Chantal. The vision he had of the lady who was to guide the destinies of the Order of the Visitation, his vivid sense of the divine power operating in his own person, and hints dropped here and there of his personal religious experiences combine to reveal him as a true mystic.

Elisabeth Stopp's selection from the Letters of St. Francis is prefaced by a compact and very moving summary of his life. The Letters themselves have been chosen with the purpose of providing a picture of St.

Francis as both a director of souls and a writer. They were written for people in the world as well as for members of the religious orders. The saint saw the mystical life as the active love of God unfolding in the soul, and this he made his constant theme. His studies in the earlier fathers and mystics led him to study Christian morals systematically and to reduce them to descriptions of the growing effects of the love of God on prayer, human relationships, and the besetting difficulties of daily life. The distinguishing feature of these letters, says the editor, is that they are not systematized but are wholly personal. Each and every one was addressed to a particular person in a particular condition. The saint "judges his correspondent's psychological and spiritual condition intuitively from within, but also by acute and clear-sighted observation, harbouring no illusions about human nature, but always judging justly, with love and compassion."

This selection has been made with great care. Repetitious passages have been deleted from the original text. The result is a movingly written treasury of spiritual advice; one can open it at random and find gold. It not only embodies the spirit of St. Francis but also records plainly the needs of his spiritual children.

JOSEPH POLITELLA
Kent State University

SHORTER NOTICES

Index to Periodical Literature on the Apostle Paul.

Compiled under the direction of BRUCE M. METZGER. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960. xvi + 183 pages. 14 guilders. (Published in the United States by William B. Eerdmans Co., Grand Rapids, Michigan, \$4.00.)

This is Volume I of an important new series, "New Testament Tools and Studies." Twenty students, under Dr. Metzger's supervision, have canvassed some sixty periodicals, and Dr. Metzger himself, another fifty. The resultant index, covering fourteen languages and including some 3000 articles, claims to be complete to the end of 1957:

"All articles on Paul, except a few of a purely homiletic nature, have been cited." The aims are high and the results are both impressive and welcome. But, alas, the *Index* is not complete. In a thirty-minute check I turned up six articles on Paul in major periodicals among those indexed but which are not in the *Index*. This is not characteristic of Dr. Metzger's usual careful scholarship and probably reflects the work of his student collaborators. The omissions I noted include three major articles of T. W. Manson in *The Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, and one of A. E. Brooke in the *Journal of Theological Studies*. The other two are from the *Harvard Theological Re-*

view and *The Journal of Bible and Religion*. Perhaps we can hope for a revision or a supplement.

LINDSEY P. PHERIGO

National Methodist Theological Seminary

The Divine Milieu. By PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. 139 pages. \$3.00.

The Divine Milieu is a companion volume to Teilhard de Chardin's *The Phenomenon of Man*. The writings of this French priest-paleontologist, which have only recently been published in English editions, have created widespread interest. His scientific acumen combined with a rare and compelling mysticism provides fresh insight into the perennial mysteries of the Christian life.

The Divine Milieu may perhaps best be seen as an essay on Christian vocation. It is more than that term often suggests—for the author is actually probing the depths of the Christian life—but the thrust of the essay is the description of a context for human life and labor. While shunning pantheism and avoiding "pagan naturalism," Fr. Teilhard seeks to draw out the implications of the statement that "God reveals Himself everywhere, beneath our groping efforts, as a *universal milieu*, only because He is the *ultimate point* upon which all realities converge" (p. 91). It is through "unflagging fidelity to the natural and supernatural duties of life," the recognition of the spiritual power of matter, and the knowledge that God "presents Himself to us as attainable through . . . the work He Himself has given us" that man is established in the divine milieu.

This essay is addressed to those who are not firmly established in their faith. Its aim, as the author himself says, is to do no more than "re-capitulate the eternal lesson of the Church in the words of a man who, because he believes himself to feel deeply in tune with his own times, has sought to teach how to see God everywhere, to see Him in all that is most hidden, most solid and most ultimate in the world. These pages put forward no more than a practical attitude—or, more exactly perhaps, a way of teaching how to see" (p. 15).

We are left wondering whether the book will actually stir the "waverer," for it seems to presuppose a more than superficial understanding of the tradition and theological perspective of Roman Catholicism. Yet the richness of insight it provides for an understanding of the Christian life justifies careful reading despite its unusual vocabulary and often obscure phrases.

ROBERT L. FERM

Pomona College

The Borderland. By ROGER LLOYD. New York: Macmillan, 1960. 111 pages. \$2.50.

Have you read *Robinson Crusoe*? All of it? Do you recall the "religious part"? Which is better in its portrayal of the religious or theological dimension, *King Lear* or *Measure for Measure*? What is illustrated in and by the *Apologue on the Parable of the Wedding Garment* and *Orchestra*, and do you know the author? How would you compare and contrast the Age of Elizabeth with the Eighteenth Century in their handling of religious themes, either in their creative literature or other kinds of writing? How would you describe or analyze these periods against the backdrop of religious ideas?

Such questions are representative of the concern of this delightful little book for the exploration of theological themes in literature. The Borderland is a country of the mind, and in it one finds "interpreting artists" of different types. The author says that "what the artist can do is to find fresh ways of stating old truths, and today that is what we most of all require of him" (p. 27). Some of the citizens of the Borderland are the metaphysical poets of the seventeenth century; others are such later figures as Robert Browning, Charles Williams, and G. K. Chesterton. But there are others too, some unexpected ones.

Can the land of "the man with the ink horn" be charted? Roger Lloyd believes that it can. He divides his discussion into three parts: A Chart of Pleasant Exploration, Finding One's Way About, and Haunted By a Muse.

Even those who are not up on their literature will find inspiration and guidance in this graphically written and well organized study. Good and usable quotations abound, and numerous references can be readily followed up. There are exhilarating surprises, as in the handling of *Robinson Crusoe*. Happily, Lloyd does not fall into one-sided or specious piety in his expositions.

There are some unnecessary misprints such as "Athens in the time of Pericles" (p. 61) and the "Life of the Word to come" (p. 56).

W. GORDON ROSS

Berea College

Luther and the Lutheran Church, 1483-1960. By ALTMAN K SWIHART. New York: Philosophical Library, 1960. xii + 703 pages. \$7.50.

To the writing of books on Martin Luther there is no end, a fact which, in light of the many eminently worthwhile Luther studies of recent decades,

is not cause for regret. However, *Luther and the Lutheran Church* is a book which should not have been published.

Part of the problem is the ambitious scope which the author sets for himself. To try to cover Luther's life (chap. one), Luther's theology (chap. two), the history of Lutheranism in Europe (chap. three) and America (chap. four), as well as the organization and current challenges of contemporary Lutheranism (chaps. five-eight), is a task to make even the expert tremble. No wonder the book contains sections which are either incompetently or inadequately handled. The former is the case in chapters one and two; the latter applies throughout the remainder of the volume. Thus one notes three lines on Erlangen Theology and twenty-one lines on (the Reformed!) Karl Barth.

The discussion of Luther consists mainly of lengthy quotations from his writings. In principle, this is laudable methodology but in the present case the Reformer's unique insights are lost through the inclusion of far too general statements applicable to any number of Christian thinkers.

The book contains a considerable number of inaccuracies, both in the notes and the text. I mention a few at random: It is highly questionable that the Wittenberg townspeople read the Ninety-five Theses "immediately with great excitement" (p. 23). The bull *Exsurge Domine* did not excommunicate Luther; it only threatened him with excommunication; and it was issued in June, and not in January, of 1520 (p. 32). It is not true that Thomas Müntzer was among the "extreme radicals" who stirred up Wittenberg during Luther's stay on the Wartburg (p. 39). The author has incorrect dates for Luther's death (p. 54) and for the death of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (p. 206). The author of *God Hidden and Revealed* is not Deilinger but Dillenberger.

Swihart obtains his Luther quotations from the *Weimar*, *Erlangen*, and *Walch* editions. It is surprising that he should quote from *Erlangen* and *Walch* in instances where he could have used *Weimar*—as in some cases he actually has.

HANS J. HILLERBRAND
Duke University

Books Received

(Books marked with an asterisk are hereby acknowledged. Others either are reviewed in this issue or will be reviewed in subsequent issues of the *Journal*.)

*Barnes, Roswell P., *Under Orders: The Churches and Public Affairs*. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1961. 138 pages. \$2.95.

*Barth, Karl, *Anselm: FIDES QUAERENS INTELLCTUM*. Anselm's Proof of the Existence of God in the Context of his Theological Scheme. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960. 173 pages. \$3.00.

*Brillet, Gaston, *Meditations on the Old Testament*. Translated by Jane Wynne Saul. New York: Desclée Company, 1961. 274 pages. \$3.75.

*Clifford, Paul Rountree, *The Pastoral Calling*. Great Neck, N. Y.: Channel Press, 1961. ix + 144 pages. \$3.00.

*Colledge, Eric, editor, *The Mediaeval Mystics of England*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961. 309 pages. \$4.95.

Conzelmann, Hans, *The Theology of St. Luke*. Translated by Geoffrey Buswell. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. 255 pages. \$5.00.

*Cullmann, Oscar, *Petrus: Jünger—Apostel—Märtyrer*. Zürich: Zwingli Verlag, 1952, 1960. 287 pages. sFr. 24.50.

*Ducasse, C. J., *The Belief in a Life After Death: A Critical Examination*. American Lecture Series No. 423. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1961. xvii + 318 pages. \$8.75.

*Dunn, David, and Paul N. Crusius, Josias Friedli, Theophil W. Menzel, Carl E. Schneider, William Toth, James E. Wagner, *A History of the Evangelical and Reformed Church*. Philadelphia: Christian Education Press, 1961. xvi + 369 pages. \$5.95.

Enslin, Morton Scott, *The Prophet from Nazareth*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1961. 221 pages. \$4.95.

Fairchild, Roy W., and John Charles Wynn, *Families in the Church: A Protestant Survey*. New York: Association Press, 1961. xii + 302 pages. \$5.75.

Farrer, Austin, *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited. An Essay on Providence and Evil*. The Nathaniel Taylor Lectures at Yale University (1961). Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1961. 168 pages. \$3.50.

*Franzmann, Martin H., *Follow Me: Discipleship According to Saint Matthew*. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1961. ix + 240 pages. \$3.50.

Gärtner, Bertil, *The Theology of the Gospel According to Thomas*. Translated by Eric J. Sharpe. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. 286 pages. \$5.00.

Hofmann, Hans, *Religion and Mental Health. A Casebook with Commentary, and an Essay on Pertinent Literature*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. xvi + 333 pages. \$5.00.

**The Holy Bible. The Prophetic Books Isaia to Malachia*. Vol. IV. Translated from the Original Languages with Critical Use of All the Ancient Sources by Members of the Catholic Biblical Association of America. Sponsored by the Episcopal Committee of the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine. Paterson, N. J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1961. viii + 776 pages. \$7.00.

*Horowitz, Edward, *How the Hebrew Language Grew*. Illustrated by Paul Sharon. New York: Jewish Education Committee Press, 1960. xxiii + 343 pages. \$5.50.

*Ikin, A. Graham, *Victory over Suffering*. Foreword by J. B. Phillips. Introduction by Edward Ely. Great Neck, N. Y.: Channel Press, 1961. 144 pages. \$2.50.

*Jackson, Edgar N., *A Psychology for Preaching*. Preface by Harry Emerson Fosdick. Great Neck, N. Y.: Channel Press, 1961. 191 pages. \$3.50.

Jeremias, Joachim, *Infant Baptism in the First Four Centuries*. Translated by David Cairns. Library of History and Doctrine. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960. 112 pages. \$3.50.

Johnson, Sherman E., *A Commentary on the Gospel According to St. Mark*. Harper's New Testament Commentaries. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. viii + 279 pages. \$5.00.

Knowles, David, *The English Mystical Tradition*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. viii + 197 pages. \$3.75.

Knox, John, *The Ethic of Jesus in the Teaching of the Church*. New York-Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1961. 124 pages. \$2.00.

Kraemer, Hendrik, *World Cultures and World Religions: The Coming Dialogue*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960. 386 pages. \$6.50.

Kuhl, Curt, *The Old Testament: Its Origins and Composition*. Translated by C. T. M. Herriott. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1961. viii + 354 pages. \$4.50.

Latourette, Kenneth Scott, *Christianity in a Revolutionary Age: A History of Christianity in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Vol. III: *The Nineteenth Century Outside Europe: The Americas, the Pacific, Asia, and Africa*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. viii + 527 pages. \$7.50.

Little, Sara, *The Role of the Bible in Contemporary Christian Education*. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1961. 190 pages. \$3.50.

*MacQuarrie, John, *The Scope of Demythologizing: Bultmann and His Critics*. Library of Philosophy and Theology. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. 255 pages. \$4.50.

Manson, T. W., *Ethics and the Gospel*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960. 109 pages. \$2.75.

*McNeill, Robert B., *Prophet, Speak Now!* Richmond: John Knox Press, 1961. 92 pages. \$2.50.

*Noli, Fan S., *The New Testament of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ*. Translated into English from the approved Greek text of the church of Constantinople and the church of Greece. Boston: Albanian Orthodox Church in America, 1961. 502 pages. \$8.00.

*Northridge, W. L., *Disorders of the Emotional and Spiritual Life*. Great Neck, N. Y.: Channel Press, 1961. 130 pages. \$3.00.

Pfeiffer, Robert H., *Religion in the Old Testament: The History of a Spiritual Triumph*. Edited by Charles Conrad Forman. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. xii + 276 pages. \$6.00.

Ross, W. Gordon, *Companion of Eternity*. New York-Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1961. 239 pages. \$3.95.

*St. John-Stevas, Norman, *Life, Death and the Law*. Law and Christian Morals in England and the United States. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961. 375 pages. \$5.95.

Sanders, J. A., *The Old Testament in the Cross*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. 143 pages. \$3.00.

*Scheler, Max, *On the Eternal in Man*. Translated by Bernard Noble. Library of Religion and Culture. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. 480 pages. \$10.00.

*Sellers, James E., *The Outsider and the Word of God: A Study in Christian Communication*. New York-Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1961. 240 pages. \$4.00.

Stewart, Charles William, *The Minister as Marriage Counselor*. New York-Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1961. 223 pages. \$4.00.

Swihart, Altman K., *Luther and the Lutheran Church, 1483-1960*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1960. xii + 703 pages. \$7.50.

Thielicke, Helmut, *Nihilism: Its Origin and Nature*. Translated by John W. Doberstein. Religious Perspectives Series, No. 4. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. 186 pages. \$5.00.

Ungersma, A. J., *The Search for Meaning*. A New Approach in Psychotherapy and Pastoral Psychology. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961. 188 pages. \$4.75.

Winter, Gibson, *The Suburban Captivity of the Churches*. An Analysis of Protestant Responsibility in the Expanding Metropolis. Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1961. 216 pages. \$3.50.

*Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Notebooks 1914-1916*. Edited by G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe with an English translation by G. E. M. Anscombe. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. vi + 131 pages. \$7.00.

Wyckoff, D. Campbell, *Theory and Design of Christian Education Curriculum*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961. 219 pages. \$4.50.

The Association

ANNUAL MEETING OF THE MIDWESTERN SECTION (1961)

The annual business meeting of the Midwestern Section of the National Association of Biblical Instructors was called to order by President Phillips Moulton on Saturday, February 18, 1961 at McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago, Illinois. Approximately seventy-five members attended the session. The minutes of the last annual meeting of the Midwestern Section were adopted as printed in *The Journal of Bible and Religion* for July, 1960.

John L. Cheek presented the following report for the nominating committee:

President	Leo H. Phillips
	<i>Hillsdale College</i>
Vice-President	Edwin T. Settle
	<i>Coe College</i>
Secretary	Milo Milanovich
	<i>Carroll College</i>
Program Co-Chairmen	Joseph L. Mihelic
	<i>University of Dubuque</i>
	Charles J. Speel, II
	<i>Monmouth College</i>
Membership Chairman	Emerson W. Shideler
	<i>Iowa State University</i>
Associates-in-Council	Phillips Moulton
	<i>Wesley College, 2 years</i>
	C. Eugene Conover
	<i>Lindenwood College, 1 year</i>

It was moved and the motion carried to accept the report and to elect the nominees to their respective offices.

President-elect Phillips spoke briefly to the group. Emerson W. Shideler, Membership Chairman, outlined the proper procedure for becoming a member in the Association. Charles J. Speel moved and the motion carried that the Section go on record as encouraging support of the forthcoming Lilly Study of Pre-Seminary Education.

Harris Erickson presented the report of the Committee on Resolutions, expressing the thanks of the Section to McCormick Theological Seminary for its hospitality and in particular to Dean Floyd Filson who was chairman of the committee on arrangements; to the officers of the Section for their effective and responsible leadership; to Edwin T. Settle, Program Chairman, who arranged a

challenging and effective program; and to the readers of papers and to leaders of discussions for the presentation of helpful materials.

The Section accepted the invitation of the Garrett Biblical Institute, Evanston, Illinois to meet there in 1962. The business session adjourned at 9:30 A.M. after visitors and new members had been introduced.

The Program of the 1961 Meeting follows:

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1961

Opening Session, 3:30 P.M.	West Room
Presiding: Edwin T. Settle, <i>Coe College</i> , Program Chairman, Midwestern Section, NABI	
Paper: "The Emerging Role of the Religion Department"	
J. Arthur Baird, <i>The College of Wooster</i>	
Discussion: Charles J. Speel, <i>Monmouth College</i> , Leader	
Paper: "The Biblical Basis for Natural Theology"	
Arthur Munk, <i>Albion College</i>	
Discussion: Albion King, <i>Cornell College</i> , Leader	

Evening Session, 7:30 P.M. West Room

Presiding: Joseph L. Mihelic, <i>University of Dubuque</i> , Vice-President, Midwestern Section, NABI	
The Presidential Address: "The Law of God and National Security"	
Phillips Moulton, <i>Wesley College</i>	
Slide Lecture: "Current Archeological Exploration and the Bible"	
Edward Campbell, <i>McCormick Theological Seminary</i>	

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1961

Morning Session, 9:00 A.M.	West Room
Presiding: Phillips Moulton, <i>Wesley College</i> , President, Midwestern Section, NABI	
Paper: "The Possibility of a Non-Christian Salvation"	
Woodbridge Johnson, <i>Park College</i>	
Discussion: Eugene Conover, <i>Lindenwood College</i> , Leader	

THE ASSOCIATION

Paper: "Existentialism, Religion, and the Bible"
John Wild, Northwestern University

Discussion: Emerson Shideler, Iowa State University, Leader

Afternoon Session, 3:00 P.M. West Room
Chicago Society for Biblical Research. (Joint Session with Midwestern Section, NABI).
Presiding: J. Coert Rylaarsdam, University of Chicago
Paper: "The Origin of Yom Yahweh"

F. W. Boelter, Evangelical Theological Seminary

Paper: "The Sabbath Laws of the Qumranites"
Judah M. Rosenthal, The College of Jewish Studies

Paper: "New Testament History After Acts"
Floyd V. Filson, McCormick Theological Seminary

Respectfully submitted,
LEO H. PHILLIPS, Secretary

CONTENTS—concluded

ELLUL, JACQUES, THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF LAW.....	257
By L. Harold DeWolf	
KITAGAWA, JOSEPH M., RELIGIONS OF THE EAST.....	258
By David G. Bradley	
MOREAU, JULES LAURENCE, LANGUAGE AND RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE.....	260
By Arthur W. Munk	
KIMPEL, BEN, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.....	261
By Charles E. Crain	
BOISEN, ANTON T., OUT OF THE DEPTHS.....	263
By Clyde J. Steckel	
BULTMANN, RUDOLF, THIS WORLD AND THE BEYOND.....	264
By Thomas A. Langford	
RITSCHL, DIETRICH, A THEOLOGY OF PROCLAMATION.....	265
By Clyde A. Holbrook	
DENBEAUX, FRED, THE ART OF CHRISTIAN DOUBT.....	267
By William Hordern	
DE LA BEDOYERE, MICHAEL, FRANCOIS DE SALES.....	268
STOPI, ELISABETH, ST. FRANCIS DE SALES: SELECTED LETTERS.....	268
By Joseph Politella	
SHORTER NOTICES:	
METZGER, BRUCE M., ED., INDEX TO PERIODICAL LITERATURE ON THE APOSTLE PAUL	270
By Lindsey P. Pherigo	
DE CHARDIN, PIERRE TEILHARD, THE DIVINE MILIEU.....	271
By Robert L. Ferm	
LLOYD, ROGER, THE BORDERLAND.....	271
By W. Gordon Ross	
SWIHART, ALTMAN K., LUTHER AND THE LUTHERAN CHURCH, 1483-1960.....	271
By Hans J. Hillerbrand	
BOOKS RECEIVED.....	273
THE ASSOCIATION:	
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE MIDWESTERN SECTION (1961).....	275

NOTES AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

(Secretaries of NABI Sections and others with Association responsibilities are urged to make use of the *Journal* for notification purposes.)

Any member of the NABI who is prepared to read a paper at the National Meeting to be held at Concordia Theological Seminary, Saint Louis, Mo. on December 29-30, 1961 is urged to communicate with the Program Chairman, Fred D. Gealy, Methodist Theological School in Ohio, Delaware, Ohio concerning the possibility of having a place on the program.

The Office of the Placement Chairman of the NABI has on file names of over fifty candidates for teaching positions in the fields of Bible and Religion. Information on these candidates may be obtained by writing to the Placement Chairman, Robert T. Osborn, Box 3735, Duke Station, Durham, North Carolina.

NELS F. S. FERRÉ

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sense that one is in the presence of a
prophet and a man of God"—WILLIAM BARCLAY

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